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Abstract
We present a logic for reasoning about pairs of interactive quantum programs – quantum rela-
tional Hoare logic (qRHL). This logic follows the spirit of probabilistic relational Hoare logic (Barthe
et al. 2009) and allows us to formulate how the outputs of two quantum programs relate given the
relationship of their inputs. Probabilistic RHL was used extensively for computer-verified security
proofs of classical cryptographic protocols. Since pRHL is not suitable for analyzing quantum cryp-
tography, we present qRHL as a replacement, suitable for the security analysis of post-quantum
cryptography and quantum protocols. The design of qRHL poses some challenges unique to the
quantum setting, e.g., the definition of equality on quantum registers. Finally, we implemented a
tool for verifying proofs in qRHL and developed several example security proofs in it.
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1 Introduction
Handwritten security proofs of cryptographic protocols are inherently error prone – mistakes may and
most likely will happen, and they can stay unnoticed for years. (The most striking examples are probably
the OAEP construction [12] whose proof went through a number of fixes [42, 30, 31] until it was finally
formally proven in [6] after years of industrial use, and the PRF/PRP switching lemma which was
a standard textbook example for many years before it was shown that the standard proof is flawed
[13].) This undermines the purpose of said proofs. In order to enable high trust in our cryptographic
protocols, computer-aided verification is the method of choice. Methods for the security analysis of
protocols have a long history in the formal methods community, starting with the seminal paper by
Dolev and Yao [27]. However, most methods were designed using so-called symbolic abstractions that
abstract away from the details of the cryptographic algorithms by treating messages as terms with
well-defined adversarial deduction rules. There is no formal justification for this (except in cases where
“computational soundness” proofs exist, see [1] and follow-up work). To avoid this heuristic, or for
reasoning about the basic cryptographic constructions themselves (e.g., when designing an encryption
scheme), we need verification methods that allow us to reason about cryptographic protocols in a fine-
grained way, treating computations as what they are: time-bounded probabilistic computations (we call
this the “computational model”).
In recent years, a number of logics and tools have been presented for reasoning about cryptographic
protocols in the computational model. For example, the CryptoVerif tool [17, 25] employs a heuristic
search using special rewriting rules to simplify a protocol into a trivial one. The CertiCrypt tool [5,
19] and its easier to use EasyCrypt successor [7, 9] allow us to reason about pairs of programs (that
represent executions of cryptographic protocols) using “probabilistic relational Hoare logic” (pRHL).
Proofs in the EasyCrypt tool are developed manually, using backwards reasoning with a set of special
tactics for reasoning about pRHL judgments.
All those tools only consider classical cryptography. In recent years, interest in quantum cryptography,
both in research and in industry, has surged. Quantum cryptography is concerned with the development
of protocols that are secure even against attacks using quantum computers, to ensure that we can
securely use cryptography in the future (post-quantum cryptography). And quantum cryptography is
concerned with the design of quantum protocols that make active use of quantum mechanics in their
communication, such as quantum key distribution protocols (an area pioneered by [14]). While these
are two different concerns involving different technologies, there is a large overlap at least in the analysis
and proof techniques.
Can we formalize quantum cryptographic proofs using the existing tools? For quantum protocols,
the answer is clearly no, because the tools do not even allow us to encode the quantum operations
performed in the protocol. Yet, when it comes to post-quantum security, the protocols themselves are
purely classical and can be modeled in tools such as EasyCrypt, only the adversaries (which stay abstract
anyway) cannot. Thus, even though existing tools were not designed with post-quantum security in mind,
it is conceivable that the logics underlying those tools happen to be sound in the quantum setting. The
logic might happen to only contain deduction rules that also happen to be valid with respect to quantum
adversaries. Unfortunately, at least for the EasyCrypt tool, we show that this is not the case. We proved
in EasyCrypt the security of a simple protocol (an execution of the CHSH game [22]) which we know
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not to be secure in the quantum setting. (For more details, see below in Section 1.2.)
Thus the question arises: can we design tools for the verification of quantum cryptography? (Both
for post-quantum security proofs, and for actual quantum protocols.) What underlying logics should we
use? In this paper, we set out to answer that question.
Our main contribution is the development of a logic for relating quantum programs, quantum re-
lational Hoare logic (qRHL). qRHL generalizes the probabilistic logic pRHL used by EasyCrypt and
CertiCrypt, and allows us to reason about the relationship between quantum programs. We have imple-
mented a theorem prover for qRHL programs, and have analyzed quantum teleportation and a simple
post-quantum secure protocol with it, to demonstrate the applicability of qRHL to the formal verification
of quantum cryptography.
We now describe the contributions in more detail. For this, we first review classical RHL. (Followed
by an overview over quantum RHL, of our tools and experiments, related work, and the outline for the
rest of the paper.)
1.1 Classical RHL
Deterministic RHL. The simplest case of RHL is deterministic RHL [15]. Deterministic RHL allows
us to relate two deterministic programs. In our context, a program is always a program in some imperative
programming language, operating on a finite set of variables. Consider two programs c1 and c2, operating
on variables x,y, . . . An RHL judgment is an expression {A}c1 ∼ c2{B} where A and B are Boolean
predicates involving the variables from c1 and c2 (tagged with index 1 and 2, respectively). For example
A might be x1 = x2, and B might be x1 > x2. Then {A}c1 ∼ c2{B} has the following meaning: If the
initial memories m1,m2 of c1 and c2 satisfy the predicate A, then the memories m′1,m′2 after execution
of c1 and c2, respectively, satisfy B.
Definition 1: Deterministic RHL, informal
{A}c1 ∼ c2{B} holds iff: For any memories m1,m2 such that JAKm1m2 = true, we have JBKm′1m′2 =
true where m′1 := Jc1K(m1) and m′2 := Jc2K(m2).
In this definition, a memory mi is simply an assignment from variables x,y, . . . to their contents. AndJAKm1m2 is the evaluation of the predicate A with the contents of memory m1 assigned to the variables
x1,y1, . . . and the contents of m2 to variables x2,y2, . . . (That is, in a predicate A, we add indices 1, 2
to the variables x,y to distinguish the variables of c1 and c2.) And Jc1K(m1) represents the content of
the memory after running c1 on initial memory m1. (That is, Jc1K is the denotational semantics of a
deterministic programming language.)
For example, {x1 = x2}x← x+ 1 ∼ x← x− 1{x1 > x2} says that if the variable x has the same
value in memory m1 and m2, and we increase x in m1 and decrease x in m2 (resulting in memories
m′1,m
′
2, respectively), then x in m′1 is greater than x in m′2.
Given this definition of RHL, we can then prove a suitable collection of sound rules such as, e.g.,
A =⇒ A′ {A′}c1 ∼ c2{B}
{A}c1 ∼ c2{B}
. These rules can then be used to prove complex relationships between de-
terministic programs.
Probabilistic RHL. Deterministic RHL as described in the previous paragraph can reason only about
deterministic programs. At first glance, it may seem that it is easy to generalize RHL to the proba-
bilistic case (pRHL). However, there are some subtleties in the definition of pRHL. Consider the pro-
gram c that assigns a uniformly random bit to x. In this case, is the following pRHL judgment true?
{true}c ∼ c{x1 = x2}. That is, if we have two programs that pick a random bit, should pRHL say that
after the execution, the bit is the same? At the first glace, one might expect that the answer should be
“no” because x1 and x2 are chosen independently and thus equal only with probability 12 . However, if we
define pRHL that way, we cannot express the fact that the two programs c do the same. We might argue
that x1 = x2 should just mean that x is chosen according to the same distribution in both programs.
The formalization of pRHL from [5] takes exactly this approach. They define pRHL as follows:
Definition 2: Probabilistic RHL, informal
{A}c1 ∼ c2{B} holds iff: For any memories m1,m2 such that JAKm1m2 = true, there exists a distribu-
tion µ′ on pairs of memories such that: JBKm′1m′2 = true for all (m′1,m′2) ∈ suppµ′, and µ′1 = Jc1K(m1)
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and µ′2 = Jc2K(m2).
Here suppµ′ is the support of µ′, i.e., the set of all (m′1,m′2) that have non-zero probability according to
µ′. And Jc1K(m1) is the probability distribution of the memory after executing c1 with initial memory
m1. And µ′1 and µ′2 refer to the marginal distributions of µ′ that return the first and second memory,
respectively.
What does this definition say, intuitively? It requires that there is some hypothetical joint distribution
µ′ on pairs of memories (that satisfy the postcondition B) such that the final memories of c1 and c2
are distributed according to the marginals of µ′. In other words, it requires that there is some way of
choosing the randomness of c1 and c2 in a joint way such that B becomes true. For example, when c picks
a uniformly random bit x, we can chose µ′ as the uniform distribution on {(0, 0), (1, 1)} (where we write
0 and 1 for the memory that assigns 0 or 1, respectively, to x). Then the two marginal distributions are
the uniform distribution, thus µ′1 = JcK(m1) and µ′2 = JcK(m2), and we have that all (m1,m2) ∈ suppµ′
satisfy B := (x1 = x2). This implies that {true}c ∼ c{x1 = x2}. A curiosity is that the following
judgment is also true: {true}c∼ c{x1 6= x2} (choose µ′ as the uniform distribution on {(0, 1), (1, 0)}).
In particular, the following rule does not hold for pRHL (but it does hold for deterministic RHL):
{A}c1 ∼ c2{B1} {A}c1 ∼ c2{B2}
{A}c1 ∼ c2{B1 ∧B2}
. Reference [5] derives a number of useful rules for pRHL. Using these
rules, one can derive complex relationships between probabilistic programs. For example, the successful
EasyCrypt tool [7, 9] uses these to prove the security of various cryptographic schemes.
pRHL is well-suited for formalizing cryptographic security proofs because those proofs usually proceed
by transforming the initial protocol (formulated as a program, called a “game”) in a sequence of small
steps to a trivial protocol, and the relationship between any two of those games can be analyzed using
pRHL.
1.2 Quantum RHL
The need for a new logic. To illustrate that a new logic is needed, even if we consider only classical
protocols (but quantum adversaries, i.e., post-quantum cryptography), we analyzed the CHSH game [22,
23] in EasyCrypt. In this game, two potentially malicious parties Alice and Bob may share a state but
are not allowed to communicate. Alice and Bob get uniformly random bits x, y, respectively, and have to
respond with bits a, b, respectively. They win iff a⊕ b = x · y. In the classical setting, the probability of
winning is at most 34 , while in the quantum setting, it is known that the maximum winning probability
is cos2(pi/8) ≈ 0.85 [21, 23]. The CHSH game can be seen as a particularly simple case of a multi-prover
proof system, see [23].
In EasyCrypt, we show that no adversary (consisting of Alice and Bob) can win the CHSH game with
probability greater than 34 . Since a quantum adversary would be able to get a larger success probability,
this shows that the logic employed by EasyCrypt indeed assumes that adversaries are classical. And if
we use EasyCrypt to reason about quantum adversaries, it will give unsound results.
We stress that this is not a flaw in EasyCrypt. It was never claimed that EasyCrypt models quantum
adversaries. However, since the logic used by EasyCrypt is not known to be complete, it could have been
that all rules hold “by accident” also in the quantum setting. The CHSH example shows that this is not
the case.
The code of the EasyCrypt development can be found at [46].
In addition, we performed a similar proof (also of the the CHSH game) in the CryptHOL framework
[11], with analogous results. The resulting Isabelle theory can be found at [47].
We would like to address one common fallacy in this context: to prove post-quantum security, we could
just use existing tools (and proofs) and strengthen them simply by limiting the hardness assumptions
to quantum-safe hardness assumptions (e.g., we do not use the hardness of factoring numbers, but, for
example, the hardness of certain lattice problems as our underlying assumption). Unfortunately, this
does not work. The underlying argument “if X is proven secure classically based on assumption Y ,
and Y is quantum-safe, then X is post-quantum secure” is a common fallacy. Examples of protocols
with classical security proofs that are insecure against quantum adversaries, even when instantiated
with quantum hard assumptions, can be found, e.g., in [2]. Also, the CHSH game above constitutes a
degenerate counterexample to this fallacy: It can be seen as a multiplayer cryptographic protocol1 that
needs no assumptions, thus “hardening” the assumptions would not change anything, so the above fallacy
would tell us that CHSH itself is quantum-secure. Which it is not.
1Where security means that the adversary cannot win with probability greater 3/4.
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Quantum programs. In order to develop a quantum variant of pRHL, we first need to fix the language
used for describing quantum programs. We make the following design choices: Our language is a simple
imperative programming language (similar to the language pWhile underlying pRHL) with both classical
and quantum variables. We model only classical control (i.e., conditions in if- and while-statements
depend only on classical variables). This is sufficient for our use case of modeling quantum cryptography,
since protocols in that field are typically described by semi-formal pseudocode with classical control,
and with mixed classical and quantum operations. The language supports classical random sampling,2
application of unitaries, projective measurements. For simplicity, we do not model procedure calls.
However, we expect that adding procedures would not lead to any difficulties. Since we do not include
any advanced language features, the semantics of the language are easily defined: The denotational
semantics JcK of a quantum program c is described by a function that maps quantum states (the state of
the memory before execution) to quantum states (the state of the memory after execution). Here quantum
states are described by density operators (mixed states) since the language contains probabilistic elements
(random sampling, measurement outcomes); density operators intuitively model probability distributions
of quantum states. The details of the language and its semantics are given in Section 3.
Quantum RHL – predicates. To extend pRHL to the quantum setting, we need to give meaning to
judgments of the form {A}c ∼ d{B} where c,d are quantum programs. For this, we need to answer two
questions: How are the predicates (pre- and post-conditions) A,B formalized (i.e., what mathematical
structure describes A,B)? And what is the semantics of the overall qRHL judgment {A}c ∼ d{B}?
In classical RHL (both the deterministic and pRHL), predicates are Boolean predicates on pairs of
memories m1,m2 (cf. the notation introduced after Definition 1). Equivalently, we can see a predicate A
as a set of pairs of memories, and a distribution µ′ over pairs of memories (cf. Definition 2) satisfies A
iff suppµ′ ⊆ A.
For formalizing quantum predicates A, there are two natural choices:
(a) A could be represented as a set of density operators (mixed states)3 (possibly subject to some natural
closure properties, e.g., closure under multiplication with a scalar). And then ρ satisfies A iff ρ ∈ A.
(b) A could be represented as a set of pure states4 (possibly subject to some natural closure properties,
e.g., a subspace of the Hilbert space of pure quantum states). Then ρ satisfies A iff supp ρ ⊆ A.
Here supp ρ is the support of ρ. (Intuitively, ρ is a probability distribution over states in supp ρ.
For a formal definition see the preliminaries.)
Obviously, approach (a) is the more general approach. However, in this work, we will model predicates
as subspaces of pure states, following approach (b). The reason for this is that we would like two
properties to be satisfied:
• If ρ1 and ρ2 both satisfy A, then p1ρ1 + p2ρ2 satisfies A.
For example, consider a program c that runs c1 with probability p1, and c2 with probability p2.
Assume that c1 and c2 both have final states ρ1, ρ2 that satisfy A. Then we would expect that c
also has a final state that satisfies A. This is guaranteed if p1ρ1 + p2ρ2 satisfies A.
• If p1ρ1 + p2ρ2 satisfies A (for p1, p2 > 0), then ρ1 and ρ2 both satisfy A.
For example, consider a program if b then c else d, and an initial state ρ = p1ρ1 + p2ρ2 where ρ1
satisfies the condition b, and ρ2 satisfies ¬b. Let A be some predicate that ρ satisfies. (E.g., the
ρ1, ρ2 could differ in the value of a classical variable that the predicate A does not even talk about.)
Then we would expect that after branching depending on b, at the beginning of the execution of c
and d, respectively, A is still satisfied. That is, ρ1 and ρ2 still satisfy A. (This is the basis of, for
example, the If1 rule in our logic.)
The only sets that satisfy both conditions are those represented by a subspace (at least in the finite
dimensional case, see Section B.2 for a proof).
That is, a predicate A is a subspace of the Hilbert space of quantum states, and each ψ ∈ A is a pure
quantum state over two memories (i.e., a superposition of states |m1,m2〉 where m1,m2 are classical
memories that assign classical values to all variables of c and d, respectively).
2Although random sampling can be encoded by a combination of unitaries and measurements, random sampling is so
common in cryptography that we prefer to include it explicitly.
3Density operators are a formalism for describing quantum states where a quantum state is represented by a positive
Hermitian operator. This formalism allows us to model probabilistic mixtures of quantum states (roughly speaking,
probability distributions over quantum states). See, e.g., [37, Chapter 2.4].
4Pure states are states that are represented as vectors in a Hilbert space. This more elementary formalism cannot
represent probability distributions. Pure states can be seen as special cases of density operators (of rank 1). See, e.g., [37,
Chapter 2.2].
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The precise definition of predicates will look somewhat different because of a special treatment of
classical variables in our predicates. This is, however, just for notational convenience and will be explained
in Section 4.
Note that our reasoning above introduced one implicit assumption: Namely that we want to model
predicates for which “ρ satisfies A” is either true or false. Instead, it would be possible to have predicates
that are fulfilled to a certain amount (say between 0 and 1). For example, the quantum predicates
modeled by D’Hondt and Panangaden [26] are Hermitian operators, and a state ρ satisfies a predicate A
to the amount trAρ. Hoare judgments then encode the fact that the postcondition is satisfied at least
as much as the precondition. We have opted not to pursue this approach in this paper (in particular
because the resulting predicates are harder to understand, and we would also deviate more strongly from
the design choices made in pRHL and EasyCrypt), but it would be interesting future work to explore
such predicates in the relational setting.
To actually work with predicates, we introduce some syntactic sugar. For example, Cla[b] is the
space of all states where the classical variables satisfy the predicate b. (E.g., Cla[x1 = x2 + 1] relates two
classical variables.) This allows us to express all classical predicates with minimal overhead. And A∩B
is simply the intersection of two predicates, which is the analogue to classical conjunction ∧.
Quantum RHL – judgments. We now explain our definition of qRHL judgments. The first attempt
would be to generalize the classical definition (Definition 2) to the quantum case by replacing classical
objects by their quantum counterparts. For example, the natural quantum analogue for a probability
distribution over some set X is a density operator on a Hilbert space with basis X. To get this analogue,
we first restate Definition 2 in an equivalent way:
Definition 3: Probabilistic RHL, informal
{A}c1 ∼ c2{B} holds iff: For any distribution µ on pairs of memories with suppµ ⊆ A, there exists a
distribution µ′ on pairs of memories with suppµ′ ⊆ B such that µ′1 = Jc1K(µ1) and µ′2 = Jc2K(µ2).
Here – in slight abuse of notation – we consider the predicate A as the set of all pairs of memories that
satisfy this predicate. And µ1, µ2, µ′1, µ′2 are the first and second marginals of the distributions µ and
µ′, respectively. And we lift the denotational semantics J·K to distributions in a natural way: Jc1K(µ1) is
the distribution of the memory after the execution of c1 if the memory was distributed according to µ1
before the distribution.
In comparison with Definition 2, instead of deterministic initial memories m1,m2, we allow distribu-
tions µ of pairs of initial memories. It is easy to see that this definition is equivalent to Definition 2.
However, the new definition has the advantage of being more symmetric (we use distributions both for
the input and the output), and that it is more obvious how to transfer it to the quantum case.
If we restate this definition in the quantum case in the natural way, we get:
Definition 4: Quantum RHL, first try, informal
Let A,B be quantum predicates (represented as subspaces, see above).
{A}c1 ∼ c2{B}nonsep holds iff: For any density operator ρ over pairs of memories with supp ρ ⊆ A,
there exists a density operator ρ′ over pairs of memories with supp ρ′ ⊆ B such that ρ′1 = Jc1K(ρ1)
and ρ′2 = Jc2K(ρ2).
Here we replace the distribution µ by a density operator ρ. That is, we consider a quantum system where
we have two memories, and the system can be in arbitrary superpositions and probabilistic mixtures of
classical assignments to the variables in these memories. (Formally, a memory is a function mapping
variables to values, and we consider a quantum system with basis |m1,m2〉, where m1,m2 range over all
such functions.)
Then ρ1 denotes the density operator resulting from tracing out the second subsystem (i.e., the result
of “destroying” the second memory), and analogously for ρ2, ρ′1, ρ′2.
And supp ρ is the support of ρ, i.e., it contains all pure states that the mixed state ρ is a mixture of.
(Formally, the support also contains linear combinations of those pure states, but that does not make a
difference in the present case, since A and B are closed under linear combinations anyway.) Note that
a state ρ with marginals ρ1, ρ2 is called a quantum coupling of ρ1, ρ2 (see, e.g., [58]). So the definition
could be rephrased compactly as: “If the initial states of c,d have a quantum coupling with support in
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A, then the final states have a quantum coupling with support in B.” Similarly, our other variants of
qRHL can be straightforwardly stated in terms of quantum couplings.
At first glance, Definition 4 seems to be a reasonable analogue of pRHL in the quantum setting. At
least, it seems to convey the same intuition. However, when we try to derive a suitable set of rules for
qRHL judgments, we run into trouble. For example, we were not able to prove the following frame rule:
Frame (simplified)
{A}c ∼ d{B}nonsep variables in R are disjoint from variables in c,d, A,B
{A ∩R}c ∼ d{B ∩R}nonsep
This rule is crucial for compositional reasoning: It tells us that any predicate that is independent of the
programs under consideration (e.g., one that is only important for a program executed before or after)
will be preserved. (Note that we were not able to prove that the frame rule does not hold for Definition 4,
yet we conjecture that it does not.)
There are a number of natural variations of Definition 4 that can be tried, but for most of them,
we either failed to prove the frame rule, or we run into problems when trying to prove rules involving
predicates that state the equality of quantum variables (see below). We discuss the various unsuccessful
approaches in Section 5.3, since we believe that it is important to understand why we chose the definition
in this paper.
The approach that turned out to work (in the sense that we can derive a useful set of rules), is to use
the Definition 4, with the only difference that we quantify over separable states ρ and ρ′ only. That is,
we only consider states where the memories of the two programs are not entangled. (We stress that we
do not restrict the entanglement within the programs, only between the programs. In particular, there
are no restrictions on algorithms that use entanglement.) That is, the definition of qRHL is:
Definition 5: Quantum RHL, informal
Let A,B be quantum predicates (represented as subspaces, see above).
{A}c1 ∼ c2{B} holds iff: For any separable density operator ρ over pairs of memories with
supp ρ ⊆ A, there exists a separable density operator ρ′ over pairs of memories with supp ρ′ ⊆ B
such that ρ′1 = Jc1K(ρ1) and ρ′2 = Jc2K(ρ2).
Note that the only difference to Definition 4 is the occurrence of the word “separable” (twice).
With this definition (stated formally in Section 5, Definition 35), we get a suitable set of rules for
reasoning about pairs of programs (frame rule, rules for predicates involving equality, rules for reasoning
about the different statements in quantum programs, case distinction, sequential composition, etc.)
Relationship to classical pRHL. By considering programs that contain no quantum instructions or
quantum variables, and by considering only pre-/postconditions of the form Cla[a], we get a definition of a
classical relational Hoare logic as a special case. As it turns out, all three variants of qRHL (Definition 4,
Definition 5, and a third approach discussed in Section 5.3) specialize to the same variant of pRHL,
namely the original pRHL (as in Definition 2). (Shown in Section 5.2.)
On coupling proofs. [10] and [8] elaborate on the connection between pRHL and so-called probabilis-
tic couplings. It is often asked whether couplings can also be used as the basis for qRHL. The approach
of [10] uses the fact that pRHL by definition guarantees that there exists a probabilistic coupling for the
output distributions of the programs that are related via a pRHL judgment, thus pRHL can be used to
derive the existence of couplings with certain properties. This observation carries over immediately to
qRHL because qRHL by definition implies the existence of quantum couplings. (In fact, the use cases
from [10] can be expressed in qRHL as easily. An interesting question is, of course, whether interesting
purely quantum use cases can be found where this method is fruitful.) So in that sense, the answer is
“yes”, qRHL is based on couplings.
On the other hand [8] defines a new logic in which an explicit product program is constructed that
produces the coupling. (This is then shown to be equivalent to the original pRHL, but having explicit
access to this program has various advantages detailed in [8].) Unfortunately, this approach most likely
does not carry over to the quantum setting. In fact, one of the qRHL variants (Definition 41) that we
explored is the quantum equivalent of this approach. We show that this approach is incompatible with
the notion of a quantum equality (see below). Details are given in Section 5.3.
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Quantum equality. Using the approach from the previous paragraphs, we have a working definition of
qRHL judgments, and a formalism for describing pre- and postconditions as subspaces. We can express
arbitrary conditions on classical variables (in particular, we can express that x1 = x2 for variables
x1,x2 of the left and right program, respectively). However, we cannot yet conveniently relate quantum
variables in the left and the right program. That is, we cannot express judgments such as, for example:
{q1 ≡quant q2}c ∼ skip{q′1 ≡quant q2}
where c swaps q1 and q′1. Here ≡quant denotes some (yet to be formalized) equality notion on quantum
states.
Note that even if our goal is to use qRHL only for security proofs in post-quantum cryptography
we need a notion of quantum equality: In this setting, all protocols contain only classical variables, but
the adversary will contain quantum variables. In this context, typical predicates (almost ubiquitous in
classical EasyCrypt proofs) are of the form: A ∧ y1 = y2 where y1,y2 refers to the global state of the
adversary in the left/right program, and A is some predicate on program variables. In the post-quantum
setting, y1,y2 will be quantum variables, and we need to express quantum equality.
So, how can quantum equality be defined? In other words, what is the formal meaning of q1 ≡quant q2
as a quantum predicate where q1,q2 are quantum variables (or, in the general case, sequences of quantum
variables)? If we do not limit ourselves to predicates that are represented by subspaces (i.e., if a predicate
can be represented as an arbitrary set of density operators), several natural equality notions exist:
(a) ρ satisfies q1 ≡quant q2 iff ρq1 = ρq2 where ρq1 , ρq2 are the density operators resulting from tracing
out all registers except q1,q2, respectively.
(b) ρ satisfies q1 ≡quant q2 iff ρ is invariant under swapping q1 and q2. That is ρ = UρU† where U is
the unitary that swaps q1 and q2.
(c) ρ satisfies q1 ≡quant q2 iff ρ is a mixture of states that are fixed under swapping q1 and q2. That is,
for all ψ ∈ supp ρ, Uψ = ψ.5
Out of these three, only (c) is a predicate in our sense (i.e., described by a subspace). In fact, we
conjecture that (c) is the only notion of equality of quantum variables that can be represented as a
subspace and that has the following property (we give partial formal evidence for this in Section B.1):{
Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Q1 ≡quant Q2)
}
c ∼ c{Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Q1 ≡quant Q2)}
Here X,Q are the classical and quantum variables of c, respectively. (And X1, X2, Q1, Q2 are those
variables indexed with 1 and 2, respectively). This rule says that, if all variables of c on the left and
right are the same before running c on both sides, then they are the same afterwards, too. This is an
essential property a notion of equality should satisfy.
Thus we get the following notion of quantum equality (formulated slightly more generally than in (c)):
Definition 6: Quantum equality, informal
The predicate (q(1)1 q
(2)
1 . . . ≡quant q(1)2 q(2)2 . . . ) is the subspace {ψ : Uψ = ψ} where U is the unitary
that swaps registers q(1)1 q
(2)
1 . . . with the registers q
(1)
2 q
(2)
2 . . .
An example for a state satisfying q1 ≡quant q2 would be ψ1⊗ψ2⊗φ where ψ1 and ψ2 are the same state
on q1 and q2, respectively.
This quantum equality allows us to express, for example, relations of the form
(“some predicate on classical variables” ∩ q1 ≡quant q2) which will be enough for many proofs in
post-quantum cryptography. (We give an example of such a proof in Section 6.3.) More generally,
however, we might wish for more expressivity. For example, we might wish to express that if q1 ≡quant q2,
and then we apply the Hadamard H to q1, then afterwards q1 equals “H applied to q2”. We generalize
the definition of ≡quant to cover such cases, too. Intuitively, (U1 q(1)1 q(2)1 . . . ≡quant U2 q(1)2 q(2)2 . . . )
means that the variables q(1)1 q
(2)
1 . . . , when we apply the unitary U1 to them, equal the variables q
(1)
2 q
(2)
2
when we apply the unitary U2 to them. We defer the details of the definition to Section 4.4. We only
mention that, for example, U−11 ψ1 ⊗ U−12 ψ2 ⊗ φ satisfies the predicate U1q1 ≡quant U2q2.
5This is not the same as (b), even though it looks similar. For example, if ψ := 1√
2
|01〉q1q2 − 1√2 |10〉q1q2 , and
ρ := proj(ψ) := ψ∗ψ is the corresponding density operator, then UρU† = ρ, hence ρ satisfies q1 ≡quant q2 according to (b),
but Uψ = −ψ 6= ψ and ψ ∈ supp ρ, so ρ does not satisfy q1 ≡quant q2 according to (c).
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Incompleteness. While we prove the soundness of all rules in this paper, we do not strive to achieve
completeness. (Incompleteness of pRHL was noted in [8] and carries over to our setting.) In fact, we
cannot expect completeness (except for restricted classes of programs) since equivalence even of programs
is not semidecidable.
1.3 Tool & experiments
We develop an interactive theorem prover for reasoning about qRHL. The tool consists of three main
components: a ProofGeneral [45] frontend, the core tool written in Scala, and an Isabelle/HOL [38]
backend for solving subgoals in the ambient logic (i.e., subgoals that do not contain qRHL judgments).
The ProofGeneral frontend eases the interactive development of proofs. The Isabelle backend can also
be accessed directly (via accompanying Isabelle theory files) to prove verification conditions that are
beyond the power of our core tool.
We stress that although we use Isabelle/HOL as a backend, this does not mean that our tool is an
LCF-style theorem prover (i.e., one that breaks down all proofs to elementary mathematical proof steps).
All tactics in the tool, and many of the simplification rules in Isabelle are axiomatized (and backed by
the proofs in this paper).
We developed a number of examples in our tool:
• A security proof that the encryption scheme defined by enc(k,m) := m ⊕ G(k) is ROR-OT-CPA
secure.6 (Where G is a pseudorandom generator.)
• A security proof that the same encryption scheme is IND-OT-CPA secure. These two proofs are
typical examples of reasoning in post-quantum security where quantum variables occur only inside
the adversary, and where we maintain the invariant Q1 ≡quant Q2 where Q1, Q2 are all quantum
variables.
• A simple example illustrating the interplay of quantum equality and the applications of unitaries.
• A proof that quantum teleportation works. That is, we show {q1 = q2}cteleport ∼ skip{q′1 = q2}
where cteleport is the program that teleports a qubit from q to q′. This proof involves reasoning
about quantum equality, measurements, unitary operations, initializations, as well as interaction
between our tool and Isabelle/HOL for non-trivial subgoals.
See the manual included with the tool for a description of the architecture of the tool, documen-
tation of its use, and details on the examples. The source code is published on GitHub [52], a binary
distribution is available at [53]. Note that the tool currently (version 0.3) only supports the rules Seq,
Equal, Conseq, QrhlElimEq, Skip, Assign1/2, Sample1/2, JointSample, Case, QApply1/2,
QInit1/2, Measure1/2.
On advanced cryptographic proofs. The simple examples presented above are, of course, only pre-
liminary indications of the usability of qRHL for quantum cryptography. The study of complex quantum
protocols (e.g., quantum key distribution) is out of the scope of this first work. For post-quantum cryp-
tography (i.e., the security of classical protocols against quantum adversaries), our examples studying
an encryption scheme indicate that derivations of qRHL judgments involving classical programs (but
quantum adversaries) are very similar to those that would be performed in EasyCrypt (except, of course,
that the EasyCrypt tool is more mature). See the example in Section 6.3. An exception to this are
post-quantum security proofs which need to explicitly reason about quantum properties (even in the
pen-and-paper proof). Typically, these are proofs involving rewinding (e.g., [54, 49]) or quantum ran-
dom oracles (e.g., [18, 48, 57]). As far as we know, proofs involving rewinding have not even been modeled
classically in EasyCrypt, so it would be premature to speculate on how difficult these would be in qRHL.
Proof involving the quantum random oracle model are currently very important, in particular in light of
the NIST competition for post-quantum cryptography. Quantum random oracles are challenging because
the adversary has superposition access to the oracle. Modeling the quantum random oracle is easy in
our setting,7 the challenge lies in reasoning about it. So-called history free reductions [18] (in which the
6IND-OT-CPA is indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks (e.g., [33, Def. 3.22]) for one-time encryption.
ROR-OT-CPA is a different formulation of the same property.
7If h is a classical variable of type X → Y , then a random oracle can modeled by the program h $← uniform (where
the expression uniform is the uniform distribution on X → Y ) for initialization, and apply x,y to Uh (where Uf is the
unitary |x, y〉→ |x, y ⊕ f(x)〉) for queries.
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random oracle is replaced by a differently chosen but equally distributed function) should be relatively
easy, because in those cases the distribution of the random oracle after replacement is the same as before,
so no quantum-specific reasoning is needed. (We checked this by implementing a very small such proof
in our tool, random-oracle.qrhl, where the adversary cannot distinguish between those two cases given
one query to the random oracle.) However, most post-quantum security proofs in the quantum random
oracle model need more advanced techniques, such as, e.g., semi-constant distributions [57], one-way-
to-hiding lemmas [51], oracle indistinguishability [56], etc. Whether (and how) those techniques can be
incorporated into qRHL-based proofs, or whether the logic will need to be extended to accommodate
them, will be part of our future work.
1.4 Related work
Frameworks for verification of cryptographic protocols (in the so-called computational model) include
CryptoVerif [17], CertiCrypt [5], EasyCrypt [7], FCF [39], CryptHOL [11], and Verypto [16]. However,
all of these only target classical cryptography and do not support quantum programs/protocols.
Hoare logics and weakest precondition calculi for quantum programs have been presented by D’Hondt
and Panangaden [26], Chadha, Mateus and Sernadas [20], Feng, Duan, Ji, and Ying [29], Ying [55], and
Kakutani [32]. However, these calculi do not allow us to reason about the relation between different
programs.
Those quantum Hoare logics fall into two flavours: [26, 29, 55] take a semantic approach in which a pre-
/postcondition is an arbitrary subspace (or more generally, Hermitian operator to model expectations),
while [20, 32] represent pre-/postcondition as terms of a specific (fixed) structure. Our work follows the
semantic approach.
In independent work, Zhou, Ying, Yu, and Ying [58] study quantum couplings, and also mention (in
passing) the applicability of quantum couplings to quantum relational Hoare logics. Using their notions
of couplings, the resulting definition would probably be very similar to Definition 4 (which had problems
with the frame rule, see above). Unfortunately, their results do not seem to give a method for proving
the frame rule, and their Quantum Strassen Theorem does not seem to work for quantum couplings with
separable states (as in Definition 5).
Existing approaches for computer-aided verification of the equivalence of quantum programs focus
either on the explicit calculation of the quantum state resulting from an execution of the programs,
e.g., [3, 4], or on bisimilarity of process calculi, e.g., [34, 35, 28]. Explicit calculation will work only for
finite-dimensional (and relatively small) systems, and is thus inapplicable to computational cryptography
(which has necessarily an exponentially large state space). Bisimilarity can show the exact equivalence
between two programs, but does not seem to scale well for modeling computational cryptographic proofs
(even in the classical setting, we are not aware of any nontrivial computational security proof based
purely on bisimilarity).
Several papers verify the security of the BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol. [28, 44]
show security against a very simple, specific intercept-resend attack (that measures all qubits in a random
basis), [34, 35] verify one step of the Shor-Preskill proof [41] for QKD. It is not clear whether these
approaches can scale to the full proof of QKD.
1.5 Organization
Section 2 presents notation and elementary definitions. Section 3 gives syntax and semantics of quantum
programs. Section 4 defines what a quantum predicate is and discusses constructions of quantum pred-
icates (in particular quantum equality, Section 4.4). Section 5 defines quantum relational Hoare logic
and derives reasoning rules for qRHL. Section 6 shows example derivations in our logic. Appendix A
contains the proofs of all rules. Section 5.3 discusses some alternative approaches to defining qRHL and
their problems.
An extended abstract of this paper appeared at POPL 2019 [50].
2 Preliminaries
A note on notation. Many of the proofs in this paper are notationally quite involved. This is
partly due to the fact that there are a number of isomorphic spaces (e.g., states over variables, states
over variables with index 1), and the isomorphisms need to be explicitly specified to make the proofs
logically consistent (there is too much ambiguity to leave them implicit). Similarly, some of the rules also
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contain variable renamings and isomorphisms. We recommend, upon first reading, to ignore all these
isomorphisms (specifically idx1, idx2, Urename,..., Erename,...), i.e., assume that they are the identity.
Without these, the lemmas and proofs, while not technically correct, will still contain the relevant ideas.
Basics. R are the reals, and C the complex numbers. R≥0 are the reals ≥ 0. B = {true, false} are
the Booleans. im f is the image of a function (or operator). dom f is the domain of f . f(x := y) denote
the function update. Formally
(
f(x := y)
)
(x) = y and
(
f(x := y)
)
(x′) = f(x′) for x 6= x. f |M is the
restriction of f to the set M . id denotes the identity function. 2M is the powerset of M . ◦ can refer
both to the composition of functions or of relations (i.e., R ◦R′ := {(x, z) : ∃y.(x, y) ∈ R ∧ (y, z) ∈ R′}).
Variables. A program variable x (short: variable) is an identifier annotated with a set Typex 6= ∅, and
with a flag that determined whether the variable is quantum or classical. (In our semantics, for classical
variables x the type Typex will be the set of all values a classical variable can store. Quantum variables
q can store superpositions of values in Typeq.)
We will usually denote classical variables with x,y and quantum variables with q. Given a set V of
variables, we write V cl for the classical variables in V and V qu for the quantum variables in V .
Given a set V of variables, we write TypesetV for the set of all functions f on V with f(x) ∈ Typex for
all x ∈ V . (I.e., the dependent product TypesetV =
∏
x∈V Typex.)
Intuitively, TypesetV is the set of all memories that assign a classical value to each variable in V .
For sets X,Y of variables, we call σ : X → Y a variable renaming iff σ is a bijection, and for all
x ∈ X, Typeσ(x) = Typex and σ(x) is classical iff x is classical.
Given a list V = (x1, . . . ,xn) of variables, TypelistV := Typex1 × · · · × Typexn . Note that if V is a list
with distinct elements, and V ′ is the set of those elements, then TypelistV and Type
set
V ′ are still not the same
set, but their elements can be identified canonically. Roughly speaking, for a list V , the components of
m ∈ TypelistV are indexed by natural numbers (and are therefore independent of the names of the variables
in V ), while for a set V , the components of m ∈ TypesetV are indexed by variable names.
For m1 ∈ TypesetX and m2 ∈ TypesetY with disjoint X,Y , let m1m2 be the union of the functions m1
and m2. I.e., (m1m2)(x) = m1(x) for x ∈ X and (m1m2)(x) = m2(x) for x ∈ Y .
Given disjoint sets X,Y of variables, we write XY for the union (instead of X ∪ Y ).
Distributions. Given a set X (possibly uncountable), let D(X) denote the set of all functions µ :
X → R≥0. We call the elements of D(X) distributions.8 The set of distributions with
∑
x∈X µ(x) ≤ 1
is denoted D≤1(X) (subprobability distributions). We call a distribution total if
∑
x∈X µ(x) = 1. For a
set V of variables, let D[V ] := D(TypesetV ) and D≤1[V ] := D≤1(Type
set
V ).
For µ ∈ D(X × Y ), let marginal1(µ) be the first marginal of µ, that is, marginal1(µ)(m1) :=∑
m2∈Y µ(m1,m2). And let marginal2(µ) be the second marginal of µ, that is, marginal2(µ)(m2) :=∑
m1∈X µ(m1,m2).
The support suppµ of a distribution µ is defined as suppµ := {x : µ(x) > 0}. We write δa for the
distribution with δa(a) = 1 and δa(b) = 0 for a 6= b.
Hilbert spaces. We assume an understanding of Hilbert spaces and of different operators on Hilbert
spaces. In the following, we only fix notation and ambiguous terminology. We refer the reader to a
standard textbook on functional analysis, e.g., [24], for an introduction into the concepts used here.
A reader interested only in the finite dimensional case (i.e., where all variables are defined over finite
domains) will find the fact helpful that in that case, the sets B(X) and T(X) defined below are simply
the finite |X| × |X| matrices (with rows and columns indexed by X), and A∗ is the conjugate transpose
of the matrix A. Furthermore, to interpret the results in this paper, an understanding of the basics of
quantum computing is required, see a textbook such as [37], especially Chapters 1, 2, 4, and 8.
The word subspace always refers to a topologically closed subspace, and the word basis refers to a
Hilbert basis. The word operator always refers to linear operators.
Given a set X (possibly uncountable), let `2(X) ⊆ CX be the Hilbert space of all functions ψ : X → C
such that ‖ψ‖2 := ∑x∈X |ψ(x)|2 exists. (That is, `2(X) represents pure quantum states.) Let |x〉 : X → C
denote the function defined by |x〉(x) := 1, |y〉(x) := 0 for y 6= x. The vectors |x〉 with x ∈ X form a
basis of `2(X), the computational basis. For M ⊆ `2(X), spanM denotes the smallest subspace of `2(X)
8That is, we do not consider distributions over arbitrary measurable spaces, only over discrete ones.
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containing M . For subspaces Mi of `2(X), we define
∑
iMi := span
⋃
iMi. For a subspace S ⊆ `2(X),
S⊥ denotes the orthogonal complement.
For a set V of variables, let `2[V ] := `2(TypesetV ). Intuitively, elements of `2[V ] can be thought of as
superpositions of different memories with variables V , i.e., as the set of all pure quantum states that a
memory with variables V can be in. For added clarity, we write |m〉V instead of |m〉 for the elements of
the computational basis of `2[V ]. We write idV for the identity on `2[V ].
In this notation, we can define the tensor product on Hilbert spaces of the form `2[V ] as follows: For
disjoint V1, V2, let `2[V1] ⊗ `2[V2] := `2[V1V2]. And ψ ∈ `2[V1], φ ∈ `2[V2], define ψ ⊗ φ ∈ `2[V1V2] by
(ψ ⊗ φ)(m1m2) := ψ(m1)φ(m2).
Note that this definition of the tensor product is isomorphic to the usual definition. However, our
definition “labels” the factors with variables (i.e., each variable labels a quantum register). In particular,
⊗ as defined here is commutative and associative.
Operator spaces. Let B(X,Y ) denote the set of bounded operators from `2(X) to `2(Y ). For a
bounded operator A, let A∗ denote the adjoint of A. Let B(X) := B(X,X). For a set V of variables, let
B[V,W ] := B(TypesetV ,Type
set
W ), i.e., the bounded operators from `2[V ] to `2[W ]. And B[V ] := B[V, V ].
We write idV for the identity on B[V ]. (Note: we use the same symbol as for the identity on `2[V ].)
We define B[V1,W1]⊗B[V2,W2] := B[V1V2,W1W2], and for A ∈ B[V1,W1], B ∈ B[V2,W2], we define
A⊗B ∈ B[V1V2,W1W2] as the unique bounded operator satisfying (A⊗B)(ψ ⊗ φ) := Aψ ⊗Bφ.
We say A ≤ B iff B −A is self-adjoint and positive.
We defineB≤1(X,Y ) as the bounded operators with operator norm ≤ 1. AndB≤1(X) := B≤1(X,X).
Let Iso(X,Y ) ⊆ B(X,Y ) denote the set of all isometries from `2(X) to `2(Y ), that is, operators U
with U∗U = id . (Note: we do not require UU∗ = id , i.e., we do not assume U to be a unitary.) Let
Iso[V,W ] := Iso(TypesetV ,Type
set
W ). Furthermore, Iso(X) := Iso(X,X) and Iso[V ] := Iso[V, V ].
Let U(X,Y ) ⊆ Iso(X,Y ) denote the set of all unitaries from `2(X) to `2(Y ), that is, operators U
with U∗U = id and UU∗ = id . Let U[V,W ] := U(TypesetV ,Type
set
W ). Furthermore, U(X) := U(X,X)
and U[V ] := U[V, V ].
Let T(X) ⊆ B(X) denote the set of all trace-class operators,9 and let trA denote the trace of A. Let
T+(X) ⊆ T(X) denote the positive self-adjoint trace-class operators. (I.e., A ∈ T+(X) iff there exists
B ∈ T(X) with A = B∗B.) We abbreviate T[V ] := T(TypesetV ), T+[V ] := T+(TypesetV ). (That is, T+[V ]
is the set of all mixed quantum states that a memory with variables V can be in.)
When we write
∑
i∈I ρi for some ρi ∈ T+(X), we do not assume a finite or countable set I.
∑
i ρi is
defined as the least upper bound of
∑
i∈J ρi where J ranges over all finite subsets of I.
∑
i ρi ∈ T+(X)
exists iff
∑
i tr ρi exists.
A projector is an operator P ∈ B(X) with P 2 = P = P ∗. (I.e., projectors always are orthogonal
projectors.) For ψ ∈ `2(X), let proj(ψ) := ψψ∗. (Then proj(ψ) is a projector onto span{ψ}.)
A cq-operator is an operator ρ ∈ T[V ] that can be written as ρ = ∑m proj(|m〉V cl) ⊗ ρm with
ρm ∈ T[V qu]. (“cq” stands for “classical-quantum”.) Here m ranges over TypesetV cl . (Intuitively, this means
that the classical part of the memory is m with probaility tr ρm, and in this case, the quantum part
of the memory is in state ρm/ tr ρm.) We write Tcq [V ] ⊆ T+[V ] for the set of all cq-operators. And
T+cq [V ] := Tcq [V ] ∩T+[V ].
We call an operator ρ ∈ T+[V1V2] (V1, V2)-separable iff it can be written as
∑
i ρi ⊗ ρ′i for some
ρi ∈ T+[V1] and ρ′i ∈ T+[V2]. We usually write just “separable” if V1, V2 are clear from the context.
For ρ ∈ T+(X), the support supp ρ is defined as follows: Let P be the smallest projector such
that PρP = ρ. Then supp ρ := imP . In particular, when ρ =
∑
i proj(ψi) for some ψi ∈ `2(X) (any
ρ ∈ T+(X) can be decomposed in this way), we have supp ρ = span{ψi}i.
A superoperator from V toW is a completely positive trace-decreasing10 linear map E : T[V ]→ T[W ].
A cq-superoperator is a completely positive trace-decreasing linear map E : Tcq [V ] → Tcq [W ]. A (cq-)
superoperator on V is a (cq-)superoperator from V to V .
For (cq-)superoperators E from V to V ′ and E ′ from W to W ′, let E ⊗ E ′ be the unique (cq-)
superoperator from VW to V ′W ′ with (E ⊗ E ′)(A⊗B) = E(A)⊗ E ′(B).
The trace tr : T[V ]→ C = T[∅] is in fact a superoperator (and a cq-superoperator). We can define
the partial trace tr[V ]W : T[VW ] → T[V ] as tr[V ]W = idV ⊗ tr (where tr is the trace on T[W ]). (Note:
usually, the partial trace is written simply trW , i.e., only the subsystem W that is removed is mentioned.
9Trace-class operators are operators for which the trace exists. In the finite dimensional case, every operator is trace-
class.
10I.e., tr E(ρ) ≤ tr ρ.
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However, for additional clarity, we also mention the retained subsystem V in the symbol tr[V ]W .) Note
that tr[V ]W is a superoperator and a cq-superoperator.
Let Meas(D,E) denote the set of all projective measurements on `2(E) with outcomes in D. For-
mally, Meas(D,E) is the set of functions M : D → B(E) such that M(z) is a projector for all z ∈ D,
and
∑
zM(z) ≤ id . We call a measurement M total iff
∑
zM(z) = id .
Variable-related canonical isomorphisms. For a variable renaming σ : X → Y , let Urename,σ :
`2[X] → `2[Y ] be the unitary mapping |m〉X to |m ◦ σ−1〉Y . We define the cq-superoperator Erename,σ
from X to Y by Erename,σ(ρ) := Urename,σρU∗rename,σ.
For a list of distinct quantum variables Q := q1, . . . ,qn, let the unitary Uvars,Q ∈ U(TypelistQ ,TypesetQ )
be the canonical isomorphism from `2(TypelistQ ) to `2[Q]. Formally, Uvars,Q|(q1, . . . , qn)〉 = |m〉Q where
m ∈ TypesetQ is given by m(qi) := qi.
Further notation. The following notation will be defined later in this paper (in addition to the above
and the syntax of programs in Section 3.2): A ÷ ψ in Definition 20. JeKm (semantics of expressions)
in Section 3.1. JcK(ρ) (semantics of programs) in Section 3.4. fv(e) (free variables of an expression) in
Section 3.1. fv(c) (free variables of a program) in Section 3.2. idx1, idx2 (add index 1 or 2 to each variable
in an expression or program) in Section 5. A»Q (operator/subspace A lifted to variables Q) in Defini-
tion 19. Cla[e] (classical predicates) in Definition 23. ≡quant (quantum equality) in Definitions 27 and 28.
Pr[e : c(ρ)] (probability of event e after running c) in Definition 9. Typeexpe (the type of an expression)
in Section 3.1. ↓eρ (restriction to state satisfying e) in Section 3.4. eσ (variable renaming applied to
expression) and e{e1/x1, . . . } (substitution applied to expression) in Section 3.1.
Auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 7: Schmidt decomposition
Let ψ ∈ `2[XY ]. Then ψ can be decomposed as ψ = ∑i λiψXi ⊗ ψYi for some λi > 0, orthonormal
ψXi ∈ `2[X], and orthonormal ψYi ∈ `2[Y ].
Proof. This lemma is well-known for separable Hilbert spaces (i.e., if TypesetXY is countable). A gener-
alization to the non-separable case is presented, e.g., in [36]. 
Lemma 8
Assume X,Y ⊆ V , X ∩ Y = ∅. Fix ψ ∈ `2[X], ψ′ ∈ `2[V \X], φ ∈ `2[Y ], φ′ ∈ `2[V \ Y ]. Assume
ψ ⊗ ψ′ = φ⊗ φ′ 6= 0. Then there exist η ∈ `2[V \XY ] such that ψ′ = φ⊗ η and φ′ = ψ ⊗ η.
Proof. Since ψ ⊗ ψ′ = φ ⊗ φ′ 6= 0, we have ψ,ψ′, φ, φ′ 6= 0. Let α := ‖ψ′‖2 6= 0 and β := ‖φ‖2 6= 0.
Then
α proj(ψ) = tr[X]V \Xproj(ψ ⊗ ψ′) = tr[X]V \Xproj(φ⊗ φ′) = tr[X]V \XY tr[V \Y ]Y proj(φ⊗ φ′) = tr[X]V \XY β proj(φ′).
Hence φ′ = ψ⊗η for some η ∈ `2[V \XY ]. Thus ψ⊗ψ′ = φ⊗φ′ = φ⊗ψ⊗η. Since ψ 6= 0, this implies
ψ′ = φ⊗ η. 
3 Quantum programs
3.1 Expressions
In the context of this paper, an expression e is – informally speaking – an arbitrary mathematical formula,
possibly containing free classical variables. (See Section 2 for the definition of variables.) We denote
by fv(e) the set of free variables occurring in the expression. For m ∈ TypesetX with X ⊇ fv(e), let JeKm
denote the result of substituting every x ∈ fv(e) in e bym(x) and then evaluating the resulting expression
(which has no free variables any more). Intuitively, this corresponds to evaluating the expression e on a
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memory m that contains the content of the variables. With every expression e, we associate a set Typeexpe
such that JeKm ∈ Typeexpe for all m.
Formally, an expression simply consists of a finite set fv(e) ⊆ V cl, a set Typeexpe , and a functionJeK : TypesetV → Typeexpe (with its argument written as subscript) such that m|fv(e) = m′|fv(e) =⇒JeKm = JeKm′ .11
Note that expressions never contain quantum variables,12 nor are they probabilistic.
Given a variable renaming σ and an expression e, we write eσ for the result of replacing free variables x
in e by σ(x). Formally, JeσKm := JeKm◦σ.
And e{e1/x1, . . . , en/xn} denotes the result of simultaneously replacing all xi by ei in e. Formally,Je{e1/x1, . . . , en/xn}Km := JeKm(x1:=Je1Km,...,xn:=JenKm).
For e with Typeexpe = B, we say that “e holds” iff JeKm = true for all m.
3.2 Syntax of programs
Programs in our language are constructed according to the following grammar. We will typically denote
programs with c or d.
c,d := skip (no operation)
x← e (classical assignment)
x
$← e (classical sampling)
if e then c else d (conditional)
while e do c (loop)
c;d (sequential composition)
q1 . . .qn
q← e (initialization of quantum registers)
apply e to q1 . . .qn (quantum application)
x←measure q1 . . .qn with e (measurement)
In the sampling statement, e evaluates to a distribution. In the initialization of quantum registers,
e evaluates to a pure quantum state, q1 . . .qn are jointly initialized to that state. In the quantum
application, e evaluates to an isometry that is applied to q1 . . .qn. In the measurement, e evaluates to
a projective measurement, the outcome is stored in x. (Recall that an expression e can be an arbitrarily
complex mathematical formula in the classical variables. So, e.g., an expression that describes an isometry
could be something as simple as just H (here H denotes the Hadamard transform), or something more
complex such as, e.g., Hx, meaning H is applied if x = 1.)
A program is well-typed according to the following rules:
• x← e is well-typed iff Typeexpe ⊆ Typex,
• x $← e is well-typed iff Typeexpe ⊆ D≤1(Typex),
• if e then c else d is well-typed iff Typeexpe ⊆ B and c,d are well-typed.
• while e do c is well-typed iff Typeexpe ⊆ B and c is well-typed.
• c;d is well-typed iff c and d are well-typed.
• Q q← e is well-typed iff Typeexpe ⊆ `2(TypelistQ ), and ‖ψ‖ = 1 for all ψ ∈ Typeexpe .
• apply e to Q is well-typed iff Typeexpe ⊆ Iso(TypelistQ ).
• x←measure Q with e is well-typed iff Typeexpe ⊆Meas(Typex, `2(TypelistQ )).
In this paper, we will only consider well-typed programs. That is, “program” implicitly means “well-typed
program”, and all derivation rules hold under the implicit assumption that the programs in premises and
conclusions are well-typed.
The set of all free variables in a program c is denoted fv(c) and consists of the classical vari-
ables fv(e) for all expressions e occurring in c, the classical variables x in subterms x ← e, x $← e,
11This formalization is more suitable for modeling expressions in a formal logical system (and thus for implementing in
a theorem prover such as Isabelle or Coq). In this paper, we nevertheless write expressions as formulas with free variables
because this leads to more readable formulas. E.g., we can simply write e+ f if e, f are expressions, instead of having to
write λm.(e(m) + f(m)) as we would have to if expressions were functions.
12At least not as free variables. Expressions may contain, e.g., the names of operators that are parameterized by quantum
variables. For example, Uvars,q · x (where Typex = `2(Typeq)) would be a valid expression with fv(e) = {x}.
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x ← measure Q with e, and all quantum variables Q in subterms Q q← e, apply e to Q,
x←measure Q with e.
3.3 Classical semantics
We call a program classical iff it does not contain the constructions Q q← e, apply e to Q, or x ←
measure Q with e. For classical programs, we can define classical semantics as follows.
Fix some set V of variables relative to which the semantics will be defined (in the remainder of the
paper, that set will always be clear from the context, and it will always be called either V , V1, or V2).
Let S be the set of all functions TypesetV → R such that
∑
a|f(x)| ≤ ∞. (Note that D≤1[V ] ⊆ S. In
fact, S is the smallest real Hilbert space containing D≤1[V ].) We define JcKclass : S → S as the linear
function satisfying the following rules:
JskipKclass(µ) := µJx← eKclass(δm) := δm(x:=JeKm)Jx $← eKclass(δm) := ∑
z∈Typex
JeKm(z) · δm(x:=z)
Jif e then c1 else c2Kclass(µ) := Jc1Kclass(↓e(µ))+ Jc2Kclass(↓¬e(µ))
Jwhile e do cKclass(µ) := ∞∑
i=0
↓¬e
(
(JcKclass ◦ ↓e)i(µ))
Jc1; c2Kclass := Jc2Kclass ◦ Jc1Kclass
Here ↓e(µ) denotes the distribution µ over memories, restricted to those memories that make the
expression e true. Formally, ↓e(µ) = ν with ν(m) := µ(m) if JeKm = true and ν(m) := 0 otherwise.
3.4 Quantum semantics
Fix some set V of variables relative to which the semantics will be defined (in the remainder of the paper,
that set will always be clear from the context, and it will always be called either V , V1, or V2).
Given a program c (with fv(c) ⊆ V ), we define its semantics JcK as a cq-superoperator on Tcq [V ].
In the following, let ρ ∈ Tcq [V ], m ∈ TypesetV cl , and ρm ∈ T+[V qu]. Note that specifying JcK on operators
proj(|m〉V cl)⊗ρm specifies JcK on all ρ ∈ Tcq [V ], since ρ can be written as an infinite sum of proj(|m〉V cl)⊗
ρm (by definition of Tcq [V ] and using the fact that any operator in T[V qu] can be written as linear
combination of four ρa ∈ T+[V qu]).
JskipK(ρ) := ρJx← eK(proj(|m〉V cl)⊗ ρm) := proj(|m(x := JeKm)〉V cl)⊗ ρmJx $← eK(proj(|m〉V cl)⊗ ρm) := ∑
z∈Typex
JeKm(z) · proj(|m(x := z)〉V cl)⊗ ρm
Jif e then c else dK(ρ) := JcK(↓e(ρ)) + JdK(↓¬e(ρ))
Jwhile e do cK(ρ) := ∞∑
i=0
↓¬e
(
(JcK ◦ ↓e)i(ρ))
Jc1; c2K := Jc2K ◦ Jc1KJQ q← eK(proj(|m〉V cl)⊗ ρm) := proj(|m〉V cl)⊗ tr[V qu\Q]Q ρm ⊗ proj(Uvars,QJeKm)Japply e to QK(proj(|m〉V cl)⊗ ρm) := proj(|m〉V cl)⊗ UρmU∗
where U := Uvars,QJeKmU∗vars,Q ⊗ idV qu\QJx←measure Q with eK(proj(|m〉V cl)⊗ ρm) := ∑
z∈Typex
proj
(|m(x := z)〉V cl)⊗ PzρmPz
where Pz := Uvars,QJeKm(z)U∗vars,Q ⊗ idV qu\Q
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Here ↓e(ρ) is the cq-density operator ρ restricted to the parts where the expression e holds. Formally,
↓e is the cq-superoperator on V such that
↓e(proj(|m〉V cl)⊗ ρm) :=
{
proj(|m〉V cl)⊗ ρm (JeKm = true)
0 (otherwise)
Definition 9
Fix a program c, an expression e with Typeexpe = B, and some ρ ∈ T+cq [V ]. Then Pr[e : c(ρ)] :=∑
m s.t. JeKm=true tr ρm where JcK(ρ) =: ∑m proj(|m〉V cl)⊗ ρm with ρm ∈ T+[V qu].
That is, Pr[e : c(ρ)] denotes the probability that e (a condition on the classical variables) holds after
running the program c on initial state ρ.
Definition 10
For a set X of variables, we call c X-local iff JcK = E ⊗ idV \X for some cq-superoperator E on X.
Lemma 11
If fv(c) ⊆ X, then c is X-local.
Proof. By induction over the structure of c. 
Relation to classical semantics. For classical variables V and a distribution µ ∈ D≤1[V ], let
lift(µ) :=
∑
m µ(m) proj
(|m〉V ) ∈ T+cq [V ]. Note that lift(µ) is a bijection between D[V ] and T+cq [V ]
(since V qu = ∅).
Lemma 12: Relation to classical semantics
Let V be classical variables, and let c be a classical program with fv(c) ⊆ V .
Then for all µ ∈ D≤1[V ], we have
JcK(lift(µ)) = lift(JcKclass(µ)).
Proof. By induction over the structure of a classical c. For each case in the induction, the statementJcK(lift(µ)) = lift(JcKclass(µ)) is verified by elementary computation. 
4 Quantum predicates
4.1 Defining predicates
In this section, we discuss what a predicate is, i.e., how predicates are mathematically represented.
In the introduction, we already gave a definition of predicates. Namely, a predicate A over variables
V is a subspace of `2[V ], and a cq-density operator ρ ∈ T+cq [V ] satisfies A iff supp ρ ⊆ A. Let us call a
predicate according to this definition a simple predicate.
While there is nothing wrong per se with simple predicates, it turns out that we can optimize the
representation of predicates somewhat. For a simple predicate A, let Am := {ψ ∈ `2[V qu] : |m〉V cl ⊗ ψ ∈
A}. For any cq-density operator ρ = ∑m proj(|m〉V cl)⊗ ρm, we then have
ρ satisfies A ⇐⇒ supp ρ ⊆ A ⇐⇒ ∀m. {|m〉V cl} ⊗ supp ρm ⊆ A ⇐⇒ ∀m. ρm ⊆ Am.
This implies that a simple predicate A is essentially described by the subspaces Am ⊆ `2[V qu].13
13We say “essentially” here, because A is not uniquely determined by the Am. But the set of cq-density operators that
satisfy A are determined by the Am.
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Thus, we will define predicates on V not as subspaces of `2[V ], but as families of subspaces of `2(V qu),
indexed by TypesetV cl .
And in fact, a family indexed by TypesetV cl is most conveniently described as an expression (in the sense
of Section 3.1) with free variables in V cl. Namely, if we represent a predicate as an expression A with
TypeexpA ⊆ `2[V qu], we get the subspaces Am from above as JAKm.
This leads to the following definition:
Definition 13: Quantum predicates
A (quantum) predicate A over V is an expression with fv(A) ⊆ V cl and TypeexpA ⊆ {S :
S is a subspace of `2[V qu]}.
Definition 14: Satisfying predicates
A state ρ ∈ T+cq [V ] satisfies A iff supp ρm ⊆ JAKm for all m, where ρ =: ∑m∈Typeset
V cl
proj
(|m〉V cl)⊗ ρm.
This definition of predicates will make notation much more convenient because it will be possible to
express the properties of the quantum variables in terms of the values of the classical variables.
Examples of predicates. We give some examples of predicates to illustrate the concepts involved.
We only explain them intuitively here, the necessary definitions to understand them formally will be
given in the following sections. Basically, an expression is a subspace of possible quantum states of the
program’s memory. In many cases, we want to say that a specific variable satisfies a predicate. E.g.,
we want to express that the state of variable q is in subspace P (where P is a subspace of `2[q]). We
will write this as P»q (and we will formally define this as a subspace later). I.e., P»q means intuitively
q ∈ P . Similarly, we can write span{ψ}»q to denote that q has state ψ. Since we can refer to classical
variables in predicates, we can write, e.g., span{|x〉}»q to denote that q has state |x〉where x is a classical
variable. Or more advanced, span{Hx|0〉}»q, where we apply H to |0〉 iff x = 1.
We can combine predicates with logical connectives. In this paper we will use + to represent
disjunction and ∩ to represent conjunction (Birkhoff-von Neumann quantum logic).14 For example,
span{|0〉}»q ∩ span{|1〉}»r means that q has state |0〉 and r has state |1〉.
Moreover, we often need to express facts about the classical variables alone. We have syntactic sugar
Cla[. . .] for that. For example, Cla[x = 1] means that the classical variable x has value 1. We can write
arbitrary formulas inside Cla[. . .] as long as they involve only classical variables. E.g., Cla[∀z ∈ x. z ≤ y]
would say that the x (a variable of type set) is upper-bounded by y. Note that predicates of the form
Cla[. . .] can be combined with non-classical predicates using + and ∩.
Finally, we can even express that two quantum variables have the same content (formalized below)
using expressions such as q ≡quant r.
We stress that predicates are not restricted to what can be built from the above constructions. Any
mathematical expression that describes a subspace is permissible. The above are merely a useful selection
of common cases.
The following subsections will introduce various definitions and facts about predicates. They are
necessary for understanding the rules defined later, but not for understanding the definition of qRHL
itself. A reader interested primarily in the latter may skip ahead to Section 5 and come back later.
4.2 Operations on predicates
We now define a few elementary operations on predicates.
First, any operation that can be performed on subspaces is meaningful on predicates, too. For
example, the intersection A ∩ B is a the quantum analogue to the conjunction of classical predicates,
the sum A + B is a quantum analogue to the disjunction of classical predicates, and the orthogonal
complement A⊥ is a quantum analogous to the negation of a classical predicate (cf. Lemma 25 below).
A word on notation: when we write C := A  B for some operation , we mean the predicate/ex-
pression C with JCKm = JAKm  JBKm for all m. In particular, when A, B are written as formulas in
some concrete syntax (with classical variables as free variables), then C is simply the formula written
AB in that syntax.
14But we stress that our definition of predicates allows us to use any other connectives, too, as long as the result is a
subspace.
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Lemma 15
A cq-density operator ρ satisfies A ∩B iff ρ satisfies A and ρ satisfies B.
Proof. Immediate from the definition. 
(Note that the analogue for A+B does not hold.)
We can easily specify relations between predicates. A predicate A implies another predicate B iff
A ⊆ B for all assignments to the free variables of A and B. That is:
Definition 16
We say A ⊆ B iff JAKm ⊆ JBKm for all m.
Lemma 17
If A ⊆ B, and ρ satisfies A, then ρ satisfies B.
Proof. Immediate from the definition. 
Often we need to specify which quantum and classical variables a given predicate refers to:
Definition 18: Locality
Fix variables X ⊆ V . A predicate A on V is X-local iff fv(A) ⊆ Xcl, and for all m ∈ TypesetXcl ,JAKm = Sm ⊗ `2[V qu \Xqu] for some subspace Sm of `2[Xqu].
Intuitively, a predicate is X-local if we only need to look at classical and quantum variables in X to
decide whether the predicate is satisfied.
Lifting of operators/subspaces. Often, we will need to express predicates like “the state of variables
q ∈ V is in subspace S” where q has type T and S ⊆ `2(T ). Formally, this can be encoded as the predicate
Uvars,qS ⊗ `2[V qu \ q] (which is a subspace of `2[V qu]) where Uvars,q is the isomorphism `2(T ) → `2[q]
described in the preliminaries. Since this notation is cumbersome, we abbreviate it as S»q.
For example, if q has type {0, 1}, then span{|0〉}»q is the subspace spanned by all |m〉V withm(q) = 0.
Informally, this is the predicate “q is in state |0〉.”
Similarly, we will often need to apply an operator A ∈ B(T ) to the (subsystem containing the)
quantum variable q. This is done by applying Uvars,qAU∗vars,q ⊗ idV qu\q ∈ B[V qu] to the overall system.
(Cf. also the definition of the denotational semantics of quantum application and measurements where
similar constructions occur.) We abbreviate this as A»q.
For example, if H is the Hadamard gate, and q is of type {0, 1}, then applying H»q to a state (in
`2[V qu]) is the same as applying H to the subsystem corresponding to variable q.
The following definition generalizes this to lists of variables:
Definition 19: Lifting
Fix a list Q ⊆ V qu. Let S ⊆ `2(TypelistQ ) be a subspace, and A ∈ B(TypelistQ ). Then:
S»Q := Uvars,QS ⊗ `2[V qu \Q] and A»Q := Uvars,QAU∗vars,Q ⊗ idV qu\Q.
Here V is a global set of variables, implicitly understood. For example, in the context of qRHL judgments
(Section 5), this set will usually be V1V2, the union of the sets of all variables indexed with 1 and 2,
respectively.
“Division” of subspaces. Finally, we introduce one technical definition that will be needed to express
the precondition of quantum initialization statements (rule QInit1 below):
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Definition 20
Fix variables W ⊆ V , let A ⊆ `2[V ] be a subspace, and let ψ ∈ `2[W ]. Then A ÷ ψ ⊆ `2[V \W ] is
defined by
φ ∈ A÷ ψ iff φ⊗ ψ ∈ A.
The notation ÷ is motivated by the fact that if A = B ⊗ span{ψ}, then A ÷ ψ = B, so ÷ is in a sense
the division operation corresponding to the tensor product ⊗.
The following simplification rule is useful for simplifying subgoals arising from rule QInit1 (in com-
bination with rule Conseq):
Lemma 21
Let A,B ⊆ `2[V qu] be subspaces. Let Q ⊆ V qu and ψ ∈ `2[Q]. Assume that A is (V qu \Q)-local. Then
A ⊆ (B ÷ ψ)⊗ `2[Q] ⇐⇒ A ∩ (span{ψ} ⊗ `2[V qu \Q]) ⊆ B. (1)
Proof. Without loss of generality we can assume that ψ 6= 0, since for ψ = 0 both sides of (1) are
vacuously true.
We first show the “=⇒” direction. So assume that the lhs of (1) holds, and fix φ ∈ A∩ (span{ψ} ⊗
`2[V qu \Q]). We need to show φ ∈ B. Since φ ∈ span{ψ} ⊗ `2[V qu \Q], we can decompose φ as
φ = φ′⊗ψ with φ′ ∈ `2[V qu \Q]. Since φ ∈ A, from the lhs of (1) we get φ′⊗ψ = φ ∈ (B÷ψ)⊗ `2[Q].
Since ψ 6= 0, this implies φ′ ∈ B ÷ ψ. By definition of ÷, this means φ = φ′ ⊗ ψ ∈ B. This shows the
“=⇒” direction.
We show the “⇐=” direction. So assume that the rhs of (1) holds, and fix φ ∈ A. We need to show
φ ∈ (B ÷ ψ) ⊗ `2[Q]. Since A is (V qu \ Q)-local, we can decompose A as A = A′ ⊗ `2[Q] for some
A′ ⊆ `2[V qu \Q]. Thus φ ∈ A can be decomposed as φ = ∑i φAi⊗φQi with φAi ∈ A′ and φQi ∈ `2[Q].
For any i, we have: Since φAi ∈ A′, φAi ⊗ ψ ∈ A. And φAi ⊗ ψ ∈ span{ψ} ⊗ `2[V qu \Q]. Thus
the rhs of (1) implies that φAi ⊗ ψ ∈ B. By definition of ÷, this implies φAi ∈ B ÷ ψ. Thus
φAi ⊗ φQi ∈ (B ÷ ψ)⊗ `2[Q].
Since this holds for any i, and (B ÷ ψ) ⊗ `2[Q] is a subspace, we also have φ = ∑i φAi ⊗ φQi ∈
(B ÷ ψ)⊗ `2[Q].
This shows the “⇐=” direction. 
Total programs. Sometimes we need to specify that a program is total, i.e., that it terminates with
probability 1. In case the totality holds only for certain initial states, the following definition can be
used:
Definition 22: Total programs
A program c is total on A if for every ρ ∈ Tcq [V ] that satisfies A, we have trJcK(ρ) = tr ρ.
4.3 Classical predicates
In many cases, we need predicates that only talk about classical variables. The following definition allows
us to do so:
Definition 23: Classical predicates
We define Cla[b] for b ∈ B as follows: Cla[true] := `2[V qu] and Cla[false] := 0 (the trivial subspace).
(Here we assume that the set V of variables is clear from the context.)
The next lemma explains why Cla[. . .] allows us to encode classical predicates:
Lemma 24
Fix an expression e with Typeexpe ⊆ B and fv(e) ⊆ V cl. Then Cla[e] is a predicate. And for any
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ρ =
∑
m proj(|m〉V cl)⊗ ρm ∈ T+cq [V ], we have:
ρ satisfies Cla[e] iff JeKm = true for all m with ρm 6= 0.
Proof. Immediate from the facts that supp ρm ∈ Cla[false] = 0 iff ρm = 0, and that supp ρm ∈
Cla[true] = `2[V qu] for all ρm. 
Predicates of the form Cla[. . .] also illustrate why intersection and sum of subspaces are the analogues
to conjunction and disjunction:
Lemma 25
For expressions e, f with Typeexpe ,Type
exp
f ⊆ B, and expressions g, we have:
(i) Cla[e] ∩ Cla[f ] = Cla[e ∧ f ].
(ii) Cla[e] + Cla[f ] = Cla[e ∨ f ].
(iii) Cla[e]⊥ = Cla[¬e].
(iv)
⋂
z∈g Cla[e] = Cla[∀z ∈ g. e]. (Here we assume that Typeexpg ⊆ Typeexpz . z may occur free in e.)
Proof. To prove (i), we need to show JCla[e] ∩ Cla[f ]Km = JCla[e ∧ f ]Km which follows by checking all
four cases for JeKm, JfKm. Analogously for (ii) and (iii).
For (iv), we need to show J⋂z∈g Cla[e]Km = JCla[∀z ∈ g. e]Km. We distinguish two cases. If there
exists an a ∈ JgKm with Je{a/z}Km = false, then both sides of the equation will be 0. And otherwise,
both sides will be `2[V ]. 
We can also use classical predicates to conveniently define what it means for a program to have only
readonly access to certain variables:
Definition 26: Readonly variables
Let X be a set of classical variables. A program is X-readonly iff for all x ∈ X, all z ∈ Typex, all ρ
that satisfy Cla[x = z], we have that JcK(ρ) satisfies Cla[x = z].
Of course, in most cases one will use a simple sufficient syntactic criterion: if no variable from X occurs
on the lhs of an assignent, sampling, or measurement, then the program is X-readonly.
4.4 Quantum equality
One predicate that is very specific to the setting of qRHL is that of quantum equality. As discussed in
the introduction (Section 1.2), we need a predicate Q1 ≡quant Q2 that encodes the intuitive fact that the
quantum variables Q1 contain the same state as the quantum variables Q2. If we want Q1 ≡quant Q2
to be a predicate in our sense (i.e., a subspace), there seems to be only one possible definition, namely,
Q1 ≡quant Q2 is the space of all quantum states that are invariant under swapping the content of Q1 and
Q2. (The fact that this is the only possibility is a conjecture only, but we give some formal evidence for
this in Section B.1.)
How do we write the unitary U that swaps Q1 and Q2? We cannot simply define U by U(ψ1⊗ψ2) =
ψ2 ⊗ ψ1 for ψ1 ∈ `2[Q1], ψ2 ∈ `2[Q2], since `2[Q1] and `2[Q2] are different (but isomorphic) spaces. The
canonical isomorphism from `2[Q1] to `2[Q2] is Uvars,Q2U∗vars,Q1 , and the canonical isomorphism from
`2[Q2] to `2[Q1] is Uvars,Q1U∗vars,Q2 . We can then define the swap by U(ψ1⊗ψ2) = Uvars,Q1U∗vars,Q2ψ2⊗
Uvars,Q2U
∗
vars,Q1
ψ1. And since the tensor product is commutative (in our formalization which uses
variables to identify the different factors), we can write this as: U(ψ1 ⊗ ψ2) = Uvars,Q2U∗vars,Q1ψ1 ⊗
Uvars,Q1U
∗
vars,Q2
ψ2. That is, the swap of Q1 and Q2 is simply U = Uvars,Q2U∗vars,Q1 ⊗ Uvars,Q1U∗vars,Q2 .
If Q1Q2 is not the set of all quantum variables V , we additionally need to express that U does not change
the other variables, and thus we get
U := Uvars,Q2U
∗
vars,Q1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈U[Q1,Q2]
⊗Uvars,Q1U∗vars,Q2︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈U[Q2,Q1]
⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈U[V qu\Q1Q2]
∈ U[V qu].
We can now define (Q1 ≡quant Q2) ⊆ `2[V qu] as the subspace fixed by U (i.e., the set of all ψ ∈ `2[V qu]
with Uψ = ψ).
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Before we do so (Definition 28 below), however, let us generalize the concept of quantum equality
somewhat. Consider the following classical equality: f(x1) = g(x2). This means that if we apply f to x1,
we get the same value as when applying g to x2. We would like to express something like this also using
quantum equality. Namely, we wish to express that Q1, when applying an isometry U1, has the same
content as Q2 when applying an isometry U2. (The quantum equality Q1 ≡quant Q2 we discussed so far is
a special case of this with U1 = U2 = id .) To model this, we define the swap somewhat differently, namely,
instead of Uvars,Q1 (which simply maps ψ1 ∈ `2[Q1] to `2(TypelistQ1)), we use the morphism U1Uvars,Q1
(which maps ψ1 ∈ `2[Q1] to `2(TypelistQ1) and then applies U1), and instead of Uvars,Q2 we use U2Uvars,Q2 .
Thus we get the following operation U ′ ∈ B[V qu] instead of U :
U ′ := Uvars,Q2U
∗
2U1U
∗
vars,Q1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈B[Q1,Q2]
⊗Uvars,Q1U∗1U2U∗vars,Q2︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈B[Q2,Q1]
⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈B[V qu\Q1Q2]
∈ B[V qu],
and we define U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2 to consist of all ψ fixed by U ′:
Definition 27: Quantum equality
Let V be a set of variables, and Q1, Q2 ⊆ V qu be disjoint lists of distinct quantum variables. Let Z
be a set. Let U1 ∈ B(TypelistQ1 , Z) and U2 ∈ B(TypelistQ2 , Z).
Then (U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2) ⊆ `2[V qu] is defined as the subspace fixed by
Uvars,Q2U
∗
2U1U
∗
vars,Q1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈B[Q1,Q2]
⊗Uvars,Q1U∗1U2U∗vars,Q2︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈B[Q2,Q1]
⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈B[V qu\Q1Q2]
∈ B[V qu].
Note that we allow U1, U2 to be arbitary bounded operators (instead of isometries). While we cannot
give an intuitive meaning to U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2 for non-isometries U1, U2, it turns out to be convenient to
allow non-isometries U1, U2 in the definition because some simplification rules for U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2 can
then be stated without extra premises (e.g., Lemma 31), and nothing is lost by the additional generality.
From the general definition of U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2, we can recover the special case Q1 ≡quant Q2 that
we started with by setting U1 := U2 := id :
Definition 28
Let Q1, Q2 be disjoint lists of distinct quantum variables with TypelistQ1 = Type
list
Q2 . Then (Q1 ≡quant
Q2) := (id Q1 ≡quant id Q2) where id is the identity on TypelistQ1 .
The following lemma gives a characterization of the quantum equality on separable states. This
characterization will make the proofs of rules involving quantum equality much simpler.
Lemma 29
Let Q1 ⊆ V qu1 , Q2 ⊆ V qu2 , U1 ∈ B≤1(TypelistQ1 , Z), and U2 ∈ B≤1(TypelistQ2 , Z) for some set Z. Let
ψ1 ∈ `2[V qu1 ], ψ2 ∈ `2[V qu2 ] be normalized.
If ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ (U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2) then there exist normalized ψQ1 ∈ `2[Q1], ψY1 ∈ `2[V qu1 \Q1],
ψQ2 ∈ `2[Q2], ψY2 ∈ `2[V qu2 \Q2] such that U1U∗vars,Q1ψQ1 = U2U∗vars,Q2ψQ2 and ψ1 = ψQ1 ⊗ ψY1 and
ψ2 = ψ
Q
2 ⊗ ψY2 .
If U1, U2 are isometries, the converse holds as well.
Note that this lemma assumes that Q1 and Q2 are in different subsystems that are not entangled
(in states ψ1, ψ2, respectively); this will be the case in qRHL judgments as defined in Section 5 below.
The lemma shows that in that case, U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2 implies that the variables Q1 and Q2 are not
entangled with any other variables.
Proof. Throughout this proof, let Uˆ1 := U1U∗vars,Q1 and Uˆ2 := U2U
∗
vars,Q2
. Since U1, U2 have operator
norm ≤ 1, and Uvars,Q1 , Uvars,Q2 are unitaries, we have that Uˆ1, Uˆ2 have operator norm ≤ 1, namely
Uˆ1 ∈ B≤1(TypesetQ1 , Z), Uˆ2 ∈ B≤1(TypesetQ2 , Z).
We first show the ⇒-direction.
Let ψ1 =
∑
i λ1i ψ
Q
1i ⊗ ψY1i be a Schmidt decomposition of ψ1, i.e., λ1i > 0, and ψQ1i ∈ `2[Q1],
21
ψY1i ∈ `2[V qu1 \Q1] are orthonormal. (Such a decomposition exists by Lemma 7.) Analogously, let
ψ2 =
∑
j λ2j ψ
Q
2j ⊗ ψY2j be a Schmidt decomposition of ψ2. We have
∑
λ21i = 1 and
∑
λ22j = 1 because
ψ1 and ψ2 are normalized.
Let W ⊆ `2[Q1Q2] be the subspace fixed by Uˆ∗2 Uˆ1 ⊗ Uˆ∗1 Uˆ2 = Uvars,Q2U∗2U1U∗vars,Q1 ⊗
Uvars,Q1U
∗
1U2U
∗
vars,Q2
. Then W ⊗ `2[V qu1 V qu2 \Q1Q2] = (U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2) by definition of ≡quant.
Since∑
i,j
λ1iλ2j ψ
Q
1i ⊗ ψQ2j ⊗ ψY1i ⊗ ψY2j = ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ (U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2) = W ⊗ `2[V qu1 V qu2 \Q1Q2],
and since all ψY1i⊗ψY2j ∈ `2[V qu1 V qu2 \Q1Q2] are orthogonal and non-zero, it follows that all λ1iλ2j ψQ1i⊗
ψQ2j ∈W . Since λ1iλ2j > 0, we have ψQ1i ⊗ ψQ2j ∈W for all i, j.
This implies
Uˆ∗2 Uˆ1ψ
Q
1i ⊗ Uˆ∗1 Uˆ2ψQ2j = (Uˆ∗2 Uˆ1 ⊗ Uˆ∗1 Uˆ2)(ψQ1i ⊗ ψQ2j)
(∗)
= ψQ1i ⊗ ψQ2j
where (∗) uses ψQ1i ⊗ ψQ2j ∈ W . Note that in the lhs, the first factor is in `2[Q2], while in the rhs, the
second factor is in `2[Q2]. (Recall that the tensor product is commutative in our formalism.) It follows
that Uˆ∗2 Uˆ1ψ
Q
1i = αijψ
Q
2j and Uˆ
∗
1 Uˆ2ψ
Q
2j = βijψ
Q
1i for some αij , βij ∈ C. We have
|αij | = ‖αijψQ2j‖ = ‖Uˆ∗2 Uˆ1ψQ1i‖
(∗)
≤ ‖ψQ1i‖ = 1.
Here (∗) uses that the operator norm of Uˆ1, Uˆ∗2 is ≤ 1. Furthermore,
ψQ1i ⊗ ψQ2j = Uˆ∗2 Uˆ1ψQ1i ⊗ Uˆ∗1 Uˆ2ψQ2j = αijψQ2j ⊗ βijψQ1i = αijβij · ψQ1i ⊗ ψQ2j .
It follows that αijβij = 1. With |αij | ≤ 1, this implies |αij | = 1 and βij = 1/αij = α∗ij .
Since Uˆ∗2 Uˆ1ψ
Q
1i = αijψ
Q
2j for all j and fixed i (there exists at least one index i since ψ1 6= 0), it
follows that all ψQ2j are colinear. Since they are also orthonormal, there can be only one index j. Let
ψˆQ2 := ψ
Q
2j and ψˆ
Y
2 := ψ
Y
2j . Analogously, there can be only one index i. Let ψ
Q
1 := ψ
Q
1i and ψ
Y
1 := ψ
Y
1i.
Let α := αij and β := βij = α∗.
Since ψQ1i, ψ
Y
1i, ψ
Q
2j , ψ
Y
2j are normalized, ψ
Q
1 and ψ
Y
1 and ψˆ
Q
2 and ψˆ
Y
2 are all normalized. And λ1 =∑
λ1i = 1 and λ2 =
∑
λ2j = 1.
We then have ψ1 = λ1ψ
Q
1 ⊗ ψY1 = ψQ1 ⊗ ψY1 and ψ2 = λ2ψˆQ2 ⊗ ψˆY2 = ψˆQ2 ⊗ ψˆY2 and Uˆ∗2 Uˆ1ψQ1 = αψˆQ2
and Uˆ∗1 Uˆ2ψˆ
Q
2 = βψ
Q
1 .
Let P1 := Uˆ1Uˆ∗1 , P2 := Uˆ2Uˆ∗2 . P1, P2 are positive operators with operator norm ≤ 1. Then∥∥Uˆ1ψQ1 ∥∥ = ∥∥Uˆ1Uˆ∗1 Uˆ2ψˆQ2 ∥∥ = ∥∥Uˆ1Uˆ∗1 Uˆ2Uˆ∗2 Uˆ1ψQ1 ∥∥ = ∥∥P1P2Uˆ1ψQ1 ∥∥ ≤ ∥∥P2Uˆ1ψQ1 ∥∥ ≤ ∥∥Uˆ1ψQ1 ∥∥.
Thus ‖Uˆ1ψQ1 ‖ = ‖P2Uˆ1ψQ1 ‖. Since the operator norm of P2 is ≤ 1, this implies that Uˆ1ψQ1 is a linear
combination of eigenvectors with eigenvalues of absolute value 1. Since P2 is positive, the only such
eigenvalue is 1. Thus Uˆ1ψ
Q
1 is an eigenvector with eigenvalue 1. Hence P2Uˆ1ψ
Q
1 = Uˆ1ψ
Q
1 . Thus
αUˆ2ψˆ
Q
2 = Uˆ2Uˆ
∗
2 Uˆ1ψ
Q
1 = P2Uˆ1ψ
Q
1 = Uˆ1ψ
Q
1 .
Let ψQ2 := αψˆ
Q
2 and ψ
Y
2 := α
−1ψˆY2 . (Since |α| = 1, these are also normalized.) Then ψ1 = ψQ1 ⊗ ψY1
and ψ2 = ψ
Q
2 ⊗ ψY2 and U1U∗vars,Q1ψQ1 = Uˆ1ψQ1 = αUˆ2ψˆQ2 = Uˆ2ψQ2 = U2U∗vars,Q2ψQ2 .
This shows the ⇒-direction.
We show the ⇐-direction (the converse). In that case, U1, U2 are isometries, and thus Uˆ1, Uˆ2 as
defined at the beginning of this proof are isometries as well. We have:(
Uˆ∗2 Uˆ1 ⊗ Uˆ∗1 Uˆ2 ⊗ idV qu1 V qu2 \Q1Q2
)
(ψ1 ⊗ ψ2) = Uˆ∗2 Uˆ1ψQ1 ⊗ Uˆ∗1 Uˆ2ψQ2 ⊗ ψY1 ⊗ ψY2
(∗)
= Uˆ∗2 Uˆ2ψ
Q
2 ⊗ Uˆ∗1 Uˆ1ψQ1 ⊗ ψY1 ⊗ ψY2
(∗∗)
= ψQ2 ⊗ ψQ1 ⊗ ψY1 ⊗ ψY2 = ψ1 ⊗ ψ2.
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Here (∗) uses that Uˆ1ψQ1 = Uˆ2ψQ2 by assumption of the lemma. And (∗∗) uses that Uˆ1 and Uˆ2 are
isometries, and hence Uˆ∗1 Uˆ1 = id and Uˆ∗2 Uˆ2 = id .
Thus ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 is invariant under Uˆ∗2 Uˆ1 ⊗ Uˆ∗1 Uˆ2 ⊗ idV qu1 V qu2 \Q1Q2 = Uvars,Q2U∗2U1U∗vars,Q1 ⊗
Uvars,Q1U
∗
1U2U
∗
vars,Q2
⊗ idV qu1 V qu2 \Q1Q2 . By definition of U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2, this implies ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈
(U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2).
This shows the ⇐-direction. 
For the special case Q1 ≡quant Q2, the lemma can be additionally simplified:
Corollary 30
Let Q1 = (q1, . . . ,qn) ⊆ V qu1 and Q2 = (q′1, . . . ,q′n) ⊆ V qu2 be disjoint lists of distinct variables with
TypelistQ1 = Type
list
Q2 . Let ψ1 ∈ `2[V qu1 ], ψ2 ∈ `2[V qu2 ] be normalized. Let σ : Q2 → Q1 be the variable
renaming with σ(q′i) = qi.
Then ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ (Q1 ≡quant Q2) iff there exist normalized ψQ1 ∈ `2[Q1], ψY1 ∈ `2[V qu1 \Q1],
ψQ2 ∈ `2[Q2], ψY2 ∈ `2[V qu2 \Q2] such that ψQ1 = Urename,σψQ2 and ψ1 = ψQ1 ⊗ ψY1 and ψ2 = ψQ2 ⊗ ψY2 .
Proof. By definition, (Q1 ≡quant Q2) is the same as (id Q1 ≡quant id Q2) where id is the identity on
`2(TypelistQ1) = `
2(TypelistQ2).
Thus by Lemma 29, ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ (Q1 ≡quant Q2) iff there are normalized ψQ1 ∈ `2[Q1], ψY1 ∈
`2[V qu1 \Q1], ψQ2 ∈ `2[Q2], ψY2 ∈ `2[V qu2 \Q2] such that id U∗vars,Q1ψQ1 = id U∗vars,Q2ψQ2 and ψ1 =
ψQ1 ⊗ ψY1 and ψ2 = ψQ2 ⊗ ψY2 .
Furthermore, id U∗vars,Q1ψ
Q
1 = id U
∗
vars,Q2
ψQ2 iff ψ
Q
1 = Uvars,Q1U
∗
vars,Q2
ψQ2 iff ψ
Q
1 = Urename,σψ
Q
2
(since Uvars,Q1U∗vars,Q2 = Urename,σ). 
Simplification rules. We prove three simplification rules that are useful for rewriting predicates
involving quantum equalities:
Lemma 31
For lists Q1 and Q2 of quantum variables, and operators U1 ∈ B(TypelistQ1 , Y ) and U2 ∈ B(TypelistQ2 , Z)
and A ∈ B(Y, Z), we have
(AU1)Q1 ≡quant U2Q2 = U1Q1 ≡quant (A∗U2)Q2.
This is especially useful for canceling out terms, e.g., we get (AQ1 ≡quant AQ2) = (idQ1 ≡quant A∗AQ2) =
(Q1 ≡quant Q2) for isometries A.
Proof. By definition, (AU1)Q1 ≡quant U2Q2 is the set of states fixed by
S := Uvars,Q2U
∗
2 (AU1)U
∗
vars,Q1 ⊗ Uvars,Q1(AU1)∗U2U∗vars,Q2 ⊗ idAqu\Q1Q2 .
and U1Q1 ≡quant (A∗U2)Q2 the set of states fixed by
T := Uvars,Q2(A
∗U2)∗U1U∗vars,Q1 ⊗ Uvars,Q1U∗1 (A∗U2)U∗vars,Q2 ⊗ idAqu\Q1Q2 .
Since S = T , we have
(
(AU1)Q1 ≡quant U2Q2
)
=
(
U1Q1 ≡quant (A∗U2)Q2
)
. 
Lemma 32
For lists Q1 and Q2 of quantum variables, and operators U1 ∈ B(TypelistQ1 , Z) and U2 ∈ B(TypelistQ2 , Z)
and A1 ∈ U(TypelistQ1) and A2 ∈ U(TypelistQ2), we have
(A1»Q1) · (U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2) = (U1A∗1)Q1 ≡quant U2Q2 (2)
and
(A2»Q2) · (U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2) = U1Q1 ≡quant (U2A∗2)Q2. (3)
23
Recall that » is the lifting from Definition 19.
Predicates of this form occur, e.g., in the preconditions of rule QApply1 below. (Uvars,Q1A1U∗vars,Q1
is the operator A1, applied to quantum variables Q1.) With this rule, we can collect the effect of several
unitary quantum operations inside the quantum equality.
Notice that we require that A1, A2 are unitary. We leave it as an open problem to generalize this rule
suitably to isometries.
Proof. We first show
(A1»Q1) · (U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2) ⊆ (U1A∗1)Q1 ≡quant U2Q2 (4)
Fix some ψ contained in the lhs of (4). Then ψ can be written as ψ = (A1»Q1)φ for some φ ∈
(U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2). Let
S := Uvars,Q2U
∗
2U1U
∗
vars,Q1 ⊗ Uvars,Q1U∗1U2U∗vars,Q2 ⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2 ,
T := Uvars,Q2U
∗
2U1A
∗
1U
∗
vars,Q1 ⊗ Uvars,Q1A1U∗1U2U∗vars,Q2 ⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2
Since (U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2) is the subspace fixed by S, we have φ = Sφ. Thus
Tψ = T (A1»Q1)φ = T
(
Uvars,Q1A1U
∗
vars,Q1 ⊗ idV \Q1
)
φ
= (Uvars,Q2U
∗
2U1A
∗
1U
∗
vars,Q1Uvars,Q1A1U
∗
vars,Q1 ⊗ Uvars,Q1A1U∗1U2U∗vars,Q2 ⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2)φ
(∗)
= (Uvars,Q2U
∗
2U1U
∗
vars,Q1 ⊗ Uvars,Q1A1U∗1U2U∗vars,Q2 ⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2)φ
= (idQ2 ⊗ Uvars,Q1A1U∗vars,Q1 ⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2)Sφ
= (A1»Q1)Sφ = (A1»Q1)φ = ψ.
Here (∗) uses that A1 is a unitary, and hence A∗1A1 = id . Since (U1A∗1)Q1 ≡quant U2Q2 is the subspace
fixed by T , we have that ψ is in the rhs of (4). Thus (4) holds.
Furthermore,
(U1A
∗
1)Q1 ≡quant U2Q2 = (A1»Q1) · (A∗1»Q1) · ·
(
(U1A
∗
1)Q1 ≡quant U2Q2
)
(4)
⊆ (A1»Q1) ·
(
(U1A
∗
1(A
∗
1)
∗)Q1 ≡quant U2Q2
)
= (A1»Q1) ·
(
U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2
)
. (5)
Here (4) is applicable because A∗1 is also unitary, and we showed (4) for all bounded U1 and unitary A1.
From (4) and (5), the equation (2) follows. And (3) follows by symmetry of ≡quant. 
Lemma 33
Fix disjoint lists Q1 and Q2 of distinct quantum variables, and operators U1 ∈ B(TypelistQ1 , Z) and
U2 ∈ B(TypelistQ2 , Z) and a vector ψ ∈ `2[TypelistQ1 ]. Assume U∗1U2U∗2U1ψ = ψ (e.g., if U1, U∗2 are
isometries) Then we have
(U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2) ∩
(
span{ψ}»Q1
)
=
(
span{ψ}»Q1
) ∩ (span{U∗2U1ψ}»Q2) (6)
This lemma tells us (in the special case U1 = U2 = id) that the following two statements are equivalent:
• Q1 and Q2 have the same content, and Q1 contains ψ.
• Q1 contains ψ and Q2 contains ψ.
Proof. We first show that the lhs of (6) is included in the rhs. W.l.o.g., we can assume ψ 6= 0 (otherwise
the lhs and rhs are trivially 0). Fix some nonzero φ ∈ (U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2) ∩
(
span{ψ}»Q1
)
.
Since φ ∈ span{ψ}»Q1, there is a φ′ ∈ `2[V qu \Q1] such that φ = Uvars,Q1ψ⊗φ′ (by Definition 19).
And since 0 6= φ ∈ (U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2), we have
∈`2[Q2]︷ ︸︸ ︷
Uvars,Q2U
∗
2U1ψ⊗
(
Uvars,Q1U
∗
1U2U
∗
vars,Q2 ⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2
)
φ′
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=
(
Uvars,Q2U
∗
2U1U
∗
vars,Q1 ⊗ Uvars,Q1U∗1U2U∗vars,Q2 ⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2
) =φ︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Uvars,Q1ψ ⊗ φ′) = Uvars,Q1ψ⊗φ′ 6= 0.
By Lemma 8, this implies that there is an η ∈ V qu \Q1Q2 such that φ′ = Uvars,Q2U∗2U1ψ ⊗ η. Thus
φ = Uvars,Q1ψ ⊗ Uvars,Q2U∗2U1ψ ⊗ η
∈ (span{Uvars,Q1ψ} ⊗ `2[V qu \Q1]) ∩ (span{Uvars,Q2U∗2U1ψ} ⊗ `2[V qu \Q2])
=
(
span{ψ}»Q1
) ∩ (span{U∗2U1ψ}»Q2).
Hence the lhs of (6) is contained in the rhs.
We now show that the rhs of (6) is contained in the lhs. Fix some nonzero γ ∈ (span{ψ}»Q1) ∩(
span{U∗2U1ψ}»Q2
)
. Since γ ∈ span{ψ}»Q1, we can write γ = Uvars,Q1ψ ⊗ ψ′ for some ψ′ ∈
`2[V qu \Q1]. Since γ ∈ span{U∗2U1ψ}»Q2, we can write γ = Uvars,Q2U∗2U1ψ ⊗ φ′ for some φ′ ∈
`2[V qu \Q2]. By Lemma 8, this implies that ψ′ = Uvars,Q2U∗2U1ψ ⊗ η for some η ∈ `2[V qu \Q1Q2].
Hence γ = Uvars,Q1ψ ⊗ Uvars,Q2U∗2U1ψ ⊗ η. Thus(
Uvars,Q2U
∗
2U1U
∗
vars,Q1 ⊗ Uvars,Q1U∗1U2U∗vars,Q2 ⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2
)
γ
= (Uvars,Q2U
∗
2U1U
∗
vars,Q1 · Uvars,Q1ψ)⊗ (Uvars,Q1U∗1U2U∗vars,Q2 · Uvars,Q2U∗2U1ψ)⊗ η
(∗)
= Uvars,Q2U
∗
2U1ψ ⊗ Uvars,Q1ψ ⊗ η = γ.
Here (∗) uses the assumption U∗1U2U∗2U1ψ = ψ. Thus γ ∈ (U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2). Since also γ ∈
span{ψ}»Q1, we have that γ is in the lhs of (6). Thus the rhs is a subset of the lhs.
Summarizing, the lhs and rhs of (6) are subsets of each other, hence (6) holds. 
Lemma 34
Fix disjoint lists Q1 and Q2 and R of distinct quantum variables, and operators U1 ∈ B(TypelistQ1 , Z)
and U2 ∈ B(TypelistQ2 , Z) and a unit vector ψ ∈ `2(TypelistR ). Then we have
(U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2) ∩
(
span{ψ}»R) = ((U1 ⊗′ id)(Q1R) ≡quant (U2 ⊗′ ψ)Q2). (7)
In this equation, ⊗′ refers to the usual positional (unlabeled) tensor product, not to the labeled tensor
product defined in Section 2. And on the rhs, ψ is interpreted as a bounded operator from C to
`2(TypelistR ).
This rule allows us to rewrite an equality between Q1 and Q2 into an equality between Q1R and Q2
if we know the content of R. It is the quantum analogue of the following obvious classical fact:
f(x1) = g(x2) ∧ y1 = y ⇐⇒ (f × id)(x1,y1) = (λx. (x, y))(x2).
Proof. We first show the following fact that we need for both directions of the proof:
Claim 1 If φ =
∑
i φ1i ⊗ φ2iψ ⊗ φ3i ⊗ Uvars,Rψ for some φ1i ∈ `2[Q1], φ2i ∈ `2[Q2], φ3i ∈
`2[V qu \Q1Q2R], then(
Uvars,Q2(U2 ⊗′ ψ)∗(U1 ⊗′ id)U∗vars,Q1R ⊗ Uvars,Q1R(U1 ⊗′ id)∗(U2 ⊗′ ψ)U∗vars,Q2 ⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2R
)
φ
=
(
Uvars,Q2U
∗
2U1U
∗
vars,Q1 ⊗ Uvars,Q1U∗1U2U∗vars,Q2φ2i ⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2
)
φ
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Proof of claim. We have for all i:(
Uvars,Q2(U2 ⊗′ ψ)∗(U1 ⊗′ id)U∗vars,Q1R
)
(φ1i ⊗ Uvars,Rψ)
= Uvars,Q2(U2 ⊗′ ψ)∗(U1 ⊗′ id)
(
U∗vars,Q1φ1i ⊗′ U∗vars,RUvars,Rψ
)
= Uvars,Q2
(
U∗2U1U
∗
vars,Q1φ1i ⊗′ ψ∗U∗vars,RUvars,Rψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=‖ψ‖2=1
)
= Uvars,Q2U
∗
2U1U
∗
vars,Q1φ1i. (8)
And we have for all i:(
Uvars,Q1R(U1 ⊗′ id)∗(U2 ⊗′ ψ)U∗vars,Q2
)
φ2i
= Uvars,Q1R(U1 ⊗′ id)∗(U2 ⊗′ ψ)(U∗vars,Q2φ2i ⊗′ 1︸︷︷︸
∈C
)
= Uvars,Q1R(U
∗
1U2U
∗
vars,Q2φ2i ⊗′ ψ)
= Uvars,Q1U
∗
1U2U
∗
vars,Q2φ2i ⊗ Uvars,Rψ (9)
Thus we have(
Uvars,Q2(U2 ⊗′ ψ)∗(U1 ⊗′ id)U∗vars,Q1R ⊗ Uvars,Q1R(U1 ⊗′ id)∗(U2 ⊗′ ψ)U∗vars,Q2 ⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2R
)
φ
=
∑
i
(
Uvars,Q2(U2 ⊗′ ψ)∗(U1 ⊗′ id)U∗vars,Q1R
)
(φ1i ⊗ Uvars,Rψ)
⊗
(
Uvars,Q1R(U1 ⊗′ id)∗(U2 ⊗′ ψ)U∗vars,Q2
)
φ2i ⊗ φ3i
(8),(9)
=
∑
i
Uvars,Q2U
∗
2U1U
∗
vars,Q1φ1i ⊗ Uvars,Q1U∗1U2U∗vars,Q2φ2i ⊗ Uvars,Rψ ⊗ φ3i
=
(
Uvars,Q2U
∗
2U1U
∗
vars,Q1 ⊗ Uvars,Q1U∗1U2U∗vars,Q2 ⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2
)
φ. 
We first show that the lhs of (7) is contained in the rhs. For this, fix some non-zero φ in the lhs.
Since φ ∈ span{ψ}»R, we can decompose φ as φ = Uvars,Rψ ⊗ φ′ for some φ′ ∈ `2[V qu \R]. We can
decompose φ′ as φ′ =
∑
i φ1i ⊗ φ2i ⊗ φ3i with φ1i ∈ `2[Q1], φ2i ∈ `2[Q2], φ3i ∈ `2[V qu \Q1Q2R]. Then
we have(
Uvars,Q2(U2 ⊗′ ψ)∗(U1 ⊗′ id)U∗vars,Q1R ⊗ Uvars,Q1R(U1 ⊗′ id)∗(U2 ⊗′ ψ)U∗vars,Q2 ⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2R
)
φ
Claim 1
=
(
Uvars,Q2U
∗
2U1U
∗
vars,Q1 ⊗ Uvars,Q1U∗1U2U∗vars,Q2φ2i ⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2
)
φ
(∗)
= φ
where (∗) follows from φ ∈ (U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2) (since φ is in the lhs of (7)). Thus φ ∈(
(U1 ⊗′ id)(Q1R) ≡quant (U2 ⊗′ ψ)Q2
)
which is the rhs of (7). Thus the lhs of (7) is contained in
the rhs.
We now prove that the rhs of (7) is contained in the lhs. Fix some φ contained in the rhs. We can
decompose φ as φ =
∑
i φ1i ⊗ φ2i ⊗ φ3i with φ1i ∈ `2[Q1R], φ2i ∈ `2[Q2], φ3i ∈ `2[V qu \Q1Q2R].
Then
φ
(∗)
=
(
Uvars,Q2(U2 ⊗′ ψ)∗(U1 ⊗′ id)U∗vars,Q1R ⊗ Uvars,Q1R(U1 ⊗′ id)∗(U2 ⊗′ ψ)U∗vars,Q2 ⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2R
)
φ
=
∑
i
Uvars,Q2(U2 ⊗′ ψ)∗(U1 ⊗′ id)U∗vars,Q1Rφ1i︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:φˆ2i∈`2[Q2]
⊗ Uvars,Q1R(U1 ⊗′ id)∗(U2 ⊗′ ψ)U∗vars,Q2φ2i ⊗ φ3i
=
∑
i
φˆ2i ⊗ Uvars,Q1R(U1 ⊗′ id)∗(U2 ⊗′ ψ)
(
U∗vars,Q2φ2i ⊗′ 1︸︷︷︸
∈C
)⊗ φ3i
=
∑
i
φˆ2i ⊗ Uvars,Q1R
(
U∗1U2U
∗
vars,Q2φ2i ⊗′ ψ
)⊗ φ3i
=
∑
i
φˆ2i ⊗ Uvars,Q1U∗1U2U∗vars,Q2φ2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:φˆ1i∈`2[Q1]
⊗ Uvars,Rψ ⊗ φ3i
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=
(∑
i
φˆ1i ⊗ φˆ2i ⊗ φ3i
)
⊗ Uvars,Rψ ∈
(
span{Uvars,Rψ} ⊗ `2[V qu \R]
)
= span{ψ}»R. (10)
Here (∗) holds because φ is in the rhs of (7).
Moreover, we have
φ
(∗)
=
(
Uvars,Q2(U2 ⊗′ ψ)∗(U1 ⊗′ id)U∗vars,Q1R ⊗ Uvars,Q1R(U1 ⊗′ id)∗(U2 ⊗′ ψ)U∗vars,Q2 ⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2R
)
φ
Claim 1
=
(
Uvars,Q2U
∗
2U1U
∗
vars,Q1 ⊗ Uvars,Q1U∗1U2U∗vars,Q2φ2i ⊗ idV qu\Q1Q2
)
φ.
Here (∗) follows since φ is in the rhs of (7). And Claim 1 applies since φ = ∑i φˆ1i⊗ φˆ2i⊗φ3i⊗Uvars,Rψ
by (10). Thus φ ∈ (U1Q1 ≡quant U2Q2). Since also φ ∈ span{ψ}»R by (10), we have that φ is in the
lhs of (7). Thus the rhs of (7) is contained in the lhs.
We have shown that the lhs is included in the rhs and that the rhs is included in the rhs. Hence (7)
holds. 
5 Quantum Relational Hoare Logic (qRHL)
We now formally introduce our quantum Relational Hoare Logic qRHL. See the introduction (especially
the discussion before Definition 5) for a motivation of the definition.
Tagged variables. In the following, there will always be a fixed set V of program variables, and
programs mentioned in qRHL judgments will always have free variables in V . In addition, we will use
two disjoint copies of the set V , called V1 and V2, consisting of the variables from V tagged with 1 or 2,
respectively. These tagged variables will be necessary to distinguish between the variables of the left and
right program in a qRHL judgment (e.g., in the pre- and postcondition of a qRHL judgment).
Formally, V1, V2 are disjoint sets with variable renamings idxi : V → Vi for i = 1, 2. (See the
preliminaries for the formal definition of variable renamings.) We will write xi for idxi(x).
For an expression e with fv(e) ⊆ V , we write idxi e for the expression e with every classical variable
x replaced by xi. Formally, Jidxi eKm := JeKm◦(idxi)−1 .
For a program c with fv(c) ⊆ V , we write idxi c for the program c with every classical or quantum
variable x in statements replaced by xi, and every expression e replaced by idxi e.
The definition. We now have all the necessary language to make Definition 5 formal:
Definition 35: Quantum Relational Hoare judgments
Let c1, c2 be programs with fv(c1), fv(c2) ⊆ V . Let A,B be predicates over V1V2.
Then {A}c1 ∼ c2{B} holds iff for all (V1, V2)-separable ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfy A, we have that
there exists a (V1, V2)-separable ρ′ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfies B such that tr[V1]V2 ρ′ = Jidx1 c1K(tr[V1]V2 ρ)
and tr[V2]V1 ρ
′ = Jidx2 c2K(tr[V2]V1 ρ).
(Recall in particular Definition 13 for the definition of “predicates”, and Definition 14 for the definition
of “satisfy”, Section 3.4 for the semantics J·K, and the preliminaries for the remaining notation.)
The following is a technical lemma that gives an alternative characterization of qRHL judgments in
terms of deterministic initial values for the classical variables, and pure initial states for the quantum
variables. This definition will simplify many proofs.
Lemma 36: qRHL for pure states
{A}c ∼ d{B} holds iff:
For all m1 ∈ TypesetV cl1 , m2 ∈ Type
set
V cl2
and all normalized ψ1 ∈ `2[V qu1 ], ψ2 ∈ `2[V qu2 ] such that
ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JAKm1m2 , there exists a (V1, V2)-separable ρ′ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] such that:
ρ′ satisfies B, and tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ = Jidx1 cK(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1)), and tr[V2]V1 ρ′ =Jidx2 dK(proj(|m2〉V cl2 )⊗ proj(ψ2)).
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Proof. First, we show the⇒-direction. Assume {A}c ∼ d{B} and fixm1,m2, ψ1, ψ2 as in the statement
of the lemma. Since ψ1⊗ψ2 ∈ JAKm1m2 , we have that ρ := proj(|m1〉V cl1 ⊗ |m2〉V cl2 ⊗ ψ1 ⊗ ψ2) satisfies A.
Note that ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] and ρ is separable. Since {A}c ∼ d{B}, there is a separable ρ′ that satisfies
B and such that
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ = Jidx1 cK(tr[V1]V2 ρ) = Jidx1 cK(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1)),
tr[V2]V1 ρ
′ = Jidx2 dK(tr[V2]V1 ρ) = Jidx2 dK(proj(|m2〉V cl2 )⊗ proj(ψ2)).
This shows the ⇒-direction.
Now we show the⇐-direction. Assume that for all m1,m2, ψ1, ψ2 as in the statement of the lemma,
there exists a separable state ρ′ such that: ρ′ satisfies B, and tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ = Jidx1 cK(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1)),
and tr[V2]V1 ρ
′ = Jidx2 dK(proj(|m2〉V cl2 )⊗ proj(ψ2)). We need to show that {A}c ∼ d{B}.
Fix a state ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfies A. We can decompose ρ as
ρ =
∑
m1∈Typeset
V cl1
,m2∈Typeset
V cl2
proj
(|m1m2〉V cl1 V cl2 )⊗ ρm1m2 .
Since ρ satisfies A, we have supp ρm1m2 ⊆ JAKm1m2 . Furthermore, since ρ is separable, the states
ρm1m2 can be decomposed as ρm1m2 =
∑
i λm1m2iproj(ψ
(1)
m1m2i
⊗ ψ(2)m1m2i) for some normalized ψ
(1)
m1m2i
∈
`2[V qu1 ], ψ
(2)
m1m2i
∈ `2[V qu2 ] and λm1m2i ≥ 0. Since supp ρm1m2 ⊆ JAKm1m2 , ψ(1)m1m2i ⊗ ψ(2)m1m2i ⊆JAKm1m2 .
By assumption, this implies the existence of separable states ρ′m1m2i that satisfy B, and such that:
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′
m1m2i = Jidx1 cK(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ(1)m1m2i)), (11)
tr[V2]V1 ρ
′
m1m2i = Jidx2 dK(proj(|m2〉V cl2 )⊗ proj(ψ(2)m1m2i)). (12)
Let ρ′ :=
∑
m1m2i
λm1m2i ρ
′
m1m2i
.
From (11), it follows that
tr ρ′m1m2i = tr Jidx1 cK(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ(1)m1m2i)) (∗)≤ tr(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ(1)m1m2i)) = 1.
(Here (∗) holds because Jidx1 cK is a cq-superoperator and thus trace-decreasing.) Thus∑
m1m2i
trλm1m2i ρ
′
m1m2i
≤ ∑m1m2i λm1m2i = tr ρ ≤ ∞. Thus ρ′ = ∑m1m2i λm1m2i ρ′m1m2i ∈
T+cq [V1V2] exists. Since all ρ′m1m2i are separable, ρ
′ is separable. Since all ρ′m1m2i satisfy B, ρ
′ satisfies
B.
Furthermore,
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ =
∑
m1m2i
λm1m2i tr
[V1]
V2
ρ′m1m2i
(11)
=
∑
m1m2i
λm1m2i Jidx1 cK(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ(1)m1m2i))
= Jidx1 cK( ∑
m1m2i
λm1m2i proj
(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ(1)m1m2i))
= Jidx1 cK(tr[V1]V2 ∑
m1m2
(
proj
(|m1m2〉V cl1 V cl2 )⊗∑
i
λm1m2i proj
(
ψ
(1)
m1m2i
⊗ ψ(2)m1m2i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ρm1m2
))
= Jidx1 cK(tr[V1]V2 ρ). (13)
And analogously, we get
tr[V2]V1 ρ
′ = Jidx2 dK(tr[V2]V1 ρ). (14)
Summarizing, for any separable ρ that satisfies A, there is a separable ρ′ that satisfies B and such
that (13) and (14) hold. Thus {A}c ∼ d{B}. This shows the ⇐-direction. 
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5.1 Sound rules for qRHL.
From the definition of qRHL judgments, we can derive a number of reasoning rules for qRHL. Our
reasoning rules are sound (each rule follows from the definition of qRHL judgments), but we make no
claim that they are complete. (This situation is similar to that of pRHL, where no complete set of rules
has been proposed either. Instead, the set of rules is chosen to cover all use cases that occur in common
cryptographic proofs.)
We group the rules in three categories: In Figure 1, we list general reasoning rules. These rules are not
specific to individual statements (such as assignment or measurement), but instead describe structural
properties of qRHL (such as the frame rule, or case distinction, etc.) In Figure 2, we list the rules specific
to the classical statements in our language (e.g., assignment, sampling, if-statement). And in Figure 3,
we list rules specific to the quantum statements (e.g., measurement, quantum initialization). We will
shortly discuss those rules. The proofs of the rules are are given in Appendix A.
Theorem 37 The rules in Figures 1, 2, and 3 are sound.
(We prove this for each rule individually, see the lemmas referenced in the figures.)
General rules.
• Rule Sym states that qRHL is symmetric, i.e., we can exchange the left and the right program.
However, in that case, the indices of the variables in the pre- and postconditions need to be adjusted
(e.g., x1 has to become x2, and q2 has to become q1). The variable renaming σ from the rule maps
x1 to x2 and vice-versa, for classical and quantum variables. Then Aσ is the predicate A with its
classical variables renamed. (Aσ does not rename the quantum variables, because a predicate A is
by definition an expression with free classical variables, see Definition 13.) To rename the quantum
variables as well (i.e., to apply the renaming σ|V qu1 V qu2 to the quantum variables), we need to apply
the unitary Urename,σ|
V
qu
1 V
qu
2
that swaps `2[V qu1 ] and `
2[V qu2 ]. Thus, to rename both quantum and
classical variables in A we write Urename,σ|
V
qu
1 V
qu
2
(Aσ).
• Rule Conseq allows us to weaken the precondition and strengthen the postcondition of a qRHL
judgment (when doing backwards reasoning).
• Rule Seq allows us to reason about the sequential composition of programs by introducing a
predicate that has to hold in the middle of the execution of the two programs.
• Rule Case allows us to strengthen a precondition by assuming that a certain classical variable
or expression has a fixed but arbitrary value. For example, we can transform a qRHL judg-
ment {Cla[x1 = x2]}c ∼ d{Cla[x1 = x2]} into {Cla[x1 = x2 = z]}c∼ d{Cla[x1 = x2]}. Then we
can, e.g., perform case distinctions over z in the ambient logic (and apply different rules and proof
steps depending on the value of z) when proving the latter judgment.
This rule is similar to the classical proof technique of coin fixing: In coin fixing, we replace an ad-
versary that starts out with a random randomness tape x by an adversary which has a randomness
tape initialized to a fixed (but arbitrary) value z.
Rule Case is also used in the derivation of other rules. The proofs of rule If1 and rule JointIf use
rule Case to make a case distinction between taking the then- and the else-branch of a conditional.
• Rule Equal states that, if all classical and quantum variables of c are the same on the left and
right before execution, they are the same after execution.
This rule allows us to reason about unknown code c (adversary invocations).
• Rule Frame formalizes the fact that if some predicate holds before execution of the programs,
and the predicate refers only to variables not written in the programs, then it also holds after
the execution. For example, if we know {A}c ∼ d{B}, then we can derive {A ∩R}c∼ d{B ∩R},
assuming that R does not refer to any variables occurring in c,d. (Actually, it is sufficient to
assume that R only refers to classical variables that are not written by c,d, and only to quantum
variables that do not occur15 in c,d. See the formal statement of the rule.)
This rule is useful for compositional analysis. If c,d are subprograms of larger programs, we can
first analyze c,d (and derive some judgment {A}c∼ d{B}) and then use rule Frame to show that
additional invariants R occurring in the analysis of the larger programs are preserved.
An important special case is where c is an unspecified program (modeling an adversary). Say we
know that c only accesses variables x and q. Then by combining rule Frame with rule Equal,
15While we allow read-only classical variables of c,d to occur in R, we cannot make a comparable exception for quantum
variables. Measuring a quantum variable modifies it, so there is no obvious concept of a read-only quantum variable.
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we get {Cla[x1 = x2] ∩ (q1 ≡quant q2) ∩R}c∼ c{Cla[x1 = x2] ∩ (q1 ≡quant q2) ∩R} for R that does
not refer to x,q. (Formally, R is Y -local with x,q /∈ Y .) This means that when analyzing a pair
d1,d2 of programs that both invoke c, any invariant R between d1 and d2 is preserved by the call
to the adversary c (assuming that Cla[x1 = x2]∩ (q1 ≡quant q2) holds before the call to c, i.e., that
the adversary’s variables before invocation have the same state on both sides).
Since typically, we do not know anything about an adversary except which variables it may or may
not access, this is the only way to reason about adversaries.
• Rule QrhlElim allows us to deduce statements about probabilities from qRHL judgments. As the
final goal of a proof in qRHL is to make statements about, e.g., attack probabilities, it is necessary
to translate the judgments into statements about probabilities of certain events in programs. The
rule QrhlElim allows us to show statements of the form Pr[e : c(ρ1)] ≤ Pr[f : d(ρ2)] (or analogous
equalities) by proving qRHL judgments of the form {. . .}c∼ d{Cla[idx1 e⇒ idx2 f ]}. That is, to
show that e is less likely to occur in c (with initial state ρ1) than f is likely to occur in d (with
initial state ρ2), we need to show that c,d can be related in such a way that e implies f after
execution.
Obviously, we cannot expect this to hold for any ρ1, ρ2, so we use the precondition A to describe
the relationship between ρ1 and ρ2. Due to its general treatment of the relationship between ρ1
and ρ2, the rule is probably not easy to apply. For the most important special case where ρ1 = ρ2,
it is better to use the next rule.
• Rule QrhlElimEq is a special case of rule QrhlElim for comparing two programs with
the same initial state ρ. To show that Pr[e : c(ρ)] ≤ Pr[f : d(ρ)], we need to show
{Eqs}c ∼ d{Cla[idx1 e⇒ idx2 f ]} where Eqs is the predicate that states equality between all vari-
ables of c and d. (And analogously for Pr[e : c(ρ)] = Pr[f : d(ρ)].)
If additionally, we know that the initial predicate ρ satisfies a certain predicate A, we can strengthen
the precondition accordingly, see the formal statement of the rule.
An application of rule QrhlElimEq is probably the last step (or first when performing backwards
reasoning) in most qRHL-based proofs, since in a game-based proof, we usually compare the prob-
abilities of events that hold in different games (programs) when running them with the same initial
state. (And in most cases, we will have A = Cla[true] because all relevant variables would be
initialized by the programs.)
• Rule Trans: If c stands in a certain relationship to d, and d stands in a certain relationship to e,
then we expect to be able to conclude what the relationship between d and e is (transitivity). Rule
TransSimple is a simple version of the transitivity, where the relationship between c and d and
e is that all classical and quantum variables are equal in pre- and postcondition. In many cases,
equality is probably too restrictive, but we included this simplified rule for illustrative purposes.
A more powerful rule is rule Trans which allows us to use more complex relationships between c,
d namely predicates of the form Cla[acd]∩ (ucQc ≡quant udQd) (and analogous for d, e), subject to
a number of technical conditions detailed in rule. That is, the relationship between the classical
variables can be expressed by an expression a, and the quantum variables can be related by unitaries
u1, u2 (which in turn may depend on classical variables). Then the pre- and postcondition relating
c and e (in the conclusion of the rule) are what one would expect: the classical condition becomes
acd ◦e ade, which is the composition of acd, ade, interpreted as relations on classical memories (see
below for a definition). And the condition on the quantum variables becomes ucQc ≡quant udQd
(that is, quantum equality is transitive in a sense).
We do not know whether the present formulation of transitivity is the most general one. Finding
a more general one (or less technical) is an interesting open question.
Formally, e ◦e f is defined as the expression such that for two memories m1,m3 ∈ `2[V cl],Je ◦e fKm1◦idx−11 m3◦idx−12 = true iff there exists m2 ∈ `2[V cl] such that JeKm1◦idx−11 m2◦idx−12 = true
and JfKm2◦idx−11 m3◦idx−12 = true.
Rules for classical statements. For each classical statement of the language (skip, assignment,
sampling, if, and while) we provide one or several rules (Figure 2). Rules ending with 1 operate only on
the left program and assume that the right program is skip. The rules can be applied to a larger program
by combining them with rule Seq (as is automatically done by the tactics in our tool). The symmetric
variants of those rules (with names ending in 2) are omitted for brevity but can be derived using rule
Sym. For some statements, we have joint rules. E.g., joint sampling for showing qRHL judgments with
a sampling on both sides. These rules are used to prove qRHL judgments where the two programs are
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“in sync” (e.g., we can show that two programs x $← e and x $← e will satisfy postcondition x1 = x2,
i.e., the two samplings, though random, can be assumed to pick the same value). The rules concerning
classical statements are very similar to those in pRHL [5], except for rule JointSample which we have
somewhat generalized:
• Rule JointSample proves qRHL judgments of the form {A}x $← e1 ∼ y $← e2{B}. In the simplest
case, e1, e2 represent the same distribution, and we show the postcondition B := Cla[x1 = y2]. That
is, sampling x and y in the two programs proceeds “in sync”. However, in more general cases, we
might have different distributions e1, e2, and we might want to show a different relationship between
x1 and y2. In this case, we need to provide a joint distribution f as a witness, such that e1, e2 are
the marginals of f , and B holds for any (x1,y2) chosen according to f . (f is an expression and
thus may itself depend on classical program variables, if needed.)
For example, say e1 is the uniform distribution on {0, . . . , n− 1} and e2 is the uniform distribution
on {0, . . . , 2n− 1}, and B = Cla[x1 ≤ y2]. Then we can chose f :=
(
λy. (by/2c, y))(e2) (where we
use the notation g(e) to denote the distribution resulting from applying g to the values sampled
by e). This f has the marginals e1, e2, and (x1,y2) in the support of f always satisfy x1 ≤ y2.
In contrast, the joint sampling rule R-Rand from [5] required use to provide a bijection h between
the supports of e1 and e2. This is a weaker rule. It cannot be applied to preceding example,
for example (since there is no bijection between {0, . . . , n − 1} and {0, . . . , 2n − 1}). One can
recover the behavior of R-Rand from [5] as a special case of our rule JointSample by setting
f :=
(
λx.(x, h(x))
)
(e1) in our rule.
Rules for quantum statements. Like with the classical statements, we provide one or several rules
for each quantum statement (one-sided ones, and joint ones, see Figure 3). Again, for the one-sided rules
we only present the ones for the left side (ending with 1), the others are analogous and can be derived
using rule Sym.
• Rule QInit1 proves qRHL judgments that have a quantum initialization of the form Q q← e on the
left side. We assume just a single skip statement on the right side, more complex programs can be
first decomposed using rule Seq.16 The precondition (A÷ e′)⊗ `2[Q′] (with ÷ as in Definition 20)
consists of those states that, when we replace the content of variables Q′ by the state described by
the expression e′, we have a state in A.
Here Q′ and e′ are derived from Q and e by certain natural isomorphisms: Q′ is idx1Q, i.e., all
variables are indexed with 1. (To distinguish left and right variables in the pre- and postcondition.)
And e′ is Uvars,Q′ idx1 e, i.e., we index the classical variables in e with 1, and then map the state
returned by e from `2(Typeexpe ) (not labeled with quantum variables) into `2[Q′] (labeled with
quantum variables). Similar natural conversions occur in the following rules as well, we will ignore
them in our informal discussions.
Note that there is no joint rule for quantum initializations. That is because initialization does
not make any probabilistic choices (like measurements do), hence a joint rule would not be any
different from simply applying rules QInit1 and QInit2 consecutively. (This is analogous to the
classical situation where rule Assign1 has no joint variant either.)
• Rule QApply1 proves qRHL judgments that have a unitary quantum operation of the form
apply e to Q on the left side. (As with rule QInit1, we assume skip on the right side, and
there is an analogous omitted rule QApply2 for the right side.)
If e (and thus e′ which is lifted using Definition 19) is unitary, then the precondition can be e′∗ ·B,
because after applying e on Q in a state in e′∗ · B, we get a state in e′ · e′∗ · B = B. But since we
also allow isometries e in quantum applications, we need to restrict B to those states that are in
the image im e′ of e′, leading to the precondition e′∗ · (B ∩ im e′).
As with quantum initialization, we have no joint rule for quantum application since we can simply
apply rules QApply1 and QApply2 and get the same result.
• Rule Measure1 proves qRHL judgments that have a measurement of the form x ←
measure Q with e on the left side. (As with rule QInit1 and rule QApply1, we assume skip on
the right side, and there is an analogous omitted rule QMeasure2 for the right side.)
To satisfy the postcondition B, we need the following things to hold in the precondition:
16Here we implicitly use the (trivial to prove) associativity of ; and the fact that that skip; c = c = c; skip (w.r.t. to the
denotation of programs).
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– e needs to be a total measurement. Otherwise, the probability that the left program ter-
minates might be < 1, and the right program terminates with probability = 1, and then
{A}x←measure Q with e ∼ skip{B} cannot hold, no matter what the postcondition B is.
– For any possible outcome z, we need that the post-measurement state after outcome z is in
B{z/x1} (i.e., B with x1 set to be the outcome z). This is the case if the initial state lies
in the complement of the image im e′z (then the measurement will not pass), or if it lies in
B ∩ im e′z (then it will pass and stay in B), or if it is a sum of states satisfying those two
conditions. Here e′z is the projector corresponding to outcome z. Thus, for every outcome z,
we have the term (B{z/x1} ∩ im e′z) + (im e′z)⊥ in the precondition A.
• Rule JointMeasureSimple allows us to analyze two measurements that are performed “in sync”.
For example, consider a judgment of the following form:
{A′}x←measure q with e∼ y←measure q with e{Cla[x1 = y2]}
where e := M is a measurement in the diagonal basis, and q is a qubit variable, and A′ :=
span{|00〉q1q2}⊗`2[V1V2 \ q1q2] is a precondition that ensures that q1 and q2 are both initialized as
|0〉. Then the measurement on each side would yield a uniformly random bit x1 and y2, respectively,
and – analogous to the case where we just sample a uniformly random bit on both sides – we would
expect to be able to “match” the equally-distributed random choices and show the postcondition
Cla[x1 = y2].
However, by applying rules Measure1 and Measure2, we will not be able to prove this since
they treat the measurement outcome as non-deterministic (i.e., they ignore the distribution of the
outcomes).
Thus we need rule JointMeasureSimple for this case. This rule requires the following things to
hold in the precondition:
– For any possible outcome z, we need that the post-measurement state after both measurements
produce outcome z is in B{z/x1, z/y2} (i.e., B with x1,y2 set to the same outcome z).
Analogous to rule Measure1 (but generalized to the application of two measurements), this
means we need to satisfy in the precondition:
(B{z/x1, z/y2} ∩ im e′1z ∩ im e′2z) + (im e′1z)⊥ + (im e′2z)⊥
for every z. Here e′1z is the projector for outcome z on variables Q′1 and e′2z the projector for
outcome z on Q′2.
In our example, this would become (we omit the ⊗ `2[. . .] subterms for readability):(
Cla[z = z] ∩ span{H|z〉q1} ∩ span{H|z〉q2}
)
+ span{H|z〉q1}⊥ + span{H|z〉q2}⊥
= span{H|z〉q1 ⊗H|z〉q2}+ span{H|z〉q1}⊥ + span{H|z〉q2}⊥ = `2[V qu1 V qu2 ]
where H is the Hadamard matrix 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
. (That this simplifies to `2[V qu1 V
qu
2 ] is not
unexpected: since in this example, the postcondition B does not refer to q1,q2, the post-
measurement state will always be in B, no matter what the initial state is.)
– The measurement on the left and right side need to be the same. In the general case, this
leads to the condition Cla[idx1 e1 = idx2 e2]. In our example, this trivializes to Cla[M = M ] =
`2[V1V2].
– Finally, in order for the two measurements to give the same outcome with the same probability,
we need the measured state to be the same on both sides. This is captured by the quantum
equality Q′1 ≡quant Q′2. In our example: q1 ≡quant q2.
So, in our example, the precondition A given by rule JointMeasureSimple is simply A =
(q1 ≡quant q2), and we have
{q1 ≡quant q2}x←measure q with e∼ y←measure q with e{Cla[x1 = y2]}.
Since A′ ⊆ (q1 ≡quant q2) (because |00〉q1q2 is invariant under swapping q1 and q2), we also have
{A′}x←measure q with e ∼ y←measure q with e{Cla[x1 = y2]} as desired.
Note that in contrast to rule Measure1, we do not require the measurements to be total.
• Rule JointMeasure is the general form of rule JointMeasureSimple which does not require
the measurements on the left and the right to be the same measurement.
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Instead, we provide a relation f that pairs up outcomes on the left and right hand side, and provide
basis transforms that transform e1 into e2 and vice versa. More precisely, we provide isometries
u1 and u2, such that for all outcomes (x, y) ∈ f , u1e1(x)u∗1 = u2e2(y)u∗2 where e1(x), e2(y) are the
projectors corresponding to outcomes x, y on the left/right side, respectively. That is, applying
the basis transform u1 to the first measurement and u2 to the second gives the same measurement,
assuming we pair up the projectors e1(x), e2(y) according to f . (f, u1, u2 are all expressions and
may depend on classical program variables.)
Notice that the precondition will contain the quantum equality u1Q1 ≡quant u2Q2 instead of simply
Q1 ≡quant Q2 because the measured states need to be equal up to the basis transforms u1, u2.
Adversary rule. In cryptographic proofs, we will often need to compare two programs that contain
unknown pieces of code, and need to show that an invariant is preserved. (Usually, this code will be
the code of the adversary.) The simplest case would be if both sides of a qRHL judgment are the same,
i.e., the judgment is of the form {A}c ∼ c{A}. For such cases, the rule Equal rule (possibly combined
with Frame) can be used. However, often the adversary might call back into other code, e.g., when
calling an encryption algorithm/oracle. In that case, the left and right program might not be exactly
the same (e.g., because we are changing the encryption algorithm). Thus we need a rule for judgments
of the form {A}c∼ c′{A} where c and c′ are almost the same, except for some known differences.
More formally, let C be a context with multiple holes.17 Then we want to prove judgments of the form
{A}C[c1, . . . , cn]∼ C[c′1, . . . , c′n]{A}, without knowing anything about C (except which free variables it
has). We can, however, assume that we know ci, c′i since those programs represent known algorithms.
Thus, we want to reduce {A}C[c1, . . . , cn]∼ C[c′1, . . . , c′n]{A} to qRHL judgments about ci, c′i. This
can be done by induction over the structure of C. The following general rule summarizes the result of
such an induction:
Adversary[Lem. 67, p. 75]
X, X˜ are lists of classical variables Y,Z,W are lists of distinct quantum variables
Xi := idxiX X˜i := idxi X˜ Yi := idxi Y Wi := idxiW Y1Y2 ∩ Z = ∅ Y ∩W = ∅
C is a context with multiple holes (cf. footnote 17)
C is XY -local R is X˜1X˜2Z-local C is (X ∩ X˜)-readonly
A := Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Y1W1 ≡quant Y2W2) ∩R ∀i. {A}ci ∼ c′i{A}
{A}C[c1, . . . , cn]∼ C[c′1, . . . , c′n]{A}
In this rule, we used two new definitions: “C is V -readonly” means that all programs c in C (according
to the grammar in footnote 17) are V -readonly. And “C is V -local” means that all programs c in C are
V -local, and all expressions e in C satisfy fv(e) ⊆ V . Rule Adversary is a derived rule. That is, it can
be proven by using only rules Equal, Seq, Conseq, JointIf, JointWhile, Frame, without recourse
to the semantics of qRHL judgments or the language.
5.2 Relationship to classical pRHL
In this section, we show that the existing classical logic pRHL [5] is a special case of our new logic qRHL.
Namely, if no quantum variables are used, qRHL and pRHL coincide. In fact, all three variants of qRHL
(Definition 35, Definition 40, Definition 41) are equivalent in that case.
We recap the definition of pRHL, formulated with out notation and with respect to our semantics
(see Section 3.3). An informal definition was given in Definition 2.
Definition 38: Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic (pRHL)
Let c1, c2 be classical programs (in the sense of Section 3.3). Assume that V qu = ∅ (and thus also
V qu1 , V
qu
2 = ∅). Let a, b be expressions of type B.
Then {a}c1 ∼ c2{b}class holds iff for all m1 ∈ TypesetV1 , m2 ∈ TypesetV2 with JaKm1m2 = true, there
exists a distribution µ′ ∈ D≤1[V1V2] such that Jc1Kclass(δm1) = marginal1(µ′) and Jc2Kclass(δm2) =
marginal2(µ
′) and JbKm′1m′2 = true for all m′1m′2 ∈ suppµ′.
17Formally, a multi-hole context C matches the grammar C ::= i | C;C | if e then C else C | while e do C | c where
i = 1, . . . , n, and c is an arbitrary program, and e an arbitrary expression. Then C[c1, . . . , cn] is the program resulting
from replacing i by ci.
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(Recall that Jc1Kclass(δm1) is the distribution of the memory of c1 after execution if the initial memory
was m1.)
The relationship between the four relational Hoare logics in the classical case are summarized by the
following theorem:
Theorem 39 Let c1, c2 be classical programs (in the sense of Section 3.3). Assume that V qu = ∅ (and
thus also V qu1 , V
qu
2 = ∅). Let a, b be expressions of type B. Then the following four statements are
equivalent:
(i) {a}c1 ∼ c2{b}class (Definition 38, informally Definition 2)
(ii) {Cla[a]}c1 ∼ c2{Cla[b]} (Definition 35, informally Definition 5)
(iii) {Cla[a]}c1 ∼ c2{Cla[b]}nonsep (Definition 40, informally Definition 4)
(iv) {Cla[a]}c1 ∼ c2{Cla[b]}uniform (Definition 41)
Proof. First, note that if V qu1 V
qu
2 = ∅, then the states ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] are just the diagonal operators
ρ =
∑
m1m2∈TypesetV1V2
proj(|m1m2〉V1V2)·pm1m2 with pm1m2 ≥ 0 and
∑
m1m2
pm1m2 <∞. (This is because
a state ρm1m2 ∈ T+[V qu1 V qu2 ] = T+[∅] = R is just a scalar pm1m2 .)
In particular, any ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] is separable. Thus Definition 35 and Definition 40 are trivially
equivalent in this case, and we have (ii) ⇐⇒ (iii).
Furthermore, Definition 41 immediately implies Definition 40 since in Definition 40 we can choose
ρ′ := E(ρ) where E is the witness from Definition 41. Thus (iv) =⇒ (iii).
We now show (ii) ⇐⇒ (i). By Lemma 36, {Cla[a]}c1 ∼ c2{Cla[b]} is equivalent to:
(∗) For all m1, m2 and all normalized ψ1 ∈ `2[V qu1 ], ψ2 ∈ `2[V qu2 ] such that ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈JCla[a]Km1m2 , there exists a (V1, V2)-separable ρ′ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] such that:
ρ′ satisfies Cla[b], and tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ = Jidx1 c1K(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1)), and tr[V2]V1 ρ′ =Jidx2 c2K(proj(|m2〉V cl2 )⊗ proj(ψ2)).
For m1,m2 with JaKm1m2 = false, JCla[a]Km1m2 = 0 and thus there are no normalized ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈JCla[a]Km1m2 . And form1,m2 with JaKm1m2 = true, normalized ψ1⊗ψ2 ∈ JCla[a]Km1m2 = `2[V qu1 V qu2 ] =
`2[∅] = C are simply scalars with |ψ1| = |ψ2| = 1 and hence proj(ψ1) = proj(ψ2) = 1 ∈ C. Thus (∗) is
equivalent to:
(∗∗) For all m1, m2 with JaKm1m2 = true, there exists a (V1, V2)-separable ρ′ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] such
that:
ρ′ satisfies Cla[b], and tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ = Jidx1 c1K(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )), and tr[V2]V1 ρ′ =Jidx2 c2K(proj(|m2〉V cl2 )).
As mentioned above, ρ′ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] is always separable. And by definition, ρ′ satisfies Cla[b] iff
ρ′ is of the form ρ′ =
∑
m1m2 s.t.JbKm1m2=true proj(|m1m2〉V1V2) · µ
′(m1m2) = lift(µ′) with µ′ ∈ D[V1V2] andJbKm1m2 = true for all m1m2 ∈ suppµ′. (lift(·) was defined just before Lemma 12.) Furthermore,
since Jidxi ciK are trace-reducing, we have that ρ′ can only have tr ≤ 1, hence ∑µ′(m1m2) ≤ 1, i.e.,
µ′ ∈ D≤1[V1V2].
Thus (∗∗) is equivalent to:
(∗∗∗) For all m1, m2 with JaKm1m2 = true, there exists a µ′ ∈ D≤1[V1V2] such that:JbKm′1m′2 = true for all m′1m′2 ∈ suppµ′ and tr[V1]V2 lift(µ′) = Jidx1 c1K(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )), and
tr[V2]V1 lift(µ
′) = Jidx2 c2K(proj(|m2〉V cl2 )).
We have tr[V1]V2 lift(µ
′) = lift(marginal1(µ
′)), and by Lemma 12, we have
Jidx1 c1K(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )) = Jidx1 c1K(lift(δm1)) = lift(Jidx1 c1Kclass(δm1)).
Thus
tr[V1]V2 lift(µ
′) = Jidx1 c1K(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )) ⇐⇒ lift(marginal1(µ′)) = lift(Jidx1 c1Kclass(δm1))
⇐⇒ marginal1(µ′) = Jidx1 c1Kclass(δm1).
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and analogously
tr[V2]V1 lift(µ
′) = Jidx2 c2K(proj(|m2〉V cl2 )) ⇐⇒ marginal2(µ′) = Jidx2 c2Kclass(δm2).
Hence (∗∗∗) is equivalent to:
For all m1, m2 with JaKm1m2 = true, there exists a µ′ ∈ D≤1[V1V2] such that:JbKm′1m′2 = true for all m′1m′2 ∈ suppµ′ and marginal1(µ′) = Jidx1 c1Kclass(δm1) and
marginal2(µ
′) = Jidx2 c2Kclass(δm2).
And this is {a}c1 ∼ c2{b}class by definition.
Thus {Cla[a]}c1 ∼ c2{Cla[b]} is equivalent to {a}c1 ∼ c2{b}class, hence we have shown (ii) ⇐⇒ (i).
We now show (i) =⇒ (iv). Thus, assume that {a}c1 ∼ c2{b}class holds. We want to show
{Cla[a]}c1 ∼ c2{Cla[b]}uniform. For this, we first construct a witness E for {Cla[a]}c1 ∼ c2{Cla[b]}uniform.
Since {a}c1 ∼ c2{b}class, for every m1 ∈ TypesetV1 , m2 ∈ TypesetV2 with JaKm1m2 = true, there is a
µ′m1m2 ∈ D≤1[V1V2] such thatJidx1 c1Kclass(δm1) = marginal1(µ′m1m2) and Jidx2 c2Kclass(δm2) = marginal2(µ′m1m2) (15)
and JbKm′1m′2 = true for all m′1m′2 ∈ suppµ′m1m2 . (16)
For m1,m2 with JaKm1m2 = false, we choose µ′m1m2 := 0. Then (16) holds for all m1,m2. (Not just
for those with JaKm1m2 = true.)
Let E be the cq-superoperator on V1V2 with
E(proj(|m1m2〉V1V2)) := lift(µ′m1m2) (17)
(This extends linearly to all of T+cq [V1V2] which is the set of diagonal positive operators and thus
uniquely defines a cq-superoperator.)
By (16) and by definition of lift(·), for all m1m2, lift(µ′m1m2) is a linear combination of states of the
form proj(|m′1m′2〉V1V2) with JbKm′1m′2 = true. That implies that lift(µ′m1m2) satisfies Cla[b]. Since for all
ρ, E(ρ) is a linear combination of states lift(µ′m1m2), it follows that E(ρ) satisfies Cla[b] as well.
Fix some m1,m2 with JaKm1m2 = true. Then
tr[V1]V2 E(proj(|m1m2〉V1V2))
(17)
= tr[V1]V2 lift(µ
′
m1m2) = lift
(
marginal1(µ
′
m1m2)
)(15)
= lift
(Jidx1 c1Kclass(δm1))
Lem. 12
= Jidx1 c1K(lift(δm1)) = Jidx1 c1K(proj(|m1〉V1)) = Jidx1 c1K(tr[V1]V2 proj(|m1m2〉V1V2)).
Thus
tr[V1]V2 E(ρ) = Jidx1 c1K(tr[V1]V2 ρ) (18)
holds for any ρ of the form proj(|m1m2〉V1V2) with JaKm1m2 = true, and thus, by linearity, for every
ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfies Cla[a]. Analogously,
tr[V2]V1 E(ρ) = Jidx2 c2K(tr[V2]V1 ρ) (19)
for every ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfies Cla[a].
From the fact that E(ρ) satisfies Cla[b] for all ρ, and (18) and (19), it follows that E is a witness
for {Cla[a]}c1 ∼ c2{Cla[b]}uniform. This implies that {Cla[a]}c1 ∼ c2{Cla[b]}uniform holds. Hence we have
shown (i) =⇒ (iv).
Altogether, we showed (iv) =⇒ (iii) ⇐⇒ (ii) ⇐⇒ (i) =⇒ (iv). Hence the four statements from
the lemma are equivalent. 
5.3 Alternative definitions of qRHL
In this section, we discuss some alternative attempts at defining qRHL. These attempts have not been
successful but we believe that including them in this paper may help other researchers to avoid repeating
those attempts.
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Non-separable definition. The first definition we studied was the following:
Definition 40: qRHL, non-separable definition
Let c1, c2 be programs with fv(c1), fv(c2) ⊆ V . Let A,B be predicates over V1V2.
Then {A}c1 ∼ c2{B}nonsep holds iff for all ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfy A, we have that there exists
a ρ′ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfies B such that tr[V1]V2 ρ′ = Jidx1 c1K(tr[V1]V2 ρ) and tr[V2]V1 ρ′ = Jidx2 c2K(tr[V2]V1 ρ).
This definition arose by direct analogy to the definition of pRHL. The only difference between this
definition and Definition 35 (the definition of qRHL that we actually use) is that Definition 35 restricts
ρ and ρ′ to separable states. We already described this definition informally in the introduction as
Definition 4.
When analyzing this definition, we got stuck trying to prove a frame rule such as the following (other
rules posed no major problems):
A,B, c,d are X-local R is Y -local X ∩ Y = ∅ {A}c ∼ d{B}nonsep
{A ∩R}c ∼ d{B ∩R}nonsep
(For to keep notation simple, we often omit the indices 1 and 2 from variable names and applications
of the functions idx1, idx2 during this discussion.) The reason why it is difficult to prove this rule is the
following property of {A}c ∼ d{B}nonsep: When proving this judgment, we start with some initial joint
state ρ that satisfies A, compute the marginals ρ1 := tr
[V1]
V2
ρ and ρ2 := tr
[V2]
V1
ρ, compute the final states
ρ′1 := JcK(ρ1), ρ′2 := JdK(ρ2), and finally we recombine ρ′1 and ρ′2 into a state ρ that satisfies B. This
recombination leaves us a lot of freedom (all that is required is that ρ′1, ρ′2 are the marginals of ρ). In
particular, ρ′ may decompose into ρ′1, ρ′2 in a very different way than ρ decomposes into ρ1, ρ2.
The following example illustrates this: Let A := Cla[x1 = x2] and B := Cla[x1 6= x2] and c,d := skip.
Consider the initial state ρ := 12proj(|00〉x1x2)+ 12proj(|11〉x1x2), i.e., a state where x1 and x2 are uniformly
random but equal. ρ satisfies A. Then ρ1 = ρ2 = 12proj(|0〉x) + 12proj(|1〉x), i.e., a uniformly random bit.
Since c,d = skip, ρ′1 = ρ′2 = ρ1 = ρ2. It would seem natural to then pick ρ′ := ρ, but we have another
choice: ρ′ := 12proj(|01〉x1x2) + 12proj(|10〉x1x2). This ρ′ also has marginals ρ′1, ρ′2, and ρ′ satisfies B. Of
course, this does not show that {A}c ∼ d{B}nonsep holds, since there other initial ρ that satisfy A for
which this reasoning does not apply. But it illustrates that there could be many different ways how the
final state ρ′ is constructed. And, what is worse, it may be that for each initial ρ satisfying A, the way
how the corresponding ρ′ is constructed is very different. (In other words, the mapping ρ 7→ ρ′ is not,
e.g., a continuous function.)
What does this have to do with the frame rule?
If we want to show {A ∩R}c ∼ d{B ∩R}nonsep, we start with a state ρ that satisfies A∩R, and that
has marginals ρ1 and ρ2, which are transformed by c,d into ρ′1, ρ′2, respectively. Now, since ρ satisfies A,
and {A}c ∼ d{B}nonsep holds by assumption, we know that ρ′1, ρ′2 can be recombined into some ρ′ that
satisfies B. We can also show that ρ′1, ρ′2 can be recombined into some ρ′′ that satisfies R.18 However,
ρ′ and ρ′′ are not the same state. It might be that any way to recombine ρ′1, ρ′2 into some state that
satisfies B will necessarily have to combine ρ′1, ρ′2 in a way that violates the predicate R. While we were
not able to find a concrete example where the frame rule breaks down for Definition 40, we were also not
able to come up with a proof that solves the problem of recombining ρ′1, ρ′2 in a way that both B and R
are satisfied.
Uniform definition. The difficulties with the frame rule seem to hint that the problem with Defini-
tion 40 is the fact that ρ′ can be constructed from ρ′1, ρ′2 in very arbitrary ways, leading to a possibly
not even continuous map ρ 7→ ρ′ (and such a map is unlikely to have a natural operational meaning).
Our second attempt was therefore to formulate a definition that forces ρ′ to depend in a more uniform
way on ρ. More specifically, we require ρ 7→ ρ′ to be a cq-superoperator (which we will call the “witness”).
We get the following definition:
Definition 41: qRHL, uniform definition
{A}c1 ∼ c2{B}uniform holds iff there exists a cq-superoperator E on V1V2 (the witness) such that for
all ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfy A, we have:
• ρ′ := E(ρ) satisfies B,
18We skip the proof here, but at least for total c,d, it is easy to see that ρ′′ := (JcK⊗ JdK)(ρ) satisfies R if ρ satisfies R.
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• tr[V1]V2 ρ′ = Jidx1 c1K(tr[V1]V2 ρ),
• tr[V2]V1 ρ′ = Jidx2 c2K(tr[V2]V1 ρ).
With this definition, the frame rule holds: One first proves that a witness for {A}c ∼ d{B}uniform (where
A,B, c,d are X-local) can without loss of generality be chosen to be X-local.19 Since E is a witness for
{A}c∼ d{B}uniform, for any ρ that satisfies A ∩ B (and thus A), we have that ρ′ := E(ρ) satisfies B.
And tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ = Jidx1 cK(tr[V1]V2 ρ) and tr[V2]V1 ρ′ = Jidx2 dK(tr[V2]V1 ρ). Furthermore, since E is X-local and R is
Y -local with X ∩ Y = ∅, and since ρ satisfies R, we have that ρ′ = E(ρ) satisfies R as well. Thus ρ′
satisfies B ∩ R. This implies that E is in fact already a witness for {A ∩R}c ∼ d{B ∩R}uniform. The
frame rule follows. (We omit a detailed proof because we do not use this version of qRHL in the end,
anyway.)
So, what is the problem with Definition 41 then? The problem is to find a notion of quantum equality.
As discussed in the introduction, we need some notion of equality of quantum variables. Besides other
rules, such an equality notion should satisfy the following rule:
c is Q-local
{Q1 ≡quant Q2}c ∼ c{Q1 ≡quant Q2}uniform
In other words, if the left and right variables are equal before execution, and we execute the same program
on both sides, then the variables should be equal afterwards.
Unfortunately, for Definition 41, no such equality notion exists (at least if we want the equality notion
to be a quantum predicate that can be represented as a subspace)!
The problem is the following: say we are given an initial state ρ = ρ1 ⊗ ρ2 satisfying q1 ≡quant q2.
Then ρ1 = ρ2. Say we execute on both side a program c that effectively applies some projector P to
the variable q1 (e.g., because c is a non-total projective measurement). Then the final state will be
ρ′1 := Pρ1P and ρ′2 := Pρ2P on the left and right side, respectively. We need to find a state ρ′ such
that ρ′1 and ρ′2 are the marginals of ρ′. At first glance, it seems the best choice is ρ′ := ρ′1 ⊗ ρ′2. But
then tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ = ρ′1 · tr ρ′2 which does in general not equal ρ′1 because ρ′2 may not have trace 1 (namely,
if P corresponds to a measurement that fails with non-zero probability). In order to get the correct
marginals, we need to define ρ′ := ρ
′
1⊗ρ′2
tr ρ′1
=
ρ′1⊗ρ′2
tr ρ′2
. (In the formal impossibility proof, we show that
at least in some cases, this is indeed the only possible choice of ρ′.) But now the mapping ρ 7→ ρ′
cannot be realized by a cq-superoperator any more (or any linear function), hence there is no witness
for {q1 ≡quant q2}c ∼ c{q2 ≡quant q2}uniform. (This holds not only for the definition of ≡quant given in
Definition 28, but for any equality definition that can be represented as a subspace.)
The formal impossibility result is given in Section B.3.
One may wonder whether this impossibility result hinges on the fact that we used a program c that
was not total (because it maps ρ1 to Pρ1P ). However, similar problems occur also with total programs,
e.g., if c measures with a projective measurement M = {P, 1 − P} and stores the result in a classical
variable.
Because of the problem with equality, we abandon the uniform definition of qRHL (Definition 41) in
favor of Definition 35 which is closer in spirit to Definition 40 (except that it requires separable states
ρ, ρ′). In some sense, this is unfortunate because Definition 41 feels somewhat more natural: it does not
allow us to pick the state ρ′ in arbitrary dependency of ρ, but instead requires that dependency to be
natural in a physical sense. It is an interesting open question whether we can find some definition in the
spirit of Definition 41 but which has a quantum equality.
As a side effect, note the problem with Definition 41 also shows that the approach of [8] is unlikely
to work in the quantum setting (at least not when translated straightforwardly to the quantum setting).
In [8], a logic ×qRHL is developed in which an explicit product program is used as a witness for a pRHL
judgment. Those explicit product programs from ×qRHL are exactly the classical special cases of the
witness in Definition 41.
19For a witness E for {A}c ∼ d{B}uniform, let E ′(ρ) := tr[XZ]Z′ Erename,σ ◦(E⊗idZ′ )◦Erename,σ(ρ⊗σ0) where Z := V1V2\X,
Z′ is a fresh copy of the variables Z, σ is the variable renaming that exchanges Z and Z′, and σ0 ∈ T+cq [Z′] is an arbitrary
operator with trσ0 = 1.
Then E ′ is a witness for {A}c ∼ d{B}uniform as well, and E ′ is X-local. (Assuming that A, c,d, B are X-local.)
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Sym[Lem. 44, p. 44]{
Urename,σ|
V
qu
1 V
qu
2
(Aσ)
}
d ∼ c{Urename,σ|
V
qu
1 V
qu
2
(Bσ)
}
σ := idx1 ◦ idx−12 ∪ idx2 ◦ idx−11
{A}c ∼ d{B}
Conseq[Lem. 46, p. 47]
A ⊆ A′ B′ ⊆ B {A′}c ∼ d{B′}
{A}c∼ d{B}
Seq[Lem. 47, p. 47]
{A}c1 ∼ c2{B} {B}d1 ∼ d2{C}
{A}c1;d1 ∼ c2;d2{C}
Case[Lem. 48, p. 48]
∀z ∈ Typeexpe . {Cla[e = z] ∩A}c∼ d{B}
{A}c ∼ d{B}
Equal[Lem. 49, p. 48]
X is a list of classical variables
Y is a list of distinct quantum variables c is XY -local Xi := idxiX Yi := idxi Y{
Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Y1 ≡quant Y2)
}
c ∼ c{Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Y1 ≡quant Y2)}
Frame[Lem. 45, p. 45]
X ′i := idxiXi Y
′
i := idxi Yi
c is X1-local d is X2-local R is Y ′1Y
′
2 -local X1 ∩ Y1 and X2 ∩ Y2 are classical
c is (X1 ∩ Y1)-readonly d is (X2 ∩ Y2)-readonly {A}c ∼ d{B}
{A ∩R}c ∼ d{B ∩R}
QrhlElim[Lem. 50, p. 50]
ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] is separable ρ satisfies A
Erename,idx1(ρ1) = tr[V1]V2 ρ Erename,idx2(ρ2) = tr[V2]V1 ρ
{
A
}
c ∼ d{Cla[idx1 e⇒ idx2 f ]}
Pr
[
e : c(ρ1)
] ≤ Pr[f : d(ρ2)] (also holds for =,⇔ and≥,⇐ instead of ≤,⇒)
QrhlElimEq[Lem. 51, p. 51]
ρ ∈ T+cq [V ] ρ satisfies A
X is a list of classical variables Y is a list of distinct quantum variables c,d are XY -local
A is V clY -local Xi := idxiX Yi := idxi Y Ai := Urename,idxi(idxiA)⊗ `2[V qu3−i]{
Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Y1 ≡quant Y2) ∩A1 ∩A2
}
c∼ d{Cla[idx1 e⇒ idx2 f ]}
Pr
[
e : c(ρ)
] ≤ Pr[f : d(ρ)] (also holds for =,⇔ and≥,⇐ instead of ≤,⇒)
TransSimple[Lem. 53, p. 62]
Xpi := idxi fv(p)
cl, Qpi := idxi fv(p)
qu for p = c,d, e, i = 1, 2
{Cla[Xc1 = Xd2] ∩ (Qc1 ≡quant Qd2)}c∼ d{Cla[Xc1 = Xd2] ∩ (Qc1 ≡quant Qd2)}
{Cla[Xd1 = Xe2] ∩ (Qd1 ≡quant Qe2)}d ∼ e{Cla[Xd1 = Xe2] ∩ (Qd1 ≡quant Qe2)}
{Cla[Xc1 = Xe2] ∩ (Qc1 ≡quant Qe2)}c∼ e{Cla[Xc1 = Xe2] ∩ (Qc1 ≡quant Qe2)}
Trans[Lem. 52, p. 53]
Qc, Qd, Rd, Qe are lists of quantum variables fv(c)qu ⊆ Qc
fv(e)qu ⊆ Qe Typeexpacd ,Typeexpade ,Typeexpbcd ,Type
exp
bde
⊆ B Typeexpup ⊆ Iso(TypelistQp , Z ′) for p = c, e
Typeexpud ⊆ U(TypelistQd , Z ′) Typeexpvp ⊆ Iso(TypelistQp , Z ′) for p = c, e Typeexpvd ⊆ B≤1(TypelistRd , Z ′)
Qpi := idxiQp, upi := idxi up, vpi := idxi vp for i = 1, 2, p = c,d, e Rdi := idxiRd for i = 1, 2
(bcd =⇒ (x(1)1 , . . . ,x(n)1 ) = idx2 ec) holds for some expression ec and {x(1), . . . ,x(n)} := fv(c)cl
(bde =⇒ (y(1)2 , . . . ,y(m)2 ) = idx1 ee) holds for some expression ee and {y(1), . . . ,y(m)} := fv(d)cl{
Cla[acd] ∩ (uc1Qc1 ≡quant ud2Qd2)
}
c∼ d
{
Cla[bcd] ∩ (vc1Qc1 ≡quant vd2Rd2)
}{
Cla[ade] ∩ (ud1Qd1 ≡quant ue2Qe2)
}
d ∼ e
{
Cla[bde] ∩ (vd1Rd1 ≡quant ve2Qe2)
}
{
Cla[acd ◦e ade] ∩ (uc1Qc1 ≡quant ue2Qe2)
}
c ∼ e
{
Cla[bcd ◦e bde] ∩ (vc1Qc1 ≡quant ve2Qe2)
}
Figure 1: Rules for qRHL (general rules). Proofs are in Section A.1.
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Skip[Lem. 54, p. 62]
{A}skip ∼ skip{A}
Assign1[Lem. 55, p. 62]{
B{idx1 e/x1}
}
x← e∼ skip{B}
Sample1[Lem. 56, p. 62]
A :=
(
Cla[e′ is total] ∩
⋂
z∈supp e′ B{z/x1}
)
e′ := idx1 e
{A}x $← e∼ skip{B}
JointSample[Lem. 57, p. 63]
A :=
(
Cla
[
marginal1(f) = idx1 e1 ∧marginal2(f) = idx2 e2
] ∩ ⋂
(z1,z2)∈supp f
B{z1/x1, z2/y2}
)
Typeexpf ⊆ D≤1(Typex × Typey)
{A}x $← e1 ∼ y $← e2{B}
If1[Lem. 58, p. 64]{
Cla[idx1 e] ∩A
}
c∼ skip{B} {Cla[¬ idx1 e] ∩A}d ∼ skip{B}
{A}if e then c else d∼ skip{B}
JointIf[Lem. 59, p. 64]
A ⊆ Cla[idx1 e1 = idx2 e2]{
Cla[idx1 e1 ∧ idx2 e2] ∩A
}
c1 ∼ c2
{
B
} {
Cla[¬ idx1 e1 ∧ ¬ idx2 e2] ∩A
}
d1 ∼ d2
{
B
}
{A}if e1 then c1 else d1 ∼ if e2 then c2 else d2{B}
While1[Lem. 60, p. 65] {
Cla[idx1 e] ∩A
}
c∼ skip{A}
A ⊆ A1 ⊗ `2[V qu2 ] (while idx1 e do idx1 c) is total on A1 (see Def. 22){
A
}
while e do c ∼ skip{Cla[¬ idx1 e] ∩A}
JointWhile[Lem. 61, p. 68]
A ⊆ Cla[idx1 e1 = idx2 e2] {Cla[idx1 e1 ∧ idx2 e2] ∩A}c ∼ d{A}
{A}while e1 do c ∼ while e2 do d{Cla[¬ idx1 e1 ∧ ¬ idx2 e2] ∩A}
Figure 2: Rules for qRHL (related to individual classical statements). Proofs are in Section A.2. For the rules Assign1,
Sample1, If1, and While1, there is also an analogous symmetric rule that we do not list explicitly.
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QInit1[Lem. 66, p. 74]
Q′ := idx1Q e′ := Uvars,Q′ idx1 e{
(A÷ e′)⊗ `2[Q′]}Q q← e ∼ skip{A}
QApply1[Lem. 65, p. 74]
e′ := idx1 e» idx1Q
{e′∗ · (B ∩ im e′)}apply e to Q∼ skip{B}
Measure1[Lem. 62, p. 70]
A :=
(
Cla[idx1 e is a total measurement] ∩
⋂
z∈Typex1
(
(B{z/x1} ∩ im e′z) + (im e′z)⊥
))
e′z := idx1 e(z)» idx1Q
{A}x←measure Q with e ∼ skip{B}
JointMeasureSimple[Lem. 64, p. 73]
Typex = Typey Type
list
Q1 = Type
list
Q1
Q′1 := idx1Q1 Q
′
2 := idx2Q2 e
′
1z := idx1 e1(z)»Q
′
1 e
′
2z := idx2 e2(z)»Q
′
2
A := Cla[idx1 e1 = idx2 e2] ∩ (Q′1 ≡quant Q′2) ∩
⋂
z∈Typex
(B{z/x1, z/y2} ∩ im e′1z ∩ im e′2z) + (im e′1z)⊥ + (im e′2z)⊥
{A}x←measure Q1 with e1 ∼ y←measure Q2 with e2{B}
JointMeasure[Lem. 63, p. 71]
Typeexpf ⊆ 2Typex×Typey Typeexpu1 ⊆ Iso(TypelistQ1 , Z) Typeexpu2 ⊆ Iso(TypelistQ2 , Z)
Q′1 := idx1Q1 Q
′
2 := idx2Q2 e
′
1x := idx1 e1(x)»Q
′
1 e
′
2y := idx2 e2(y)»Q
′
2
Cf := Cla
[(∀x. idx1 e1(x) 6= 0 =⇒ ∣∣{y : (x, y) ∈ f}∣∣ = 1) ∧ (∀y. idx2 e2(y) 6= 0 =⇒ ∣∣{x : (x, y) ∈ f}∣∣ = 1)]
Ce := Cla
[
∀(x, y) ∈ f. u1
(
idx1 e1(x)
)
u∗1 = u2
(
idx2 e2(y)
)
u∗2
]
A :=
⋂
(x,y)∈f
(B{x/x1, y/y2} ∩ im e′1x ∩ im e′2y) + (im e′1x)⊥ + (im e′2y)⊥{
Cf ∩ Ce ∩A ∩ (u1Q′1 ≡quant u2Q′2)
}
x←measure Q1 with e1 ∼ y←measure Q2 with e2
{
B
}
Figure 3: Rules for qRHL (related to individual quantum statements). Proofs are in Section A.3. For the rulesMeasure1,
QApply1, and QInit1, there is also an analogous symmetric rule that we do not list explicitly.
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6 Examples
6.1 EPR pairs
We present a small example of a derivation in our logic. What we show is that, if we initialize two
variables with an EPR pair, it does not matter whether we apply a Hadamard transform to the first or
to the second variable.
The two programs we analyze are thus:
c := qr
q← EPR;apply H to q, d := qr q← EPR;apply H to r.
Here EPR := 1/
√
2
∣∣(0, 0)〉 + 1/√2∣∣(1, 1)〉 is an EPR pair, and H := 1√
2
1 1
1 −1
 is the Hadamard
transform.
We want to show that both programs return the same quantum state, i.e., we want to show
{Cla[true]}c ∼ d{q1r1 ≡quant q2r2}. (20)
We refer to the first/second statement of c as c1, c2. Analogously for d. Let I0 := (q1r1 ≡quant q2r2).
By rule QApply1, we have {I1}c2 ∼ skip{I0} with
I1 := (H»q1)∗ ·
(
I0 ∩ im(H»q1)
) (∗)
=
(
(H ⊗ id)q1r1 ≡quant q2r2
)
.
Here (∗) follows by the fact that im(H»q1) is the full space (since H is unitary), and Lemma 32.
By rule QApply2, we have {I2}skip ∼ d2{I1} with
I2 := (H»r2)∗ ·
(
I1 ∩ im(H»r2)
) (∗)
=
(
(H ⊗ id)q1r1 ≡quant (id ⊗H)q2r2
)
.
Here (∗) is simplified analogously as the previous step.
By rule QInit1, we have {I3}c1 ∼ skip{I2} with
I3 := I2 ÷ Uvars,q1r1EPR⊗ `2[q1r1].
By rule QInit2, we have {I4}skip∼ d1{I3} with
I4 := I3 ÷ Uvars,q2r2EPR⊗ `2[q2r2].
Using three applications of rule Seq,20 those three qRHL judgments imply {I4}c ∼ d{I0}.
In order to show {Cla[true]}c∼ d{I0} using Conseq, we need to show that Cla[true] ⊆ I4.
We have
Cla[true] ⊆ I4
Lemma 21⇐⇒ Cla[true] ∩ span{Uvars,q2r2EPR} ⊗ `2[V qu1 V qu2 \ q2r2] ⊆ I3
⇐⇒ span{EPR»q2r2} ⊆ I3
Lemma 21⇐⇒ span{EPR»q2r2} ∩ span{Uvars,q1r1EPR} ⊗ `2[V qu1 V qu2 \ q1r1] ⊆ I2
⇐⇒ span{EPR»q2r2} ∩ span{EPR»q1r1} ⊆ I2
⇐⇒ ∀x. Uvars,q2r2EPR⊗ Uvars,q1r1EPR⊗ |x〉V qu1 V qu2 \q1r1q2r2 ∈ I2 =
(
(H ⊗ id)q1r1 ≡quant (id ⊗H)q2r2
)
Lemma 29⇐⇒ (H ⊗ id)EPR = (id ⊗H)EPR.
The last line can be verified by elementary computation. Hence Cla[true] ⊆ I4 is true. (In fact, we
can also prove the statement Cla[true] ⊆ I4 directly by explicit computation, but the involved matrices
are too unwieldy for a pen-and-paper proof. However, in our tool such a computation can be performed
automatically.)
From Cla[true] ⊆ I4 and {I4}c∼ d{I0}, by rule Conseq, we get (20) as desired.
We have formalized this proof in our tool in the contributed file epr.qrhl.
20Here we implicitly use the (trivial to prove) fact that that skip; c = c = c; skip (w.r.t. to the denotation of programs).
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6.2 Measurements
We extend the previous example to include a measurement of the two quantum registers in the compu-
tational basis. The fact that the quantum registers between the two programs are equal (in the sense of
≡quant) before the measurements will imply that the outcomes are the same. That is, with c,d as in the
previous section, we define
c′ := c;x←measure qr with Mclass︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:e
, d′ := d;x←measure qr with Mclass .
Here x has type Typex = B× B, i.e., two bits, and Mclass is a measurement in the computational basis
on two qubits. (Formally, Mclass
(
(a, b)
)
:= proj
(|(a, b)〉).)
And we want to show:
{Cla[true]}c′ ∼ d′{Cla[x1 = x2]}. (21)
By rule JointMeasureSimple (with Q1 := Q2 := qr, e1 := e2 := Mclass), we have
{I1}e∼ e{Cla[x1 = x2]}
with
I1 := Cla[Mclass = Mclass ] ∩ (q1r1 ≡quant q2r2) ∩
⋂
a,b∈{0,1}
(
Cla[z = z] ∩A1ab ∩A2ab
)
+ (A1ab)
⊥ + (A2ab)
⊥.
and Aiab := im proj(|(a, b)〉qiri).
Since Mclass = Mclass and z = z are trivially true, the above simplifies to
I1 = (q1r1 ≡quant q2r2) ∩
⋂
a,b∈{0,1}
(A1ab ∩A2ab) + (A1ab)⊥ + (A2ab)⊥.
Furthermore, A1ab ∩ A2ab + (A1ab)⊥ + (A2ab)⊥ = `2[V1V2]. This is shown by noting that ev-
ery vector ψ is a linear combination of vectors in A1ab ∩ A2ab, (A1ab)⊥, (A2ab)⊥ and then verify-
ing the equation for each of those three cases. Thus the definition of I1 simplifies to I1 =
(q1r1 ≡quant q2r2). Hence {q1r1 ≡quant q2r2}e ∼ e{Cla[x1 = x2]}. With (20) and rule Seq, we get
{Cla[true]}c; e ∼ d; e{Cla[x1 = x2]}. Using the definitions of c′,d′, e, we obtain our goal (21).
We have formalized this proof in our tool in the contributed file epr-measure.qrhl.
6.3 Post-quantum cryptography
Our second example proof is the ROR-OT-CPA security of a simple one-time encryption scheme. This
example illustrates how post-quantum cryptographic proofs may end up being very similar to classical
pRHL proofs, except for a bit of additional syntactic clutter.
The setting. The encryption scheme is defined by
enc : K ×M →M, enc(k,m) := G(k)⊕m
dec : K ×M →M, dec(k, c) := G(k)⊕ c
where G : K →M is a pseudorandom generator, k is the key, and m is the message (plaintext).
The ROR-OT-CPA security notion says, informally: The adversary cannot distinguish between an
encryption of m and an encryption of a random message, even if the adversary itself chooses m. More
formally:
Definition 42: ROR-OT-CPA advantage
For a stateful adversary A1, A2, let
AdvA1A2ROR :=
∣∣∣Pr[b = 1 : k $← U , m← A1(), c← enc(k,m), b← A2(c)]
−Pr[b = 1 : k $← U , m← A1(), r $← U , c← enc(k, r), b← A2(c)]∣∣∣
where U is the uniform distribution (on the domain of the respective variable), and the notation
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Pr[e : G] denotes the probability that e holds after executing the instructions in G.
We call AdvA1A2ROR the ROR-OT-CPA advantage of A1, A2.
Analogously, we define pseudorandomness of G : K → M by defining the PRG advantage of G:
Definition 43: PRG advantage
For an adversary B, let
AdvBPRG :=
∣∣∣Pr[b = 1 : s $← U , r ← G(s), b← B(r)]− Pr[b = 1 : r $← U , b← B(r)]∣∣∣.
What we want to show is the following well-known fact: “If G is pseudorandom, then enc is ROR-OT-
CPA.” In other words, if AdvAROR is big for some efficient adversary A, then Adv
B
PRG is big for some related
efficient adversary B. In the present case, we can even show the stronger result AdvAROR = Adv
B
PRG for
some B. This is shown by proving that for a suitable B, the lhs of AdvAROR equals the lhs of Adv
B
PRG,
and the rhs of AdvAROR equals the rhs of Adv
B
PRG. Since our formalism does not include procedures with
parameters and return values, we first need to rewrite the games (program fragments) in the definitions
of AdvAROR and Adv
B
PRG. This is done by defining A1 to be an arbitrary adversary that can access the
output variable m, and A2 to be one that can access the input/output variables c,b. In addition, they
can keep an internal state, thus A1 and A2 have access to some additional classical variables C and (very
important for the post-quantum setting) quantum variables Q. That is, A1 has free variables m, C,Q,
and A2 has free variables c,b, C,Q. We can then write the lhs of AdvROR and AdvPRG as the following
programs:
G1 := k
$← U ; A1; c← enc(k,m); A2
G2 := s
$← U ; r← G(s); B
where k, r, c, s,m,b are classical variables. (We omit the proof of the equality of the right hand sides
from this example.) Furthermore, we need to chose an efficient adversary B:
B := A1; c← r⊕m;A2
We now need to show Pr[b = 1 : G1(ρ)] = Pr[b = 1 : G2(ρ)] for arbitrary initial state ρ. (See Definition 9
for the notation Pr[· : ·(ρ)].) For this, we first show {I}G1 ∼ G2{Cla[b1 = b2]} for a suitable precondition
A. To make the following calculation more compact, let xy . . . mean x1 = x2∧y1 = y2∧ . . . for classical
x,y, . . . , and let Q mean Q1 ≡quant Q2. We perform a backward reasoning, starting with the desired
post-condition, and working out way backward through the statements in G1, G2 (sometimes individually,
sometimes pairwise). Note that the precondition of each line matches the postcondition of the next one.
{Cla[bcC] ∩Q}A2 ∼ A2{Cla[b]} Equal,Conseq
{Cla[enc(k1,m1) = c2 ∧ bC] ∩Q}c← enc(k,m)∼ skip{Cla[bcC] ∩Q} Assign1
{Cla[enc(k1,m1)=r2⊕m2 ∧ bC] ∩Q}skip∼ c←r⊕m{Cla[enc(k1,m1)=c2 ∧ bC] ∩Q} Assign2
{Cla[G(k1) = r2 ∧mbC] ∩Q} ⊆ {Cla[enc(k1,m1) = r2⊕m2 ∧ bC] ∩Q} (def. of enc)
{Cla[G(k1) = r2 ∧mbC] ∩Q}A1 ∼ A1{Cla[G(k1) = r2 ∧mbC] ∩Q} Equal,Frame
{Cla[G(k1) = G(s2) ∧mbC] ∩Q}skip ∼ r← G(s){Cla[G(k1) = r2 ∧mbC] ∩Q} Assign2
{A}k $← U ∼ s $← U{Cla[G(k1) = G(s2) ∧mbC] ∩Q} JointSample
In the last step (JointSample), we define µ to be the uniform distribution on pairs (z, z). Using f := µ
in rule JointSample, we get the precondition
A := Cla[marginal1(µ) = U ∧marginal2(µ) = U ] ∩
⋂
(z1,z2)∈suppµ
(
Cla[G(z1) = G(z2) ∧mbC] ∩Q
)
= Cla[∀(z1, z2) ∈ suppµ. G(z1) = G(z2) ∧mbC] ∩Q = Cla[mbC] ∩Q ⊇ Cla[krcsmbC] ∩Q
Here the first expression after := is what rule JointSample gives us, the next equality holds since
both marginals of of µ are the uniform distribution, and by Lemma 25. The last equality is elementary
first-order logic (using the fact that suppµ contains only pairs (z, z)).
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Combining all those judgments using rules Seq and Conseq, we get
{Cla[krcsmbC] ∩Q}G1 ∼ G2{Cla[b]}.
By rule QrhlElimEq, this implies
Pr[b = 1 : G1(ρ)] = Pr[b = 1 : G2(ρ)]
as desired.
Notice how each predicate in the above calculation is of the form Cla[e] ∩ (Q1 ≡quant Q2) for some
classical expression e, and that the (Q1 ≡quant Q2)-part of the predicates is not touched by the rules.21
This means that, as long as we treat the quantum adversary as a black box, and no other quantum
operations are performed in our games, the reasoning in qRHL will be almost identical to that in pRHL.
This is good news because it means that we need to deal with the extra complexity of quantum mechanics
only in those cases where we would have to deal with them in a pen-and-paper proof as well.
We have formalized this proof in our tool in the contributed file prg-enc-rorcpa.qrhl.
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A Proofs of rules
A.1 General rules
Lemma 44: Symmetry
Rule Sym holds.
Proof. We first show an auxiliary fact:
Claim 2 If ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] satisfies a predicate A, and σ : V1V2 → V1V2 is a variable renaming, then
Erename,σ(ρ) satisfies A∗ := Urename,σ|
V
qu
1 V
qu
2
(Aσ).
21Rule JointSample gave us a more complex precondition but we can easily see that the precondition of JointSample
can always be simplified to something of the form Cla[. . .] ∩ Q with steps analogous to what we did here, provided the
postcondition is of the form Cla[. . .] ∩Q. In fact, we could formulate a special case of JointSample that directly has pre-
and postcondition of the form Cla[. . .] ∩Q.
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Proof of claim. Since ρ is a cq-operator, we can write ρ as ρ =
∑
m∈Typeset
V cl1 V
cl
2
proj(|m〉V cl1 V cl2 )⊗ρm.
Since ρ satisfies A, it follows that supp ρm ⊆ JAKm for all m. Let ρ′m := Erename,σ|V qu1 V qu2 (ρm).
Then
supp ρ′m = suppUrename,σ|V qu1 V qu2
ρmU
∗
rename,σ|
V
qu
1 V
qu
2
= Urename,σ|
V
qu
1 V
qu
2
supp ρm ⊆ Urename,σ|
V
qu
1 V
qu
2
JAKm
= Urename,σ|
V
qu
1 V
qu
2
JAσKm◦(σ|
V cl1 V
cl
2
)−1
= JA∗Km◦(σ|
V cl1 V
cl
2
)−1 .
Furthermore,
Erename,σ(ρ) =
∑
m
Erename,σ|
V cl1 V
cl
2
(
proj(|m〉V cl1 V cl2 )
)⊗ Erename,σ|
V
qu
1 V
qu
2
(ρm)
=
∑
m
proj
(
Urename,σ|
V cl1 V
cl
2
|m〉V cl1 V cl2
)
⊗ ρ′m
=
∑
m
proj
(∣∣m ◦ (σ|V cl1 V cl2 )−1〉V cl1 V cl2 )⊗ ρ′m.
Since supp ρ′m ∈ JA∗Km◦(σ|V cl1 V cl2 )−1 , this implies that ρ′′m := proj(|m ◦ (σ|V cl1 V cl2 )−1〉V cl1 V cl2 ) ⊗ ρ′m
satisfies A∗, and hence Erename,σ(ρ) =
∑
m ρ
′′
m satisfies A∗. 
Let A∗ := Urename,σ|
V
qu
1 V
qu
2
(Aσ) and B∗ := Urename,σ|
V
qu
1 V
qu
2
(Bσ).
Fix a separable ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfies A. Then ρˆ := Erename,σ(ρ) satisfies A∗ by Claim 2.
Since ρ is separable, so is ρˆ. We have {A∗}d ∼ c{B∗} from the premises of rule Sym. Thus there exists
a separable ρˆ′ that satisfies B∗ and such that
Jidx1 dK(tr[V1]V2 ρˆ) = tr[V1]V2 ρˆ′ and Jidx2 cK(tr[V2]V1 ρˆ) = tr[V2]V1 ρˆ′. (22)
Let ρ′ := Erename,σ(ρˆ′). Then
Jidx1 cK(tr[V1]V2 ρ) = Erename,σ|V2 ◦ Jidx2 cK ◦ Erename,σ|V1 (tr[V1]V2 ρ)
= Erename,σ|V2 ◦ Jidx2 cK(tr[V2]V1 Erename,σ(ρ))
= Erename,σ|V2 ◦ Jidx2 cK(tr[V2]V1 ρˆ)
(22)
= Erename,σ|V2
(
tr[V2]V1 ρˆ
′) = tr[V1]V2 Erename,σ(ρˆ′) = tr[V1]V2 ρ′.
Analogously, we get Jidx2 dK(tr[V2]V1 ρ) = tr[V2]V1 ρ′.
Furthermore, since ρˆ′ is separable, ρ′ is separable. And since ρˆ′ satisfies B∗, by Claim 2, ρ′ satisfies
Urename,σ|
V
qu
1 V
qu
2
(B∗σ) = Urename,σ|
V
qu
1 V
qu
2
Urename,σ|
V
qu
1 V
qu
2
(
B(σ ◦ σ)) = B. (We use that σ ◦ σ = id .)
Since this holds for any separable ρ that satisfies A, we have {A}c∼ d{B}. 
Lemma 45: Frame rule
Rule Frame holds.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that Xqu1 Y
qu
1 = V
qu and Xqu2 Y
qu
2 = V
qu. (Otherwise, we
replace Yi by Yi ∪ V qu \Xqui without making any of the premises false. Note that Xqu1 , Y qu1 as well as
Xqu2 , Y
qu
2 are disjoint by assumption.) Thus X
′
1
qu
Y ′1
qu
= V qu1 and X
′
2
qu
Y ′2
qu
= V qu2 .
Fix m1 ∈ TypesetV cl1 and m2 ∈ Type
set
V cl2
and normalized ψ1 ∈ `2[V qu1 ] and ψ2 ∈ `2[V qu2 ] with ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈JA ∩RKm1m2 .
Let ρ := proj
(|m1m2〉V cl1 V cl2 ⊗ ψ1 ⊗ ψ2). Since ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JA ∩RKm1m2 ⊆ JAKm1m2 , we have that ρ
satisfies A.
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Since {A}c∼ d{B}, this implies that there exists a separable ρ′ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] such that
ρ′ satisfies B, (23)
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ = Jidx1 cK(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1)), (24)
tr[V2]V1 ρ
′ = Jidx2 dK(proj(|m2〉V cl2 )⊗ proj(ψ2)). (25)
For applying Lemma 36, it remains to show that ρ′ satisfies B ∩R.
By Lemma 7, we can decompose ψ1 =
∑
i λ1iψ
X
1i ⊗ ψY1i for some λ1i > 0, and orthonormal ψX1i ∈
`2[X ′1
qu
], ψY1i ∈ `2[Y ′1qu]. And ψ2 =
∑
i λ2iψ
X
2i ⊗ ψY2i for some λ2i > 0, and orthonormal ψX2i ∈ `2[X ′2qu],
ψY2i ∈ `2[Y ′2qu].
Let R1 :=
∑
i span{ψY1i} ⊆ `2[Y ′1qu] and R2 :=
∑
i span{ψY2i} ⊆ `2[Y ′2qu]. Both R1 and R2 are
subspaces.
Let R′ ⊆ `2[Y ′1quY ′2qu] be the subspace such that JRKm1m2 = R′⊗ `2[X ′1quX ′2qu] (R′ exists since R is
is Y ′1Y ′2 -local and X ′1
qu
X ′2
qu ∩ Y ′1quY ′2qu = ∅).
Claim 1 R1 ⊗R2 ⊆ R′.
Proof of claim. Since ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JA ∩RKm1m2 ⊆ JRKm1m2 = R′ ⊗ `2[X ′1quX ′2qu], we have
supp proj(ψ1 ⊗ ψ2) ⊆ R′ ⊗ `2[X ′1quX ′2qu] and thus for all i, j:
ψY1i ⊗ ψY2j ∈ supp
∑
i,j
λ1iλ2jproj(ψ
Y
1i ⊗ ψY2j) = supp tr[Y
′
1
quY ′2
qu]
X′1
quX′2
qu proj(ψ1 ⊗ ψ2) ⊆ R′.
Since R1 ⊗R2 is the span of {ψY1i ⊗ ψY2j}ij , it follows that R1 ⊗R2 ⊆ R′. 
Since ρ′ ∈ T+cq [V1V2], we can decompose it as ρ′ =
∑
m¯1m¯2
proj
(|m¯1m¯2〉V cl1 V cl2 )⊗ρ′m¯1m¯2 with ρ′m¯1m¯2 ∈
T+cq [V
qu
1 V
qu
2 ].
Claim 2 For all m¯1, m¯2, supp ρ′m¯1m¯2 ⊆ R1 ⊗R2 ⊗ `2[X ′1quX ′2qu].
Proof of claim. Since idx1 c is X ′1-local, and X ′1
qu∩Y ′1qu = ∅, we can write Jidx1 cK = Ec⊗ idY ′1 qu
for some cq-superoperator Ec on V1 \ Y ′1qu. Then
tr
[Y ′1
qu]
V1V2\Y ′1
qu ρ′ = tr
[Y ′1
qu]
V1\Y ′1
qu tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ (24)= tr[Y
′
1
qu]
V1\Y ′1
quJidx1 cK(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1))
= tr
[Y ′1
qu]
V1\Y ′1
qu(Ec ⊗ idY ′1 qu)
(
proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1)
)
= tr
[Y ′1
qu]
V1\Y ′1
qu
(
proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1)
)
= tr
[Y ′1
qu]
V
qu
1 \Y
′
1
qu proj(ψ1) =
∑
i
λ21i proj
(
ψY1i
)
=: ρ′′.
Since ψR1i ∈ R1 for all i by definition of R1, we have that supp ρ′′ ⊆ R1. Thus supp tr[Y
′
1
qu]
V1V2\Y ′1
quρ′ ⊆
R1 as well. Hence supp ρ′ ⊆ R1 ⊗ `2[V1V2 \ Y ′1qu]. Hence supp(
∑
m¯1,m¯2
ρ′m¯1,m¯2) =
supp tr
[V
qu
1 V
qu
2 ]
V cl1 V
cl
2
ρ′ ⊆ R1 ⊗ `2[V qu1 V qu2 \ Y ′1qu]. Hence supp ρ′m¯1m¯2 ⊆ R1 ⊗ `2[V qu1 V qu2 \ Y ′1qu].
Analogously, we show supp ρ′m¯1m¯2 ⊆ R2 ⊗ `2[V qu1 V qu2 \ Y ′2qu].
Since
(R1 ⊗ `2[V qu1 V qu2 \ Y ′1qu]) ∩ (R2 ⊗ `2[V qu2 V qu1 \ Y ′2qu])
= R1 ⊗R2 ⊗ `2[V qu1 V qu2 \ Y ′1quY ′2qu] = R1 ⊗R2 ⊗ `2[X ′1quX ′2qu],
the claim follows. 
Claim 3 For all m¯1, m¯2 with ρm¯1m¯2 6= 0, we have JRKm¯1m¯2 = R′ ⊗ `2[X ′1quX ′2qu].
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Proof of claim. Fix m¯1, m¯2 with ρm¯1m¯2 6= 0.
We first show that m¯1 = m¯2 on Y ′1
cl. Fix y1 ∈ Y ′1 cl. Let z := m1(y1). Then
we have that proj
(|m1〉V cl1 ) ⊗ proj(ψ1) satisfies Cla[y1 = z]. If y1 ∈ X ′1cl ∩ Y ′1 cl, the fact
that idx1 c is (X ′1 ∩ Y ′1)-readonly (from the premises of rule Frame) implies that tr[V1]V2 ρ′
(24)
=Jidx1 cK(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1)) satisfies Cla[y1 = z]. If y1 ∈ Y ′1 cl \ X ′1cl, the fact that idx1 c is
X ′1
cl-local (from the premises) implies that tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ (24)= Jidx1 cK(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1)) satisfies
Cla[y1 = z]. So tr
[V1]
V2
ρ′ satisfies Cla[y1 = z] in both cases. Hence ρ′ satisfies Cla[y1 = z]. Since
ρ′ =
∑
m¯1m¯2
proj
(|m¯1m¯2〉V cl1 V cl2 ) ⊗ ρ′m¯1m¯2 , this implies supp ρm¯1m¯2 ⊆ JCla[y1 = z]Km1m2 . Since
ρm¯1m¯2 6= 0, this implies JCla[y1 = x]Km1m2 6= 0, hence (m¯1(y1) = z) = Jy1 = zKm¯1m¯2 = true,
thus m¯1(y1) = z = m1(y1). Since this holds for every y1 ∈ Y ′1 cl, we have that m¯1 = m1 on Y ′1 cl.
Analogously we show that m¯2 = m2 on Y ′2
cl.
Since R is Y ′1Y ′2 -local, we have fv(R) ⊆ Y ′1 clY ′2 cl. And since m¯1m¯2 = m1m2 on Y ′1 clY ′2 cl,
we have JRKm¯1m¯2 = JRKm1m2 . And JRKm1m2 = R′ ⊗ `2[X ′1quX ′2qu] by definition of R′. ThusJRKm¯1m¯2 = R′ ⊗ `2[X ′1quX ′2qu]. 
Claim 4 ρ satisfies B ∩R.
Proof of claim. By Claim 2, supp ρ′m¯1m¯2 ⊆ R1 ⊗ R2 ⊗ `2[X ′1quX ′2qu] for all m¯1, m¯2. By
Claim 1, it follows that supp ρ′m¯1m¯2 ⊆ R′ ⊗ `2[X ′1quX ′2qu]. If ρ′m¯1m¯2 6= 0, this implies
supp ρ′m¯1m¯2 ⊆ JRKm¯1m¯2 by Claim 3. If ρ′m¯1m¯2 = 0, we have supp ρ′m¯1m¯2 = 0 ⊆ JRKm¯1m¯2 .
Thus ρ′ =
∑
m¯1m¯2
proj
(|m¯1m¯2〉V cl1 V cl2 )⊗ ρ′m¯1m¯2 satisfies R.
By (23), ρ′ satisfies B. Thus ρ′ satisfies B ∩R. 
Summarizing, for all m1 ∈ TypesetV cl1 and m2 ∈ Type
set
V cl2
and normalized ψ1 ∈ `2[V qu1 ] and ψ2 ∈ `2[V qu2 ]
with ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JA ∩RKm1m2 , there is a separable ρ′ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfies B ∩ R, and such that
(24) and (25) hold. By Lemma 36, this implies {A ∩R}c ∼ d{B ∩R}. 
Lemma 46: Weakening
Rule Conseq holds.
Proof. Fix a separable ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfies A. By Lemma 17, ρ satisfies A′. Then {A′}c ∼ d{B′}
implies that there is a separable ρ′ ∈ Tcq [V1V2] that satisfies B′ and such that tr[V1]V2 ρ′ = Jidx1 c1K(tr[V1]V2 ρ)
and tr[V2]V1 ρ
′ = Jidx2 c2K(tr[V2]V1 ρ). By Lemma 17, ρ′ satisfies B. Thus {A}c∼ d{B} holds. 
Lemma 47: Program composition
Rule Seq holds.
Proof. Fix a separable ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfies A. Then by {A}c1 ∼ c2{B}, there is a separable
ρ′ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfies B such that
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ = Jidx1 c1K(tr[V1]V2 ρ) and tr[V2]V1 ρ′ = Jidx2 c2K(tr[V2]V1 ρ). (26)
Then by {B}d1 ∼ d2{C}, there is a separable ρ′′ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfies C such that
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′′ = Jidx1 d1K(tr[V1]V2 ρ′) and tr[V2]V1 ρ′′ = Jidx2 d2K(tr[V2]V1 ρ′). (27)
By definition, Jidx1(c1;d1)K = Jidx1 c1; idx1 d1K = Jidx1 d1K ◦ Jidx1 c1K and thus
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′′ (27)= Jidx1 d1K(tr[V1]V2 ρ′)(26)= Jidx1 d1K(Jidx1 c1K(tr[V1]V2 ρ)) = qidx1(c1;d1)y(tr[V1]V2 ρ).
Similarly,
tr[V2]V1 ρ
′′ =
q
idx2(c2;d2)
y(
tr[V2]V1 ρ
)
.
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Thus {A}c1;d1 ∼ c2;d2{C}. 
Lemma 48: Case distinction
Rule Case holds.
Proof. Fix m1 ∈ TypesetV cl1 , m2 ∈ Type
set
V cl2
, and normalized ψ1 ∈ `2[V qu1 ], ψ2 ∈ `2[V qu2 ] with ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈JAKm1m2 .
Let ρ := proj(|m1m2〉V cl1 V cl2 ) ⊗ proj(ψ1 ⊗ ψ2) ∈ T+cq [V1V2]. The operator ρ is separable. Since
ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JAKm1m2 , we have that ρ satisfies A. Let z := JeKm1m2 . Then ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ `2[V qu1 V qu2 ] =JCla[e = z]Km1m2 . Thus ρ satisfies Cla[e = z]. Since ρ satisfies both Cla[e = z] and A, ρ satisfies
Cla[e = z] ∩ A. By assumption, we have {Cla[e = z] ∩A}c∼ d{B}. Thus there exists a separable
ρ′ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfies B and such that tr[V1]V2 ρ′ = Jidx1 cK(tr[V1]V2 ρ) and tr[V2]V1 ρ′ = Jidx2 dK(tr[V2]V1 ρ).
Since tr[V1]V2 ρ = proj(|m1〉V cl1 ) ⊗ proj(ψ1) and tr
[V2]
V1
ρ = proj(|m2〉V cl2 ) ⊗ proj(ψ2), it follows that tr
[V1]
V2
ρ′ =Jidx1 cK(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1)), and tr[V2]V1 ρ′ = Jidx2 dK(proj(|m2〉V cl2 )⊗ proj(ψ2)).
By Lemma 36, this implies {A}c ∼ d{B}. 
Lemma 49: Equality
Rule Equal holds.
Proof. Let A := Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Y1 ≡quant Y2). We need to show {A}c ∼ c{A}. Let Z1 := V1 \X1Y1
and Z2 := V2 \X2Y2.
Fix m1 ∈ TypesetV cl1 , m2 ∈ Type
set
V cl2
and normalized ψ1 ∈ `2[V qu1 ], ψ2 ∈ `2[V qu2 ] such that ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈JAKm1m2 .
Let ρ′1 := Jidx1 cK(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1)) and ρ′2 := Jidx2 cK(proj(|m2〉V cl2 )⊗ proj(ψ2)).
Our goal is to show that there exists a separable ρ′ ∈ Tcq [V1V2] such that: ρ′ satisfies A, and
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ = ρ′1, and tr
[V1]
V2
ρ′ = ρ′2. This will imply {A}c ∼ c{A} by Lemma 36.
Claim 1 m1(x1) = m2(x2) for all x ∈ X.
Proof of claim. If m1(x1) 6= m2(x2) for some x ∈ X, we have JX1Km1m2 6= JX2Km1m2 . ThusJX1 = X2Km1m2 = false, and thus JCla[X1 = X2]Km1m2 = 0. Since A ⊆ Cla[X1 = X2] this
implies JAKm1m2 = 0 in contradiction to ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JAKm1m2 . 
Let σ : V1 → V2 denote the variable renaming with σ(x1) = x2 for all x ∈ V .
Claim 2 We can write ρ′1 and ρ′2 as ρ′1 = ρ′1,XY ⊗ ρ′1,Z and ρ′2 = ρ′2,XY ⊗ ρ′2,Z for some ρ′1,XY ∈
T+cq [X1Y1], ρ′2,XY ∈ T+cq [X2Y2], ρ′1,Z ∈ T+cq [Z1], and ρ′2,Z ∈ T+cq [Z2] such that tr ρ′1,Z = tr ρ′2,Z = 1 and
Erename,σ|X1Y1 (ρ′1,XY ) = ρ′2,XY .
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Proof of claim. Since idx1 c is X1Y1-local, we can write Jidx1 cK as Jidx1 cK = Ec⊗ idZ1 for some
cq-superoperator Ec on X1Y1. Furthermore, Jidx2 cK = Erename,σ ◦ Jidx1 cK ◦ Erename,σ−1 . HenceJidx2 cK = E ′c ⊗ idZ2 for E ′c := Erename,σ|X1Y1 ◦ Ec ◦ Erename,(σ|X1Y1 )−1 .
Note that σ|Y1 is the variable renaming with σ(qi) = q′i when qi and q′i are the i-th variable in
Y1 and Y2, respectively. And ψ1 ⊗ψ2 ∈ JAKm1m2 ⊆ (Y1 ≡quant Y2). Thus by Corollary 30, we can
write ψ1, ψ2 as ψ1 = ψY1 ⊗ψZ1 and ψ2 = ψY2 ⊗ψZ2 for some normalized ψY1 ∈ `2[Y1], ψZ1 ∈ `2[Zqu1 ],
ψX2 ∈ `2[Y2], ψY2 ∈ `2[Zqu2 ] with ψY1 = Urename,(σ|Y1 )−1ψY2 . (Note that in Corollary 30, the variable
renaming σ : V2 → V1 is the inverse of the variable renaming σ defined here.)
We then have
ρ′1 = Jidx1 cK(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1)) = Ec (proj(∣∣m1|X1〉X1 ⊗ ψY1 ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ρ′1,XY
⊗ proj(∣∣m1|Zcl1 〉Zcl1 ⊗ ψZ1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ρ′1,Z
and
ρ′2 = Jidx2 cK(proj(|m2〉V cl2 )⊗ proj(ψ2)) = E ′c (proj(∣∣m2|X2〉X2 ⊗ ψY2 ))⊗ proj(∣∣m2|Zcl2 〉Zcl2 ⊗ ψZ2 )
= Erename,σ|X1Y1 ◦ Ec ◦ Erename,(σ|X1Y1 )−1
(
proj
(∣∣m2|X2〉X2 ⊗ ψY2 ))⊗ proj(∣∣m2|Zcl2 〉Zcl2 ⊗ ψZ2 )
= Erename,σ|X1Y1 ◦ Ec
(
proj
(∣∣(m2|X2 ◦ σ|X1)〉X1)⊗ proj(Urename,(σ|Y1 )−1ψY2 ))⊗ proj(∣∣m2|Zcl2 〉Zcl2 ⊗ ψZ2 )
(∗)
= Erename,σ|X1Y1 ◦ Ec
(
proj
(∣∣m1|X1〉X1 ⊗ ψY1 ))⊗ proj(∣∣m2|Zcl2 〉Zcl2 ⊗ ψZ2 )
= Erename,σ|X1Y1
(
ρ′1,XY
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ρ′2,XY
⊗ proj(∣∣m2|Zcl2 〉Zcl2 ⊗ ψZ2 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ρ′2,Z
.
Here (∗) uses that m2|X2 ◦ σ|X1 = m1|X1 by Claim 1 and Urename,(σ|Y2 )−1ψY2 = ψY1 by definition
of ψY1 and ψY2 .
And ρ′1,Z , ρ
′
2,Z have trace 1 since ψ
Z
1 and ψZ2 are normalized. 
Since ρ′1,XY is a cq-density operator, we can decompose ρ
′
1,XY as ρ
′
1,XY =∑
mX1 ,i
λmX1 ,iproj
(|mX1 〉X1)⊗ proj(φmX1 i) for some normalized φmX1 i ∈ `2[Y1] and some λmX1 ,i > 0. Here
mX1 ranges over Type
set
Xqu1
. Note that
∑
mX1 ,i
λmX1 i = tr ρ
′
1,XY <∞.
Let
ρ′ :=
∑
mX1 ,i
λmX1 ,i proj
(∣∣(mX1 mX1 ◦ (σ|X2))〉X1X2)⊗ proj(φmX1 i)⊗ proj(Urename,σ|Y1φmX1 i)⊗ ρ′1,Z ⊗ ρ′2,Z .
(28)
Claim 3 ρ′ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] exists (i.e., the sum defining ρ′ converges) and ρ′ is separable.
Proof of claim. Since λmX1 ,i > 0 and
∑
mX1 ,i
λmX1 i = tr ρ
′
1,XY < ∞, and the tensor product in
(28) has trace 1, we have ρ′ ∈ T+cq [V1V2]. And by construction, ρ′ is separable. 
Claim 4 tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ = ρ′1 and tr
[V2]
V1
ρ′ = ρ′2.
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Proof of claim. We compute tr[V1]V2 ρ
′:
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ =
∑
mX1 ,i
λmX1 ,i proj(|m
X
1 〉X1)⊗ proj(φmX1 i)⊗ ρ
′
1,Z · tr proj(Urename,σ|Y1φmX1 i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=‖φ
mX1 i
‖2=1
· tr ρ′2,Z︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
= ρ′1,XY ⊗ ρ′1,Z = ρ′1.
We now compute tr[V2]V1 ρ
′:
tr[V2]V1 ρ
′ =
∑
mX1 ,i
λmX1 ,i proj
(∣∣(mX1 ◦ σ|X2)〉X2)⊗ proj(Urename,σ|Y1φmX1 i)⊗ ρ′2,Z · tr proj(φmX1 i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=‖φ
mX1 i
‖2=1
· tr ρ′1,Z︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
=
∑
mX1 ,i
λmX1 ,i Erename,σ|X1Y1
(
proj
(|mX1 〉X1)⊗ proj(φmX1 i))⊗ ρ′2,Z
= Erename,σ|X1Y1 (ρ′1,XY )⊗ ρ′2,Z = ρ′2,XY ⊗ ρ′2,Z = ρ′2. 
Claim 5 ρ′ satisfies A.
Proof of claim. For any m1,m2 such that m1|X1 = mX1 and m2|X2 = mX1 ◦(σ|X2) for some mX1 ∈
TypesetX1 , we have JX1 = X2Km1m2 = true, thus JCla[X1 = X2]Km1m2 = `2[V cl1 V cl2 ]. Hence any cq-
operator of the form
∑
mX1 ,i
λmX1 ,i proj
(∣∣(mX1 mX1 ◦ (σ|X2))〉X1X2) ⊗ . . . satisfies Cla[X1 = X2].
Thus ρ′ as defined in (28) satisfies Cla[X1 = X2].
From (28) it follows that ρ′ can be decomposed as ρ′ =∑
j λjproj
(
φj ⊗ Urename,σ|Y1φj ⊗ φ′1j ⊗ φ′2j
)
for some normalized φj ∈ `2[Y2], φ′1j ∈ `2[X1Zqu1 ],
φ′2j ∈ `2[X2Zqu2 ], and λi > 0. (To arrive at this decomposition, we start with (28), and decompose
ρ′1,Z and ρ
′
2,Z as mixtures of pure states.)
Fix some j. By Corollary 30 (with ψ1 := φj ⊗ φ′1j and ψ2 := Urename,σ|Y1φj ⊗ φ′2j and
X1 := Y1 and X2 := Y2 and V1 := V1 and V2 := V2 and σ := (σ|Y1)−1), we have that (φj ⊗φ′1j)⊗
(Urename,σ|Y1φj ⊗ φ′2j) ∈ (Y1 ≡quant Y2), since φj = Urename,(σ|Y1 )−1Urename,σ|Y1φj .
Since for all j, (φj ⊗ φ′1j)⊗ (Urename,σ|Y1φj ⊗ φ′2j) ∈ (Y1 ≡quant Y2), it follows that ρ′ satisfies
(Y1 ≡quant Y2).
Thus ρ’ satisfies both Cla[X1 = X2] and Y1 ≡quant Y2, hence ρ′ satisfies A = Cla[X1 = X2] ∩
(Y1 ≡quant Y2). 
Summarizing, for any ψ1, ψ2,m1,m2 as in Lemma 36 with ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JAKm1m2 , there exists a
separable ρ′ ∈ Tcq [V1V2] (Claim 3) such that tr[V1]V2 ρ′ = ρ′1 = Jidx1 cK(proj(|m1〉V cl1 ) ⊗ proj(ψ1)) and
tr[V2]V1 ρ
′ = ρ′2 = Jidx2 cK(proj(|m2〉V cl2 )⊗ proj(ψ2)) (Claim 4) and such that ρ′ satisfies A (Claim 5).
By Lemma 36, this implies {A}c ∼ c{A}. Since A was defined as A := Cla[X1 = X2]∩(Y1 ≡quant Y2),
the lemma follows. 
Lemma 50: Elimination rule for qRHL
Rule QrhlElim holds.
Proof. Let ρ′1 := Erename,idx1(ρ1) and ρ′2 := Erename,idx2(ρ2).
Since ρ is separable, and ρ satisfies A, and since {A}c∼ d{Cla[idx1 e⇒ idx2 f ]}, there exists a state
ρ′ such that ρ′ satisfies Cla[idx1 e⇒ idx2 f ], and
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ = Jidx1 cK(tr[V1]V2 ρ) = Jidx1 cK(ρ′1),
tr[V2]V1 ρ
′ = Jidx2 dK(tr[V2]V1 ρ) = Jidx2 dK(ρ′2).
Since ρ′ is a separable and ρ′ ∈ T+cq [V1V2], we can write ρ′ as
ρ′ =
∑
m1m2
proj
(|m1m2〉V cl1 V cl2 )⊗ ρ′m1m2
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for some ρ′m1m2 ∈ T+[V qu1 V qu2 ]. Then
Jidx1 cK(ρ′1) = tr[V1]V2 ρ′ = ∑
m1
proj
(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗∑
m2
tr
[V
qu
1 ]
V
qu
2
ρ′m1m2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ρ′′m1
,
Jidx2 dK(ρ′2) = tr[V2]V1 ρ′ = ∑
m2
proj
(|m2〉V cl2 )⊗∑
m1
tr
[V
qu
2 ]
V
qu
1
ρ′m1m2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ρ′′m2
.
Let pm1m2 := tr ρ′m1m2 . Let E := {m1 : Jidx1 eKm1 = true} and F := {m2 : Jidx2 fKm2 = true}. By
definition of Pr[e : c(ρ1)], we have
Pr
[
e : c(ρ1)
]
= Pr
[
idx1 e : (idx1 c)(ρ
′
1)
]
=
∑
m1∈E
tr ρ′′m1 =
∑
m1,m2
m1∈E
tr tr
[V
qu
1 ]
V
qu
2
ρ′m1m2 =
∑
m1,m2
m1∈E
pm1m2 .
And analogously
Pr
[
f : d(ρ2)
]
=
∑
m1,m2
m2∈F
pm1m2 .
Since ρ′ satisfies Cla[idx1 e⇒ idx2 f ], we have that ρ′m1m2 = 0 whenever Jidx1 e⇒ idx2 fKm1m2 =
false. In other words, pm1m2 = 0 whenever m1 ∈ E ∧m2 /∈ F .
Thus
Pr
[
f : d(ρ2)
]
=
∑
m1,m2
m2∈F
pm1m2 =
∑
m1,m2
m2∈F
pm1m2 +
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
m1,m2
m1∈E∧m2 /∈F
pm1m2 =
∑
m1,m2
m1∈E∨m2∈F
pm1m2
≥
∑
m1,m2
m1∈E
pm1m2 = Pr
[
e : c(ρ1)
]
.
This shows rule QrhlElim.
The variants of rule QrhlElim with =,⇔ and ≥,⇐ instead of ≤,⇒ follow from the ≤,⇒-case
using rule Sym and rule Conseq. 
Lemma 51: Elimination rule for qRHL, for quantum equality
Rule QrhlElimEq holds.
Proof. Fix some arbitrary normalized ψ0 ∈ `2[V qu \ Y ]. Let E(ρˆ) := tr[V clY ]V qu\Y (ρˆ) ⊗ proj(ψ0) for all
ρˆ ∈ Tcq [V ]. Then E is an (V qu \ Y )-local cq-superoperator on V .
Let ρ∗ := E(ρ). Since E is (V qu \ Y )-local, and c is XY -local, and (V qu \ Y ) ∩XY = ∅ (since X1
are classical), we have that JcK and E commute. Furthermore, since E is (V qu \ Y )-local, it operates
only on quantum variables. Thus E = idV ⊗ E ′ for some trace-preserving E ′ on V qu. Let JcK(ρ) =:∑
m proj
(|m〉V cl)⊗ ρm for some ρm ∈ Tcq [V qu]. Then
JcK(ρ∗) = JcK(E(ρ)) = ∑
m
E(proj(|m〉V cl)⊗ ρm) = ∑
m
proj(|m〉V cl)⊗ E ′(ρm).
Hence
Pr
[
e : c(ρ)
]
=
∑
m:JeKm=true
tr ρm =
∑
m:JeKm=true
tr E ′(ρm) = Pr
[
e : c(ρ∗)
]
. (29)
Analogously, we get
Pr
[
f : d(ρ)
]
= Pr
[
f : d(ρ∗)
]
. (30)
Since E is a cq-superoperator, we have that ρ∗ = E(ρ) ∈ T+cq [V ]. Thus we can decompose ρ∗ as
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ρ∗ =
∑
m,i αm,i proj
(|m〉V cl ⊗ ψm,i ⊗ ψ0) for some αm,i > 0 and normalized ψm,i ∈ `2[Y ]. Let
ρˆ :=
∑
m,i
αm,iproj
(
Urename,idx1
(|m〉V cl ⊗ ψm,i ⊗ ψ0)⊗ Urename,idx2(|m〉V cl ⊗ ψm,i ⊗ ψ0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:φm,i
)
.
Claim 1 ρˆ is separable.
Proof of claim. Immediate from the definition of ρˆ. 
Claim 2 ρˆ satisfies Cla[X1 = X2].
Proof of claim. We have JX1Km ◦ idx−11 = JXKm = JX2Km ◦ idx−12 for all m ∈ TypesetV cl . ThusJX1 = X2Km ◦ idx−11 m ◦ idx−12 = true. Furthermore
φm,i = Urename,idx1|m〉V cl ⊗ Urename,idx2|m〉V cl ⊗ · · · =
∣∣m ◦ idx−11 〉V cl1 ⊗ ∣∣m ◦ idx−12 〉V cl2 ⊗ · · ·
=
∣∣m ◦ idx−11 m ◦ idx−12 〉V cl1 V cl2 ⊗ · · ·
where . . . stands for the other terms from φm,i which are irrelevant here. And ρˆ =
∑
m,i αm,i φm,i.
Thus proj(φm,i) satisfies Cla[X1 = X2]. Thus ρˆ satisfies Cla[X1 = X2]. 
Claim 3 ρˆ satisfies Y1 ≡quant Y2.
Proof of claim. Let σ : Y2 → Y1 be defined by σ(q2) := q1 for all q ∈ Y . Note that
Urename,idx1ψm,i = Urename,idx1◦idx2−1 Urename,idx2ψm,i = Urename,σ Urename,idx2ψm,i.
Thus by Corollary 30 (with X1 := Y1, X2 := Y2, V1 := V1, V2 := V2, ψX1 := Urename,idx1ψm,i,
ψX2 := Urename,idx2ψm,i, ψY1 := Urename,idx1ψ0, ψY2 := Urename,idx2ψ0, σ := σ) we have
φ′m,i := Urename,idx1ψm,i ⊗ Urename,idx1ψ0 ⊗ Urename,idx2ψm,i ⊗ Urename,idx2ψ0
∈ (Y1 ≡quant Y2).
Since φm,i =
∣∣m ◦ (idx1)−1 m ◦ (idx2)−1〉V cl1 V cl2 ⊗ φ′m,i, it follows that proj(φm,i) satisfies Y1 ≡quant
Y2, and thus ρˆ =
∑
m,i αm,i proj(φm,i) satisfies Y1 ≡quant Y2. 
Claim 4 ρˆ satisfies A1.
Proof of claim. Since ρ satisfies A by assumption, and E is (V qu \ Y )-local, and A is V clY -
local by assumption, we have that ρ∗ = E(ρ) satisfies A. Since ρ∗ = ∑m,i αm,i proj(|m〉V cl) ⊗
proj(ψm,i ⊗ ψ0), it follows that ψm,i ⊗ ψ0 ∈ JAKm = Jidx1AKm◦(idx1)−1m◦(idx2)−1 . Hence
Urename,idx1(ψm,i ⊗ ψ0) ∈
q
Urename,idx1 idx1A
y
m◦(idx1)−1m◦(idx2)−1 . Thus
φ′m,i = Urename,idx1(ψm,i ⊗ ψ0)⊗ Urename,idx2(ψm,i ⊗ ψ0)
∈ qUrename,idx1 idx1Aym◦(idx1)−1m◦(idx2)−1 ⊗ `2[V qu2 ] = JA1Km◦(idx1)−1m◦(idx2)−1 .
Thus
proj(φm,i) = proj
(∣∣m ◦ (idx1)−1m ◦ (idx2)−1〉
V cl1 V
cl
2
⊗ φ′m,i
)
satisfies A1.
Thus ρˆ =
∑
m,i αm,i proj(φm,i) satisfies A1. 
Claim 5 ρˆ satisfies A2
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Proof of claim. Analogous to Claim 4. 
Claim 6 Pr
[
e : c(ρ∗)
] ≤ Pr[f : d(ρ∗)].
Proof of claim. Since ρˆ satisfies Cla[X1 = X2] and Y1 ≡quant Y1 and A1 and A2, we have that ρˆ
satisfies Aˆ := Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Y1 ≡quant Y1) ∩A1 ∩A2.
We have
tr[V1]V2 ρˆ =
∑
m,i
αm,i proj
(
Urename,idx1
(|m〉V cl ⊗ ψm,i ⊗ ψ0)) = Erename,idx1(ρ∗),
tr[V2]V1 ρˆ =
∑
m,i
αm,i proj
(
Urename,idx2
(|m〉V cl ⊗ ψm,i ⊗ ψ0)) = Erename,idx2(ρ∗).
Then we can apply rule QrhlElim, with e := e, f := f , c := c, d := d. ρ := ρˆ, ρ1 := ρ∗,
ρ2 := ρ
∗, A := Aˆ. (The premises of rule QrhlElim are satisfied by Claims 1–5.) Thus we get
Pr
[
e : c(ρ∗)
] ≤ Pr[f : d(ρ∗)]. 
We conclude
Pr
[
e : c(ρ)
](29)
= Pr
[
e : c(ρ∗)
] Claim 6≤ Pr[f : d(ρ∗)](30)= Pr[f : d(ρ1)].
This shows rule QrhlElimEq.
The variants of rule QrhlElimEq with =,⇔ and ≥,⇐ instead of ≤,⇒ are shown analogously
using the corresponding variants of rule QrhlElim in Claim 6. 
Lemma 52: Transitivity
Rule Trans holds.
Proof. Let
Acd := Cla[acd] ∩ (uc1Qc1 ≡quant ud2Qd2)
Ade := Cla[ade] ∩ (ud1Qd1 ≡quant ue2Qe2)
Ace := Cla[acd ◦e ade] ∩ (uc1Qc1 ≡quant ue2Qe2)
Bcd := Cla[bcd] ∩ (vc1Qc1 ≡quant vd2Rd2)
Bde := Cla[bde] ∩ (vd1Rd1 ≡quant ve2Qe2)
Bce := Cla[bcd ◦e bde] ∩ (vc1Qc1 ≡quant ve2Qe2)
With this notation, the qRHL judgments in the premise of rule Trans are {Acd}c ∼ d{Bcd} and
{Ade}d∼ e{Bde}, and we need to show the conclusion {Ace}c∼ e{Bce}.
Furthermore, for i = 1, 2 we abbreviate Uidxi := Urename,idxi , i.e., Uidxi is the canonical isomorphism
between `2[V qu] and `2[V qui ] (where V is clear from the context). Let Eidxi := Erename,idxi , i.e., the cq-
superoperator Eidxi is the canonical isomorphism between T+cq [V ] and T+cq [Vi].
Furthermore, let
BQcd := Cla[bcd] ∩ (vc1Qc1 ≡quant vd2Rd2) ⊆ `2[V cl1 V cl2 Qc1Rd2]
BQde := Cla[bde] ∩ (vd1Rd1 ≡quant ve2Qe2) ⊆ `2[V cl1 V cl2 Rd1Qe2]
That is, Bcd = B
Q
cd⊗ `2[V qu1 V qu2 \Qc1Rd2] and Bde = BQde⊗ `2[V qu1 V qu2 \Rd1Qe2] (In other words, Bcd
and BQcd are basically the same predicate, but the latter is defined on a subset of variables.)
Define RAcd, R
A
de, R
B
cd, R
B
de ⊆ TypesetV cl × TypesetV cl to be the relations on memories encoded by the
expressions acd, ade, bcd, bde. Formally:
(mc,md) ∈ RAcd :⇐⇒ JacdKmc◦idx−11 md◦idx−12 = true
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(md,me) ∈ RAde :⇐⇒ JadeKmd◦idx−11 me◦idx−12 = true
(mc,md) ∈ RBcd :⇐⇒ JbcdKmc◦idx−11 md◦idx−12 = true
(md,me) ∈ RBde :⇐⇒ JbdeKmd◦idx−11 me◦idx−12 = true
Then in particular, RAcd ◦RAde and RBcd ◦RBde are the relations encoded by the expressions acd ◦e ade
and bcd ◦e bde. Formally:
(mc,me) ∈ RAcd ◦RAde ⇐⇒ Jacd ◦e adeKmc◦idx−11 me◦idx−12 = true (31)
(mc,me) ∈ RBcd ◦RBde ⇐⇒ Jbcd ◦e bdeKmc◦idx−11 me◦idx−12 = true
(This is immediate from the definition of ◦e, page 30.)
Claim 1 To show {Ace}c ∼ d{Bce}, it is sufficient to show that for all m0c ∈ TypesetV cl , m0e ∈ TypesetV cl
and all normalized ψc, ψe ∈ `2[V qu], such that Uidx1ψc ⊗ Uidx2ψe ∈ JAceKm0c◦idx−11 m0e◦idx−12 , there is a
separable ρ′ce ∈ T+cq [V1V2] such that:
ρ′ce satisfies Bce,
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′
ce = Eidx1(ρ′c) for ρ′c := JcK(proj(|m0c〉V cl)⊗ proj(ψc)), (32)
tr[V2]V1 ρ
′
ce = Eidx2(ρ′e) for ρ′e := JeK(proj(|m0e〉V cl)⊗ proj(ψe)). (33)
Proof of claim. This is a simple corollary of Lemma 36, with A := Ace and B := Bce:
In Lemma 36 we quantify over all m1 ∈ TypesetV cl1 , m2 ∈ Type
set
V cl2
, here we quantify over all
m0c,m
0
e ∈ TypesetV cl instead and use the fact that m0c 7→ m0c ◦ idx−11 and m0d 7→ m0d ◦ idx−12 are
bijections from TypesetV cl to Type
set
V cl1
and TypesetV cl2 , respectively. We thus replace occurences ofm1,m2
in Lemma 36 by m0c ◦ idx−11 and m0d ◦ idx−12 .
Similarly, we quantify over ψc, ψd ∈ `2(V qu) instead of ψ1 ∈ `2[V qu1 ], ψ2 ∈ `2[V qu2 ], and replace
ψ1, ψ2 by Uidx1ψc, Uidx2ψd (because Uidx1 , Uidx2 is unitary and thus an isomorphism).
And we rename ρ′ as ρ′cd.
These substitution in Lemma 36 already almost give us the present claim, except that the last
two lines become:
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′
ce = Jidx1 cK(proj(|m0c ◦ idx−11 〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(Uidx1ψc)), (34)
tr[V2]V1 ρ
′
ce = Jidx2 eK(proj(|m0e ◦ idx−12 〉V cl2 )⊗ proj(Uidx2ψe)). (35)
Since |m0c ◦ idx−11 〉V cl1 = Uidx1 |m0c〉V cl , we have
Jidx1 cK(proj(|m0c ◦ idx−11 〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(Uidx1ψc))
= Jidx1 cK(proj(Uidx1 |m0c〉V cl)⊗ proj(Uidx1ψc))
= Jidx1 cK(Eidx1(proj(|m0c〉V cl)⊗ ψc))
= Eidx1(JcK(proj(|m0c〉V cl)⊗ ψc)).
Thus (34) becomes (32). Analogously, (35) becomes (33). 
Thus, fix some m0c,m0e, ψc, ψe with the properties from Claim 1. We need to show the existence of
ρ′ce with the properties from Claim 1.
Let Uc := JucKm0c = Juc1Km0c◦idx−11 ∈ Iso(TypelistQc , Z) and Ue := JueKm0e = Jue2Km0e◦idx−12 ∈
Iso(TypelistQe , Z).
Claim 2 (m0c,m0e) ∈ RAcd ◦RAde. And ψc and ψe are of the form ψc = ψcQ ⊗ ψc• and ψe = ψeQ ⊗ ψe•
for some normalized ψcQ ∈ `2[Qc], ψeQ ∈ `2[Qe], ψc• ∈ `2[V qu \Qc], ψe• ∈ `2[V qu \Qe]. And
UcU
∗
vars,Qc
ψcQ = UeU
∗
vars,Qe
ψeQ.
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Proof of claim. By choice of m0c,m0e, ψc, ψe (after Claim 1) we have that
Uidx1ψc ⊗ Uidx2ψe ∈ JAceKm0c◦idx−11 m0e◦idx−12 , (36)
and ψc, ψe are normalized. This implies JAceKm0c◦idx−11 m0e◦idx−12 6= 0, and by definition of Ace,JCla[acd ◦e ade]Km0c◦idx−11 m0e◦idx−12 = true. Hence (m0c,m0e) ∈ RAcd ◦RAde by (31).
By definition of Ace, (36) also implies
Uidx1ψc ⊗ Uidx2ψe ∈ Juc1Qc1 ≡quant ue2Qe2Km0c◦idx−11 m0e◦idx−12 = (UcQc1 ≡quant UeQe2).
By Lemma 29 this implies that there exist normalized ψQ1 ∈ `2[Qc1], ψY1 ∈ `2[V qu1 \Qc1], ψQ2 ∈
`2[Qe2], ψY2 ∈ `2[V qu2 \Qe2] such that UcU∗vars,Qc1ψQ1 = UeU∗vars,Qe2ψQ2 and Uidx1ψc = ψQ1 ⊗ ψY1
and Uidx2ψe = ψ
Q
2 ⊗ ψY2 .
Let ψcQ := U−1idx1ψ
Q
1 , ψc• := U
−1
idx1
ψY1 , ψeQ := U
−1
idx2
ψQ2 , ψe• := U
−1
idx2
ψY2 . Then ψc =
U−1idx1(ψ
Q
1 ⊗ ψY1 ) = ψcQ ⊗ ψc•. And analogously ψe = ψeQ ⊗ ψe•.
And finally,
UcU
∗
vars,QcψcQ = UcU
∗
vars,QcU
−1
idx1
ψQ1 = UcU
∗
vars,Qc1ψ
Q
1
= UeU
∗
vars,Qe2ψ
Q
2 = UeU
∗
vars,QeU
−1
idx2
ψQ2 = UeU
∗
vars,QeψeQ 
Let
ρ′′c := JcK(proj(|m0c〉V cl)⊗ proj(ψcQ)) ∈ T+cq [V clQc] (37)
and ρ′′e := JeK(proj(|m0e〉V cl)⊗ proj(ψeQ)) ∈ T+cq [V clQe]
(It is well-defined to apply c and e to the smaller sets of quantum variablesQc andQe since fv(c)qu ⊆ Qc
and fv(e)qu ⊆ Qe by assumption.)
Then
ρ′c = ρ
′′
c ⊗ proj(ψc•) and ρ′e = ρ′′e ⊗ proj(ψe•) (38)
by Claim 2 and (32),(33).
(In the following, operators ρ′′... will always be variants of operators ρ′... that live on a smaller set of
quantum variables.)
Claim 3 There are
separable operators ρ′′cd ∈ T+cq [V cl1 V cl2 Qc1Rd2] and ρ′′de ∈ T+cq [V cl1 V cl2 Rd1Qe2],
and an operator ρ′′d ∈ T+cq [V clRd],
such that
ρ′′cd satisfies B
Q
cd tr
[V cl1 Qc1]
V cl2 Rd2
ρ′′cd = Eidx1(ρ′′c) tr[V
cl
1 Rd1]
V cl2 Qe2
ρ′′de = Eidx1(ρ′′d)
ρ′′de satisfies B
Q
de tr
[V cl2 Rd2]
V cl1 Qc1
ρ′′cd = Eidx2(ρ′′d) tr[V
cl
2 Qe2]
V cl1 Rd1
ρ′′de = Eidx2(ρ′′e)
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Proof of claim. Since (m0c,m0e) ∈ RAcd ◦ RAde by Claim 2, we can choose an m0d ∈ TypesetV cl such
that (m0c,m0d) ∈ RAcd and (m0d,m0e) ∈ RAde.
Also by Claim 2, we have
ψ := UcU
∗
vars,QcψcQ = UeU
∗
vars,QeψeQ ∈ `2(Z).
Let Ud := JudKm0d = Jud1Km0d◦idx−11 = Jud2Km0d◦idx−12 ∈ U(TypelistQd , Z). Fix an arbitrary
normalized ψd• ∈ `2[V qu \Qd]. Let ψdQ := Uvars,QdU∗dψ ∈ `2[Qd]. Let ψd := ψdQ ⊗ ψd• ∈
`2[V qu]. Note that ψdQ is normalized since ψ is and Ud is unitary. Then
UcU
∗
vars,Qc1Uidx1ψcQ = UcU
∗
vars,QcψcQ = ψ = UdU
∗
vars,Qd
ψdQ = UdU
∗
vars,Qd2
Uidx2ψdQ
and hence by Lemma 29 (converse direction),
Uidx1ψc ⊗ Uidx2ψd = Uidx1ψcQ ⊗ Uidx2ψdQ ⊗ Uidx1ψc• ⊗ Uidx2ψd•
∈ (UcQc1 ≡quant UdQd2) = Juc1Qc1 ≡quant ud2Qd2Km0c◦idx−11 m0d◦idx−12 .
Analogously,
Uidx1ψd ⊗ Uidx2ψe = Jud1Qd1 ≡quant ue2Qe2Km0d◦idx−11 m0e◦idx−12 .
This implies
ρ0cd := proj(Uidx1 |m0c〉V cl)⊗ proj(Uidx2 |m0d〉V cl)⊗ Uidx1ψc ⊗ Uidx2ψd
satisfies (uc1Qc1 ≡quant ud2Qd2) (39)
ρ0de := proj(Uidx1 |m0d〉V cl)⊗ proj(Uidx2 |m0e〉V cl)⊗ Uidx1ψd ⊗ Uidx2ψe
satisfies (ud1Qd1 ≡quant ue2Qe2)
Since (m0c,m0d) ∈ RAcd, we also have that ρ0cd satisfies Cla[acd]. Thus ρ0cd satisfies Acd.
Analogously ρ0de satisfies Ade.
Let ρ′d := JdK(proj(|m0d〉V cl ⊗ ψd)).
Since ρ0de satisfies Acd, and since {Acd}c ∼ d{Bcd}, there exists a separable ρ′cd ∈ T+cq [V1V2]
satisfying Bcd such that tr
[V1]
V2
ρ′cd = Jidx1 cK(tr[V1]V2 ρ0cd) and tr[V2]V1 ρ′cd = Jidx2 dK(tr[V2]V1 ρ0cd). Fur-
thermore, we have
Eidx1(ρ′c)(32)= Jidx1 cK(proj(Uidx1 |m0c〉V cl ⊗ Uidx1ψc))(39)= Jidx1 cK(tr[V1]V2 ρ0cd) = tr[V1]V2 ρ′cd
and
Eidx2(ρ′d) = Jidx2 dK(proj(Uidx2 |m0d〉V cl ⊗ Uidx2ψd))(39)= Jidx2 dK(tr[V2]V1 ρ0cd) = tr[V2]V1 ρ′cd.
That is,
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′
cd = Eidx1(ρ′c) and tr[V2]V1 ρ′cd = Eidx2(ρ′d). (40)
Analogously,
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′
de = Eidx1(ρ′d) and tr[V2]V1 ρ′de = Eidx2(ρ′e).
Let ρ′′cd := tr
[V cl1 V
cl
2 Qc1Rd2]
V
qu
1 V
qu
2 \Qc1Rd2
ρ′cd and ρ
′′
de := tr
[V cl1 V
cl
2 Rd1Qe2]
V
qu
1 V
qu
2 \Rd1Qe2
ρ′de. These are separable because ρ
′
cd
and ρ′de are separable. Since Bcd = B
Q
cd ⊗ `2[V qu1 V qu2 \Qc1Rd2] and ρ′cd satisfies Bcd, we have
that ρ′′cd satisfies B
Q
cd. Analogously, ρ
′′
de satisfies B
Q
de. Furthermore,
tr
[V cl1 Qc1]
V cl2 Rd2
ρ′′cd = tr
[V cl1 Qc1]
V cl2 Rd2
tr
[V cl1 V
cl
2 Qc1Rd2]
V
qu
1 V
qu
2 \Qc1Rd2
ρ′cd = tr
[V cl1 Qc1]
V
qu
1 \Qc1
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′
cd
(40)
= tr
[V cl1 Qc1]
V
qu
1 \Qc1
Eidx1(ρ′c) = Eidx1
(
tr[V
clQc]
V qu\Qcρ
′
c
)(38)
= Eidx1
(
ρ′′c
)
.
and analogously, tr[V
cl
2 Qe2]
V cl1 Rd1
ρ′′de = Eidx2(ρ′′e). And if we define ρ′′d := tr[V
clRd]
V qu\Rdρ
′
d, we also get analo-
gously tr[V
cl
2 Rd2]
V cl1 Qc1
ρ′′cd = Eidx2(ρ′′d) and tr[V
cl
1 Rd1]
V cl2 Qe2
ρ′′de = Eidx1(ρ′′d). 
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Let ρ′′cd and ρ
′′
de be as in Claim 3. Then we can write
ρ′′cd =
∑
mcmd
µcd(mc,md) proj(Uidx1 |mc〉V cl ⊗ Uidx2 |md〉V cl)⊗ ρˆcd,mcmd (41)
for some µcd ∈ D(TypelistV cl × TypelistV cl) and some separable operators ρˆcd,mcmd ∈ T+cq [Qc1Rd2] with
tr ρˆcd,mcmd = 1. (Here mc,md ∈ TypesetV cl .) And since ρ′′cd satisfies BQcd ⊆ (vc1Qc1 ≡quant vd2Rd2), it
follows that
supp ρˆcd,mcmd ⊆ (Vc,mcQc1 ≡quant Vd,mdRd2) (42)
for all (mc,md) ∈ suppµcd where Vc,mc := JvcKmc and Vd,md := JvdKmd . (Recall that vc1 = idx1 vc
and vd2 = idx2 vd.) And since ρ′′cd satisfies B
Q
cd ⊆ Cla[bcd], we have µcd(mc,md) 6= 0 only ifJbcdKmc◦idx−11 md◦idx−12 = true, i.e., we have suppµcd ⊆ RBcd.
Analogously, we can write
ρ′′de =
∑
mdme
µde(md,me)proj(Uidx1 basisV
clmd ⊗ Uidx2 |me〉V cl)⊗ ρˆde,mdme (43)
for some µde ∈ D(TypelistV cl × TypelistV cl) and some separable operators ρˆde,mdme ∈ T+cq [Rd1Qe2] with
tr ρˆde,mdme = 1 and
supp ρˆde,mdme ⊆ (Vd,mdRd1 ≡quant Ve,meQe2) (44)
for all (md,me) ∈ suppµde. Here Ve,me := JveKme and Vd,me as above. And suppµde ⊆ RBde.
Claim 4 There is a distribution µcde ∈ D(TypelistV cl × TypelistV cl × TypelistV cl) such that marginal1,2(µcde) =
µcd and marginal2,3(µcde) = µde.
Here marginal1,2(µcde) is the marginal distribution that projects onto the first two components, i.e.,
the result of summing µcde over me. marginal2,3(µcde) analogously.
Proof of claim. We first show
marginal2(µcd) = marginal1(µde) =: µd. (45)
To show this, we calculate:
Eidx2
(
lift
(
marginal2(µcd)
))
(∗)
= Eidx2
( ∑
mc,md
µcd(mc,md) proj(|md〉V cl)
)
=
∑
mc,md
µcd(mc,md) proj
(
Uidx2 |md〉V cl
)
(∗∗)
= tr
[V cl2 ]
V cl1 Qc1Rd2
∑
mc,md
µcd(mc,md) proj
(
Uidx1 |mc〉V cl ⊗ Uidx2 |md〉V cl
)⊗ ρˆcd,mcmd
(41)
= tr
[V cl2 ]
V cl1 Qc1Rd2
ρ′′cd = tr
[V cl2 ]
Rd2
tr
[V cl2 Rd2]
V cl1 Qc1
ρ′′cd
(∗∗∗)
= tr
[V cl2 ]
Rd2
Eidx2(ρ′′d) = Eidx2
(
tr[V
cl]
Rd
ρ′′d
)
.
Here (∗) is by definition of marginal1(·) and lift(·). (Recall: lift(·) maps a distribution to a diagonal
operator and was defined on page 16.) And (∗∗) follows since tr ρˆcd,mcmd = 1. And (∗∗∗) follows
from the properties of ρ′′cd stated in Claim 3.
Since Eidx2 is injective, this implies lift
(
marginal2(µcd)
)
= tr[V
cl]
Rd
ρ′′d. Analogously, we show
lift
(
marginal1(µde)
)
= tr[V
cl]
Rd
ρ′′d. Thus lift
(
marginal2(µcd)
)
= lift
(
marginal1(µde)
)
. Since lift(·) is
injective, (45) follows.
Let
µcde(mc,md,me) := µcd(mc,md)µde(md,me)/µd(md)
It is then easy to see (using (45)) that marginal1,2(µcde) = µcd and marginal2,3(µcde) = µde.

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Claim 5 There are functions fc, fe such that (mc,md) ∈ suppµcd =⇒ mc = fc(md) and (md,me) ∈
suppµde =⇒ me = fe(md).
Proof of claim. By assumption (of rule Trans), we have that bcd =⇒ (x(1)1 , . . . ,x(n)1 ) = idx2 ec
holds. for some expression ec and {x(1), . . . ,x(n)} = fv(c)cl. For any (mc,md) ∈ RBcd we haveJbcdKmc◦idx−11 md◦idx−12 = true (by definition of RBcd). Thus for (mc,md) ∈ RBcd, we have(
mc(x
(1)), . . . ,mc(x
(1))
)
= J(x(1)1 , . . . ,x(n)1 )Kmc◦idx−11 md◦idx−12
(∗)
= Jidx2 ecKmc◦idx−11 md◦idx−12 = JecKmd =: f ′c(md)
Here (∗) follows since bcd =⇒ (x(1)1 , . . . ,x(n)1 ) = idx2 ec holds. Since {x(1), . . . ,x(n)} = fv(c)cl,
there is a function f ′′c such that f ′′c
(
mc(x
(1)), . . . ,mc(x
(1))
)
= mc|fv(c)cl . Then f ′′c ◦ f ′c(md) =
mc|fv(c)cl for any (mc,md) ∈ RBcd. Since suppµcd ⊆ RBcd (discussion after Claim 3), we get:
(mc,md) ∈ suppµcd implies f ′′c ◦ f ′c(md) = mc|fv(c)cl . (46)
Let m′ := m0c|V cl\fv(c)cl . By definition of ρ′′c in (37) and the fact that c is fv(c)cl-local, we
have that ρ′′c is of the form
∑
mc
λmcproj(|mc〉V ) · ρmc for some λmc ≥ 0 and positive operators
ρmc where the sum ranges only over mc with mc|V cl\fv(c)cl = m′. Since tr[V
cl
1 Qc1]
V cl2 Rd2
ρ′′cd = Eidx1(ρ′′c)
(Claim 3), this implies that the sum in (41) ranges only over mc with mc|V cl\fv(c)cl = m′. In other
words, µcd(mc,md) = 0 unless mc|V cl\fv(c)cl = m′. Thus
(mc,md) ∈ suppµcd implies mc|V cl\fv(c)cl = m′. (47)
Hence (mc,md) ∈ suppµcd implies
fc(md) := m
′ ∪ (f ′′c ◦ f ′c(md))(46),(47)= mc|fv(c)cl ∪mc|V cl\fv(c)cl = mc.
This shows the existence of fc as required by the current claim.
The existence of fe is shown analogously. 
Claim 6 Let µcde be as in Claim 4. For every (mc,md,me) ∈ suppµcde, there is a ρˆd,mcmdme ∈
T+cq [Rd] such that tr
[Rd2]
Qc1
ρˆcd,mcmd = Eidx2(ρˆd,mcmdme) and tr[Rd1]Qe2 ρˆde,mdme = Eidx1(ρˆd,mcmdme).
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Proof of claim. Let fc, fe be as in Claim 5. Then
Eidx2(ρ′′d) Claim 3= tr[V
cl
2 Rd2]
V cl1 Qc1
ρ′′cd
(41)
=
∑
mcmd
µcd(mc,md) proj(Uidx2 |md〉V cl)⊗ tr[Rd2]Qc1 ρˆcd,mcmd
Claim 5
=
∑
md
µcd(fc(md),md) proj(Uidx2 |md〉V cl)⊗ tr[Rd2]Qc1 ρˆcd,fc(md)md
and analogously (using (43) instead of (41)),
Eidx1(ρ′′d) =
∑
md
µde(md, fe(md)) proj(Uidx1 |md〉V cl)⊗ tr[Rd1]Qe2 ρˆde,mdfe(md).
Hence∑
md
µcd(fc(md),md) proj(|md〉V cl)⊗ E−1idx2(tr
[Rd2]
Qc1
ρˆcd,fc(md)md) = ρ
′′
d
=
∑
md
µde(md, fe(md)) proj(|md〉V cl)⊗ E−1idx1(tr
[Rd1]
Qe2
ρˆde,mdfe(md)).
It follows that, whenever µcd(fc(md),md) 6= 0, we have
ρˆd,mcmdme := E−1idx2(tr
[Rd2]
Qc1
ρˆcd,fc(md)md) = E−1idx1(tr
[Rd1]
Qe2
ρˆde,mdfe(md)). (48)
If (mc,md,me) ∈ suppµcde, by Claim 4, (mc,md) ∈ suppµcd, and thus, by Claim 5,
(fc(md),md) ∈ suppµcd. Thus (48) holds whenever (mc,md,me) ∈ suppµcde.
Hence for every (mc,md,me) ∈ suppµcde, by (48), we have that
tr
[Rd2]
Qc1
ρˆcd,fc(md)md = Eidx2(ρˆd,mcmdme) and tr[Rd1]Qe2 ρˆde,mdfe(md) = Eidx1(ρˆd,mcmdme) (49)
and mc = fc(md), me = fe(me), which implies the properties required in the current claim. 
Claim 7 Fix Vc ∈ Iso(TypelistQc , Z), Vd ∈ B≤1(TypelistRd , Z), Ve ∈ Iso(TypelistQe , Z). Fix a separable ρˆcd ∈
T+cq [Qc1Rd2] and a separable ρˆde ∈ T+cq [Rd1Qe2] and ρˆd ∈ T+cq [Rd] such that supp ρˆcd ⊆ (VcQc1 ≡quant
VdRd2) and supp ρˆde ⊆ (VdRd1 ≡quant VeQe2) and tr[Rd2]Qc1 ρˆcd = Eidx2(ρˆd) and tr[Rd1]Qe2 ρˆde = Eidx1(ρˆd).
Then there exists a separable ρˆce ∈ T+cq [Qc1Qe2] such that
supp ρˆce ⊆ (VcQc1 ≡quant VeQe2), tr[Qc1]Qe2 ρˆce = tr[Qc1]Rd2 ρˆcd, tr[Qe2]Qc1 ρˆce = tr[Qe2]Rd1 ρˆde.
59
Proof of claim. Since ρˆcd is separable, we can write it as:
ρˆcd =
∑
i
λi proj(ψci ⊗ ψdi) (50)
with λi ≥ 0,
∑
λi < ∞, and unit vectors ψci ∈ `2[Qc1] and ψdi ∈ `2[Rd2]. Since supp ρˆcd ⊆
(VcQc1 ≡quant VdRd2), it follows that ψci ⊗ ψdi ∈ (VcQc1 ≡quant VdRd2). By Lemma 29 (in the
special case V qu1 , Q1 := Qc1 and V
qu
2 , Q2 := Rd2), this implies that
VcU
∗
vars,Qc1ψci = VdU
∗
vars,Rd2
ψdi. (51)
Then
VcU
∗
vars,Qc1 (tr
[Qc1]
Rd2
ρˆcd)Uvars,Qc1V
∗
c
(50)
=
∑
i
λi proj(VcU
∗
vars,Qc1ψci)
(51)
=
∑
i
λi proj(VdU
∗
vars,Rd2
ψdi)
(50)
= VdU
∗
vars,Rd2
(tr
[Rd2]
Qc1
ρˆcd)Uvars,Rd2V
∗
d = VdU
∗
vars,Rd2
Eidx2(ρˆd)Uvars,Rd2V ∗d . (52)
Analogously,
VeU
∗
vars,Qe2 (tr
[Qe2]
Rd1
ρˆde)Uvars,Qe2V
∗
e = VdU
∗
vars,Rd1
Eidx1(ρˆd)Uvars,Rd1V ∗d . (53)
We have that
U∗vars,Rd2 Eidx2(ρˆd)Uvars,Rd2 = U∗vars,Rd ρˆd Uvars,Rd = U∗vars,Rd1 Eidx1(ρˆd)Uvars,Rd1 .
Thus the rhs of (52) and (53) are equal, hence
VcU
∗
vars,Qc1 (tr
[Qc1]
Rd2
ρˆcd)Uvars,Qc1V
∗
c = VeU
∗
vars,Qe2 (tr
[Qe2]
Rd1
ρˆde)Uvars,Qe2V
∗
e =: σ ∈ T+(Z). (54)
Since σ ∈ T+(Z), we can write σ = ∑i∈I γ(i) proj(ψi) for some set I, some γ ∈ D(I) and
normalized ψi ∈ `2(Z). From (54), we get that suppσ ⊆ imVc, hence ψi ∈ imVc. Analogously
ψi ∈ imVe.
Let
ρˆce :=
∑
i
γ(i) proj(Uvars,Qc1V
∗
c ψi ⊗ Uvars,Qe2V ∗e ψi︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: φi ∈ `2[Qc1Qe2]
). (55)
Since γ ∈ D(I), and ψi are normalized, and Vc, Ve are isometries, this sum converges and ρˆce
exists. ρˆce is separable by construction.
We now show that φi ∈ (VcQc1 ≡quant VeQe2). By Definition 27, this means that φi is
fixed by U := Uvars,Qe2V ∗e VcU∗vars,Qc1 ⊗ Uvars,Qc1V ∗c VeU∗vars,Qe2 . (The third factor from Def-
inition 27 vanishes because φi ∈ `2[Qc1Qe2], and hence the third factor is the identity on
`2[Qc1Qe2 \Qc1Qe2] = `2[∅] = C.) We calculate:
Uφi = Uvars,Qe2V
∗
e VcU
∗
vars,Qc1Uvars,Qc1V
∗
c ψi ⊗ Uvars,Qc1V ∗c VeU∗vars,Qe2Uvars,Qe2V ∗e ψi
= Uvars,Qe2V
∗
e VcV
∗
c ψi ⊗ Uvars,Qc1V ∗c VeV ∗e ψi
(∗)
= Uvars,Qe2V
∗
e ψi ⊗ Uvars,Qc1V ∗c ψi = φi.
Here (∗) uses that ψi ∈ imVc and thus VcV ∗c ψi = ψi (since Vc is an isometry), and analogously
VeV
∗
e ψi = ψi.
Thus φi is invariant under U , thus φi ∈ (VcQc1 ≡quant VeQe2), and thus supp ρˆce ⊆
(VcQc1 ≡quant VeQe2). This is the first property that we needed to prove about ρˆce.
The second required property (tr[Qc1]Qe2 ρˆce = tr
[Qc1]
Rd2
ρˆcd) is shown as follows:
tr[Qc1]Qe2 ρˆce
(∗)
=
∑
i
γ(i) proj(Uvars,Qc1V
∗
c ψi) = Uvars,Qc1V
∗
c σVcU
∗
vars,Qc1
(54)
= Uvars,Qc1V
∗
c VcU
∗
vars,Qc1 (tr
[Qc1]
Rd2
ρˆcd)Uvars,Qc1V
∗
c VcU
∗
vars,Qc1
(∗∗)
= tr[Qc1]Rd2 ρˆcd
Here (∗) uses the definition (55) of ρˆce, and the fact that ‖Uvars,Qe2V ∗e ψi‖ = 1 since Ve is an
isometry and ψi ∈ imVe. And (∗∗) uses that Vc is an isometry and thus V ∗c Vc = id .
The last required property, tr[Qe2]Qc1 ρˆce = tr
[Qe2]
Rd1
ρˆde, is shown analogously. 
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Claim 8 There is a separable ρ′′ce ∈ T+cq [V cl1 V cl2 Qc1Qe2] such that ρ′′ce satisfies BQce and tr[V
cl
1 Qc1]
V cl2 Qe2
ρ′′ce =
tr
[V cl1 Qc1]
V cl2 Rd2
ρ′′cd and tr
[V cl2 Qe2]
V cl1 Qc1
ρ′′ce = tr
[V cl2 Qe2]
V cl1 Rd1
ρ′′de.
Proof of claim. For each mc,md,me, we apply Claim 7 to ρˆcd,mcmd and ρˆde,mdme . That
is, we invoke Claim 7 with Vc := Vc,mc , Vd := Vd,md , Ve := Ve,me (as defined on page 57),
ρˆcd := ρˆcd,mcmd , ρˆde := ρˆde,mdme (defined in (41),(43)), ρˆd := ρˆd,mcmdme (from Claim 6). The
assumptions of Claim 7 where shown in (42), (44), and Claim 6. Then by Claim 7, there exists
a separable ρˆcd,mcmdme ∈ T+cq [Qc1Qe2] such that
supp ρˆce,mcmdme ⊆ (Vc,mcQc1 ≡quant Ve,meQe2), (56)
tr[Qc1]Qe2 supp ρˆce,mcmdme = tr
[Qc1]
Rd2
supp ρˆcd,mcmd , (57)
tr[Qe2]Qc1 supp ρˆce,mcmdme = tr
[Qe2]
Rd1
supp ρˆde,mdme .
(For all mc,md,me.)
Since ρˆcd,mcmd has trace 1, it follows that tr ρˆce,mcmdme = 1 for all mc,md,me.
Let µcde be as in Claim 4. Since
∑
µcde(mc,md,me) is finite,
ρ′′ce :=
∑
mc,md,me
µcde(mc,md,me) proj(Uidx1 |mc〉V cl ⊗ Uidx2 |me〉V cl)⊗ ρˆce,mcmdme (58)
exists. ρ′′ce is separable since ρˆce,mcmdme are.
If (mc,md,me) ∈ suppµcde, then (mc,md) ∈ suppµcd ⊆ RBcd and (md,me) ∈ suppµde ⊆
RBde, thus (mc,me) ∈ RBcd ◦RBde, hence Jbcd ◦e bdeKmc◦idx−11 me◦idx−12 = true by (1). This implies
that ρ′′ce satisfies Cla[bcd ◦e bde].
By (56), supp ρce,mcmdme ⊆ (Vc,mcQc1 ≡quant Ve,meQe2) =JvcQc1 ≡quant veQe2Kmc◦idx−11 me◦idx−12 . Thus ρ′′ce satisfies vcQc1 ≡quant veQe2. Together,
we have that ρ′′ce satisfies B
Q
cd = Cla[bcd ◦e bde] ∩ (vcQc1 ≡quant veQe2). We have shown the first
required property of ρ′′ce.
Furthermore, we have
tr
[V cl1 Qc1]
V cl2 Qe2
ρ′′ce
(58)
=
∑
mc,md,me
µcde(mc,md,me) proj(Uidx1 |mc〉V cl)⊗ tr[Qc1]Qe2 ρˆce,mcmdme
(57)
=
∑
mc,md,me
µcde(mc,md,me) proj(Uidx1 |mc〉V cl)⊗ tr[Qc1]Rd2 ρˆcd,mcmd
(∗)
=
∑
mc,md
µcd(mc,md) proj(Uidx1 |mc〉V cl)⊗ tr[Qc1]Rd2 ρˆcd,mcmd
(41)
= tr
[V cl1 Qc1]
V cl2 Rd2
ρ′′cd.
Here (∗) uses that µcd = marginal1,2(µcde) (Claim 4).
Thus tr[V
cl
1 Qc1]
V cl2 Qe2
ρ′′ce = tr
[V cl1 Qc1]
V cl2 Rd2
ρ′′cd, this shows the second required property of ρ
′′
ce.
Analogously, we get tr[V
cl
2 Qe2]
V cl1 Qc1
ρ′′ce = tr
[V cl2 Qe2]
V cl1 Rd1
ρ′′de which is the third (and last) required property
of ρ′′ce. 
By Claim 1, all we need to do is to find a ρ′ce satisfying the conditions given in Claim 1. Let
ρ′ce := ρ
′′
ce ⊗ proj(Uidx1ψc• ⊗ Uidx2ψe•)
where ρ′′ce is the operator from Claim 8. Since ρ′′ce satisfies BQce, ρ′ce satisfies Bce = BQce ⊗
`2[V qu1 V
qu
2 \Qc1Rd2]. Furthermore,
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′
ce =
(
tr
[V cl1 Qc1]
V cl2 Qe2
ρ′′ce
)⊗ Uidx1ψc•Claim 8= (tr[V cl1 Qc1]V cl2 Rd2 ρ′′cd)⊗ Uidx1ψc•
Claim 3
= Eidx1(ρ′′c)⊗ Uidx1ψc• = Eidx1
(
ρ′′c ⊗ proj(ψc•)
)(38)
= Eidx1
(
ρ′c
)
.
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Analogously, tr[V2]V1 ρ
′
ce = Eidx2
(
ρ′e
)
. Thus the conditions required by Claim 1 are satisfied, and
{Ace}c∼ d{Bce} follows. 
Lemma 53: Transitivity, simple
Rule TransSimple holds.
Proof. Follows as a special case from rule Trans, taking Qc := fv(c)qu, Qd := Rd := fv(d)qu,
Qe := fv(e)
qu, acd := bcd := (Xc1 = Xd2), ade := bde := (Xd1 = Xe2), up, vp := id for p = c,d, e,
ec := fv(c)
cl, ee := fv(e)cl. Note that then acd ◦e ade = bcd ◦e bde = (Xc1 = Xe2). 
A.2 Rules for classical statements
Lemma 54: Empty program
Rule Skip holds.
Proof. Immediate from Definition 35 and the semantics of skip. 
Lemma 55: Assignment
Rule Assign1 holds.
Proof. Fix m1 ∈ TypesetV cl1 , m2 ∈ Type
set
V cl2
and normalized ψ1 ∈ `2[V qu1 ], ψ2 ∈ `2[V qu2 ] such that ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈q
B{idx1 e/x1}
y
m1m2
.
Let
ρ′ := proj
(∣∣m1(x1 := Jidx1 eKm1)m2〉V cl1 V cl2 ⊗ ψ1 ⊗ ψ2).
Thenq
idx1(x← e)
y(
proj
(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1)) = Jx1 ← idx1 eK(proj(|m1〉V cl1 ⊗ ψ1))
(∗)
= proj
(∣∣m1(x1 := Jidx1 eKm1)〉V cl1 ⊗ ψ1) = tr[V1]V2 ρ′, (59)Jidx1 skipK(proj(|m2〉V cl2 )⊗ proj(ψ2)) = JskipK(proj(|m2〉V cl2 ⊗ ψ2)) (∗)= proj(|m2〉V cl2 ⊗ ψ2) = tr[V2]V1 ρ′.
(60)
Here (∗) follows from the semantics of assignments and skip.
We have
ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈
q
B{idx1 e/x1}
y
m1m2
= JBKm1(x1:=Jidx1 eKm1 )m2 .
Hence ρ′ = proj
(∣∣m1(x1 := Jidx1 eKm1)m2〉V cl1 V cl2 ⊗ ψ1 ⊗ ψ2) satisfies B.
Furthermore, ρ′ is separable.
Thus for allm1,m2, ψ1, ψ2 with ψ1⊗ψ2 ∈ JB{idx1 e/x1}Km1m2 , there is a separable ρ′ that satisfies B
and such that (59) and (60) holds. By Lemma 36, this implies
{
B{idx1 e/x1}
}
x← e∼ skip{B}. 
Lemma 56: Sampling (one-sided)
Rule Sample1 holds.
Proof. Fix m1 ∈ TypesetV cl1 , m2 ∈ Type
set
V cl2
and normalized ψ1 ∈ `2[V qu1 ], ψ2 ∈ `2[V qu2 ] such that ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈JAKm1m2 .
Let µ := Je′Km1m2 = Je′Km1 . Since ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JAKm1m2 ⊆ qCla[e′ is total]ym1m2 we haveJe′ is totalKm1m2 = true. Thus µ is total.
For z ∈ suppµ, let φ′z :=
∣∣m1(x1 := z)m2〉
V cl1 V
cl
2
⊗ ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 and let
ρ′ :=
∑
z
µ(z) proj(φ′z).
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Thenq
idx1(x
$← e)y(proj(|m1〉X1)⊗ proj(ψ1)) = qx1 $← e′y(proj(|m1〉X1)⊗ proj(ψ1))
(∗)
=
∑
z
Je′Km1(z) proj(∣∣m1(x1 := z)〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1) = ∑
z
µ(z) tr[V1]V2 proj(φ
′
z) = tr
[V1]
V2
ρ′, (61)
q
idx2 skip
y(
proj
(|m2〉X2)⊗ proj(ψ2)) = JskipK(proj(|m2〉X2 ⊗ ψ2)) (∗)= proj(|m2〉V cl2 ⊗ ψ2)
(∗∗)
=
∑
z
µ(z) proj
(|m2〉V cl2 ⊗ ψ2) = ∑
z
µ(z) tr[V2]V1 proj(φ
′
i) = tr
[V2]
V1
ρ′. (62)
Here (∗) follows from the semantics of the sampling and the skip statement. And (∗∗) follows since µ
is total.
For any z ∈ suppµ = Jsupp e′Km1m2 , we have
ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JAKm1m2 ⊆ r⋂
z∈supp e′ B{z/x1}
z
m1m2
⊆ qB{z/x1}ym1m2 = JBKm1(x1:=z)m2 .
Hence proj(φ′z) satifies B for z ∈ suppµ. Hence ρ′ =
∑
z µ(z) proj(φ
′
z) satisfies B.
Furthermore, ρ′ is separable.
Thus for all m1,m2, ψ1, ψ2 with ψ1⊗ψ2 ∈ JAKm1m2 , there is a separable ρ′ that satisfies B and such
that (61) and (62) holds. By Lemma 36, this implies {A}x $← e ∼ skip{B}. 
Lemma 57: Sampling (joint)
Rule JointSample holds.
Proof. Fix m1 ∈ TypesetV cl1 , m2 ∈ Type
set
V cl2
and normalized ψ1 ∈ `2[V qu1 ], ψ2 ∈ `2[V qu2 ] such that ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈JAKm1m2 .
Let µ := JfKm1m2 . For (z1, z2) ∈ suppµ, let φ′z1z2 := ∣∣m1(x1 := z1)m2(x2 := z2)〉V cl1 V cl2 ⊗ ψ1 ⊗ ψ2
and let
ρ′ :=
∑
z1,z2
µ(z1, z2) proj(φ
′
z1z2).
Since ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JAKm1m2 ⊆ qCla[marginal1(f) = idx1 e1]ym1m2 , we haveq
marginal1(f) = idx1 e1
y
m1m2
= true, thus
marginal1(µ) = marginal1
(JfKm1m2) = Jidx1 e1Km1m2 = Jidx1 e1Km1 . (63)
Analogously, we show Jidx2 e2Km2 = marginal2(µ).
Thenq
idx1(x
$← e1)
y(
proj
(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1)) = qx1 $← idx1 e1y(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1))
(∗)
=
∑
z1
Jidx1 e1Km1(z1) proj(|m1(x1 := z1)〉V cl1 ⊗ ψ1)
(63)
=
∑
z1
(
marginal1(µ)
)
(z1) proj
(∣∣m1(x1 := z1)〉V cl1 ⊗ ψ1)
=
∑
z1,z2
µ(z1, z2) proj
(∣∣m1(x1 := z1)〉
V cl1
⊗ ψ1
)
=
∑
z1,z2
µ(z1, z2) tr
[V1]
V2
proj(φ′z1,z2) = tr
[V1]
V2
ρ′. (64)
Here (∗) follows from the semantics of the sampling statement.
Analogously, we get q
idx2(y
$← e2)
y(
proj
(|m2〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ2)) = tr[V2]V1 ρ′. (65)
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For any (z1, z2) ∈ suppµ, we have that J(z1, z2) ∈ supp fKm1m2 = true. Thus
ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JAKm1m2 ⊆ r⋂
(z1,z2)∈supp f
B{z1/x1, z2/x2}
z
m1m2
⊆ qB{z1/x1, z2/x2}ym1m2
= JBKm1(x1:=z1)m2(x2:=z2).
Hence proj(φ′z1z2) satisfies B for all (z1, z2) ∈ suppµ. Since ρ′ =
∑
z1,z2
µ(z1, z2) proj(φ
′
z1,z2), ρ
′ satis-
fies B.
Furthermore, ρ′ is separable.
Thus for all m1,m2, ψ1, ψ2 with ψ1⊗ψ2 ∈ JAKm1m2 , there is a separable ρ′ that satisfies B and such
that (64) and (65) hold. By Lemma 36, this implies {A}x $← e2 ∼ y $← e2{B}. 
Lemma 58: Conditionals (one-sided)
Rule If1 holds.
Proof. Let e′ := idx1 e and c′ := idx1 c and d′ := idx1 d. Let Ab := Cla[e′ = b]∩A for b = true, false.
Claim 1 {Atrue}if e then c else d ∼ skip{B}.
Proof of claim. Fix a separable ρ that satisfies Atrue. Since {Atrue}c∼ skip{B} by assumption,
there exists a separable ρ′ that satisfies B and such that
Jc′K(tr[V1]V2 ρ) = tr[V1]V2 ρ′, (66)Jidx1 skipK(tr[V1]V2 ρ) = tr[V1]V2 ρ′. (67)
Since ρ satisfies Atrue ⊆ Cla[e′ = true], and fv(e′) ⊆ V1, we have that tr[V1]V2 ρ satisfies
Cla[e′ = true], and thus ↓e′(tr[V1]V2 ρ) = tr[V1]V2 ρ and ↓¬e′(tr[V1]V2 ρ) = 0. Thusq
if e′ then c′ else d′
y(
tr[V1]V2 ρ
) (∗)
= Jc′K(↓e′(tr[V1]V2 ρ))+ Jd′K(↓¬e′(tr[V1]V2 ρ)) = Jc′K(tr[V1]V2 ρ). (68)
Here (∗) follows from the semantics of the if statement.
Thusq
idx1(if e then c else d)
y(
tr[V1]V2 ρ
)
=
q
if e′ then c′ else d′
y(
tr[V1]V2 ρ
)(68)
= Jc′K(tr[V1]V2 ρ)(66)= tr[V1]V2 ρ′.
(69)
Thus ρ′ is separable and satisfies B, and (69) and (67) hold. Thus
{Atrue}if e then c else d∼ skip{B} holds. 
Claim 2 {Afalse}if e then c else d ∼ skip{B}.
Proof of claim. Analogous to Claim 1. 
Note that Typeexpe′ = B. From Claim 1 and Claim 2 we thus have
∀z ∈ Typeexpe′ .
{
Cla[e′ = z] ∩A}if e then c else d∼ skip{B}.
By rule Case, this implies {A}if e then c else d∼ skip{B}. 
Lemma 59: Conditionals (joint)
Rule JointIf holds.
Proof. Let e′i := idxi ei and c′i := idxi ci and d′i := idxi di. Let Ab := Cla[e′1 = b ∧ e′2 = b] ∩ A for
b = true, false.
Claim 1 Ab = Cla[e′1 = b] ∩A.
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Proof of claim. We have
Ab = Cla
[
e′1 = b ∧ e′2 = b
] ∩A (∗)⊆ Cla[e′1 = b ∧ e′2 = b] ∩ Cla[e′1 = e′2] ∩A
= Cla
[
e′1 = b ∧ e′2 = b ∧ e′1 = e′2
] ∩A = Cla[e′1 = b ∧ e′1 = e′2] ∩A ⊆ Cla[e′1 = b] ∩A
and
Cla
[
e′1 = b
] ∩A (∗)⊆ Cla[e′1 = b] ∩ Cla[e′1 = e′2] ∩A = Cla[e′1 = b ∧ e′1 = e′2] ∩A
= Cla
[
e′1 = b ∧ e′2 = b ∧ e′1 = e′2
] ∩A ⊆ Cla[e′1 = b ∧ e′2 = b] ∩A = Ab.
In both calculations, (∗) holds since we have A ⊆ Cla[e′1 = e′2] by assumption. 
Claim 2
{
Cla[e′1] ∩A
}
if e1 then c1 else d1 ∼ if e2 then c2 else d2
{
B
}
.
Proof of claim. Fix a separable ρ that satisfies Cla[e′1] ∩A. By Claim 1, ρ satiesfies Atrue. Since
{Atrue}c1 ∼ c2{B} by assumption, there exists a separable ρ′ that satisfies B and such that
Jc′1K(tr[V1]V2 ρ) = tr[V1]V2 ρ′, (70)Jc′2K(tr[V2]V1 ρ) = tr[V2]V1 ρ′, (71)
Since ρ satisfies Atrue ⊆ Cla[e′1], and fv(e′1) ⊆ V1, we have that tr[V1]V2 ρ satisfies Cla[e′1], and thus
↓e′1(tr
[V1]
V2
ρ) = tr[V1]V2 ρ and ↓¬e′1(tr
[V1]
V2
ρ) = 0. Thusq
if e′1 then c
′
1 else d
′
1
y(
tr[V1]V2 ρ
) (∗)
=
q
c′1
y(↓e′1(tr[V1]V2 ρ))+ Jd′1K(↓¬e′1(tr[V1]V2 ρ)) = Jc′1K(tr[V1]V2 ρ). (72)
Here (∗) follows from the semantics of the if statement. Analogously,q
if e′2 then c
′
2 else d
′
2
y(
tr[V2]V1 ρ
)
= Jc′2K(tr[V2]V1 ρ). (73)
Thusq
idx1(if e1 then c1 else d1)
y(
tr[V1]V2 ρ
)
=
q
if e′1 then c
′
1 else d
′
1
y(
tr[V1]V2 ρ
)(72)
= Jc′1K(tr[V1]V2 ρ)(70)= tr[V1]V2 ρ′,
(74)q
idx2(if e2 then c2 else d2)
y(
tr[V2]V1 ρ
)
=
q
if e′2 then c
′
2 else d
′
2
y(
tr[V2]V1 ρ
)(73)
= Jc′2K(tr[V2]V1 ρ)(71)= tr[V2]V1 ρ′.
(75)
So ρ′ is separable and satisfies B, and (74) and (75) hold. Thus{
Atrue
}
if e1 then c1 else d1 ∼ if e2 then c2 else d2
{
B
}
holds. 
Claim 3
{
Cla[¬e′1] ∩A
}
if e1 then c1 else d1 ∼ if e2 then c2 else d2
{
B
}
.
Proof of claim. Analogous to Claim 2. 
Note that Typeexpe′1 = B. From Claim 2 and Claim 3 we thus have
∀z ∈ Typeexpe′1 .
{
Cla[e′1 = z] ∩A
}
if e1 then c1 else d1 ∼ if e2 then c2 else d2
{
B
}
.
By rule Case, this implies {A}if e1 then c1 else d1 ∼ if e2 then c2 else d2{B}. 
Lemma 60: While loops (one-sided)
Rule While1 holds.
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Proof. Let e′ := idx1 e and c′ := idx1 c.
Since
{
Cla[e′] ∩A}c ∼ skip{A}, for any separable ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfies Cla[e′] ∩ A, there is
a separable ρ′ that satisfies A and such that
Jc′K(tr[V1]V2 ρ) = tr[V1]V2 ρ′ and tr[V2]V1 ρ = qidx2 skipy(tr[V2]V1 ρ) = tr[V2]V1 ρ′.
Thus there exists a function (not a superoperator!) E : T+cq [V1V2] → T+cq [V1V2] such that for all
separable ρ that satisfy Cla[e′] ∩A, we have that E(ρ) is separable and satisfies A, and
Jc′K(tr[V1]V2 ρ) = tr[V1]V2 E(ρ) and tr[V2]V1 ρ = tr[V2]V1 E(ρ). (76)
Fix some separable ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfies A. To prove the rule, we need to show that there
exists a separable ρ′ such that ρ′ satisfies Cla[¬e′] ∩A, andq
idx1(while e do c)
y
(ρ1) = tr
[V1]
V2
ρ′ and Jidx2 skipK(ρ2) = tr[V1]V2 ρ′
where
ρ1 := tr
[V1]
V2
ρ and ρ2 := tr[V2]V1 ρ.
Let ρˆ0 := ρ, and ρˆi+1 := E
(↓e′(ρˆi)). Let ρ′i := ↓¬e′(ρˆi). Let ρ′ := ∑∞i=0 ρ′i. (Existence of ρ′ is shown
below in Claim 3.)
Claim 1 ρˆi is separable and satisfies A. ρ′i is separable and satisfies Cla[¬e′] ∩A.
Proof of claim. We prove that ρˆi is separable and satisfies A by induction over i. For i = 0,
this follows since ρˆ0 = ρ is separable and satisfies A by assumption. For i > 0, by induction
hypothesis, ρi−1 is separable and satisfies A. Thus ↓e′(ρi−1) is separable and satisfies Cla[e′]∩A.
Thus ρi = E
(↓e′(ρi−1)) is separable and satisfies A.
To show that ρ′i is separable and satisfies Cla[¬e′]A, note that ρ′i = ↓′¬e(ρˆi). Since ρˆi is
separable and satisfies A, ρ′i is separable and satisfies Cla[¬e′] ∩A, 
Claim 2 tr[V1]V2 ρ
′
i = ↓¬e′
(
(Jc′K ◦ ↓e′)i(ρ1)).
Proof of claim. By Claim 1, and by definition of E, we have
tr[V1]V2 ρˆi = tr
[V1]
V2
E
(↓e′(ρˆi−1)) = Jc′K(tr[V1]V2 ↓e′(ρˆi−1)) = (Jc′K ◦ ↓e′)(tr[V1]V2 ρˆi−1) for i ≥ 1.
Since tr[V1]V2 ρˆ0 = tr
[V1]
V2
ρ =
(Jc′K ◦ ↓e′)0(ρ1), it follows by induction that tr[V1]V2 ρˆi = (Jc′K ◦ ↓e′)i(ρ1)
for i ≥ 0. And thus tr[V1]V2 ρ′i = tr[V1]V2 ↓¬e′(ρˆi) = ↓¬e′
(
tr[V1]V2 ρˆi
)
= ↓¬e′
(
(Jc′K ◦ ↓e′)i(ρ1)). 
Claim 3 ρ′ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] exists, and tr ρ′ = tr ρ.
Proof of claim. Since ρ satisfies A ⊆ A1 ⊗ `2[V qu2 ], we have that ρ1 = tr[V1]V2 ρ satisfies A1. Since
while e′ do c′ is total on A1 by assumption, we have trJwhile e′ do c′K(ρ1) = tr ρ1 .
We have
∞∑
i=0
tr ρ′i =
∞∑
i=0
tr tr[V1]V2 ρ
′
i
(∗)
=
∞∑
i=0
tr ↓¬e′
(
(Jc′K ◦ ↓e′)i(ρ1)) = tr ∞∑
i=0
↓¬e′
(
(Jc′K ◦ ↓e′)i(ρ1))
(∗∗)
= tr
q
while e′ do c′
y
(ρ1) = tr ρ1 = tr ρ.
Here (∗) follows from Claim 2. And (∗∗) follows from the semantics of while statements.
Since
∑∞
i=0 tr ρ
′
i = tr ρ <∞, we have that ρ′ =
∑∞
i=0 ρ
′
i exists and tr ρ′ = tr ρ. 
Claim 4 ρ′ is separable and satisfies Cla[¬e′] ∩A.
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Proof of claim. Since ρ′i is separable and satisfies Cla[¬e′]∩A by Claim 1, we immediately have
that ρ′ =
∑
i ρ
′
i is separable and satisfies Cla[¬e′] ∩A. 
Claim 5 tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ =
q
idx1(while e do c)
y
(ρ1).
Proof of claim. We have
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ =
∞∑
i=0
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′
i
(∗)
=
∞∑
i=0
↓¬e′
(
(Jc′K ◦ ↓e′)i(ρ1))(∗∗)= qwhile e′ do c′y(ρ1) = qidx1(while e do c)y(ρ1).
Here (∗) follows from Claim 2. And (∗∗) follows from the semantics of while statements. 
Claim 6 tr[V2]V1 ρ
′ ≤ tr ρ2.
Proof of claim. We first show for all n ≥ 0,
tr[V2]V1
(
ρˆn +
n−1∑
i=0
ρ′i
)
= ρ2. (77)
We show this by induction over n. For n = 0, this follows since ρˆ0 = ρ and ρ2 = tr
[V2]
V1
ρ by
definition. Assume (77) holds for n, then
tr[V2]V1
(
ρˆn+1 +
n∑
i=0
ρ′i
)
= tr[V2]V1 E
(↓e′(ρˆn))+ tr[V2]V1 ( n∑
i=0
ρ′i
)
(76)
= tr[V2]V1 ↓e′(ρˆn) + tr[V2]V1
( n∑
i=0
ρ′i
)
= tr[V2]V1
(↓e′(ρˆn) + ρ′n︸︷︷︸
=↓¬e′ (ρˆn)
)
+ tr[V2]V1
(n−1∑
i=0
ρ′i
)
= tr[V2]V1 ρˆn + tr
[V2]
V1
(n−1∑
i=0
ρ′i
)
(77)
= ρ2.
Here (76) can be applied since ρˆn is separable and satisfies A by Claim 1 and thus ↓e′(ρˆn) is
separable and satisfies Cla[e′]∩A. Thus we have shown (77) for n+ 1, and thus (77) holds for all
n by induction.
Then for n ≥ 0,
n∑
i=0
ρ′i = ρ
′
n +
n−1∑
i=0
ρ′i
(∗)
= ↓¬e′(ρˆn) +
n−1∑
i=0
↓¬e′(ρ′i) = ↓¬e′
(
ρˆn +
n−1∑
i=0
ρ′i
)(∗∗)
≤ ρˆn +
n−1∑
i=0
ρ′i.
Here (∗) holds since ρ′n = ↓¬e′(ρˆn) by definition, and ↓¬e′(ρ′i) = ↓¬e′
(↓¬e′(ρˆi)) = ↓¬e′(ρˆi) = ρ′i.
And (∗∗) holds since for any ρ, ↓e′(ρ) = ρ− ↓¬e′(ρ) and ↓¬e′(ρ) ≥ 0, and thus ↓e′(ρ) ≤ ρ.
Since superoperators are monotonous and tr[V2]V1 is a superoperator, it follows
n∑
i=0
tr[V2]V1 ρ
′
i = tr
[V2]
V1
( n∑
i=0
ρ′i
)
≤ tr[V2]V1
(
ρˆn +
n−1∑
i=0
ρ′i.
)
(77)
= ρ2. (78)
Thus also
tr[V2]V1 ρ
′ =
∞∑
i=0
tr[V2]V1 ρ
′
i = sup
n
n∑
i=0
tr[V2]V1 ρ
′
i
(78)
≤ ρ2. 
Claim 7 tr[V2]V1 ρ
′ =
q
idx2 skip
y
(ρ2).
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Proof of claim. We have
tr tr[V2]V1 ρ
′ = tr ρ′ (∗)= tr ρ = tr ρ2
where (∗) is by Claim 3. And we have tr[V2]V1 ρ′ ≤ ρ2. Together, this implies tr[V2]V1 ρ′ = ρ2. (Otherwise
ρ2 − tr[V2]V1 ρ′ would be positive, nonzero, and have zero trace.) Hence
tr[V2]V1 ρ
′ = ρ2 = JskipK(ρ2) = qidx2 skipy(ρ2). 
To summarize, for any separable ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfies A, there is a
ρ′ ∈ T+cq [V1] that is separable and satisfies Cla[¬ idx1 e] ∩ A (Claim 4), and such thatq
idx1(while e do c)
y(
tr[V1]V2 ρ
)
= tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ (Claim 5) and
q
idx2 skip
y(
tr[V2]V1 ρ
)
= tr[V2]V1 ρ
′ (Claim 7).
This implies
{
A
}
while e do c ∼ skip{Cla[¬ idx1 e] ∩A}. 
Lemma 61: While loops (joint)
Rule JointWhile holds.
Proof. Let e′i := idxi ei for i = 1, 2 and c′ := idx1 c and d′ := idx2 d.
Since
{
Cla[e′1 ∧ e′2] ∩A
}
c ∼ d{A} by assumption, for any separable ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfies
Cla[e′1 ∧ e′2] ∩A, there is a separable ρ′ that satisfies A and such that
Jc′K(tr[V1]V2 ρ) = tr[V1]V2 ρ′ and Jd′K(tr[V2]V1 ρ) = tr[V2]V1 ρ′.
Thus there exists a function (not a superoperator!) E : T+cq [V1V2] → T+cq [V1V2] such for separable ρ
that satisfies Cla[e′1 ∩ e′2] ∩A, we have that E(ρ) is separable and satisfies A, and
Jc′K(tr[V1]V2 ρ) = tr[V1]V2 E(ρ) and Jd′K(tr[V2]V1 ρ) = tr[V2]V1 E(ρ). (79)
Fix some separable ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfies A. To prove the lemma, we need to show that there
exists a separable ρ′ such that ρ′ satisfies Cla[¬e′1 ∧ ¬e′2] ∩A, andq
idx1(while e1 do c)
y
(ρ1) = tr
[V1]
V2
ρ′ and
q
idx2(while e2 do d)
y
(ρ2) = tr
[V2]
V1
ρ′
where
ρ1 := tr
[V1]
V2
ρ and ρ2 := tr[V2]V1 ρ.
Let ρˆ0 := ρ, and ρˆi+1 := E
(↓e′1∧e′2(ρˆi)). Let ρ′i := ↓¬e′1∧¬e′2(ρˆi). Let ρ′ := ∑∞i=0 ρ′i. (Existence of ρ′
is shown below in Claim 5.)
Claim 1 ρˆi is separable and satisfies A. ρ′i is separable and satisfies Cla[¬e′1 ∧ ¬e′2] ∩A.
Proof of claim. We prove that ρˆi is separable and satisfies A by induction over i. For i = 0, this
follows since ρˆ0 = ρ is separable and satisfies A by assumption. For i > 0, by induction hypothesis,
ρˆi−1 is separable and satisfies A. Thus ↓e′1∧e′2(ρˆi−1) is separable and satisfies Cla[e′1 ∧ e′2] ∩ A.
Thus ρˆi = E(↓e′1∧e′2(ρˆi−1)) is separable and satisfies A by definition of E.
To show that ρ′i is separable and satisfies Cla[¬e′1 ∧ ¬e′2] ∩ A, note that ρ′i = ↓¬e′1∧¬e′2(ρˆi).
Since ρˆi is separable and satisfies A, ρ′i is separable and satisfies Cla[¬e′1 ∧ ¬e′2] ∩A. 
Claim 2 For any σ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfies A, it holds that ↓e′1∧e′2(σ) = ↓e′1(σ) = ↓e′2(σ) and↓¬e′1∧¬e′2(σ) = ↓¬e′1(σ) = ↓¬e′2(σ).
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Proof of claim. Since σ ∈ T+cq [V1V2], we can decompose σ as σ =
∑
m proj
(|V cl1 V cl2 〉m) ⊗ σm =:∑
m σ
′
m. Let S := {m : σm 6= 0}. Let S1 :=
{
m ∈ S : Je′1Km} and S2 := {m ∈ S : Je′2Km}. Then
↓e′1∧e′2(σ) =
∑
m∈S1∩S2
σ′m, ↓e′1(σ) =
∑
m∈S1
σ′m, ↓e′2(σ) =
∑
m∈S2
σ′m. (80)
Since σ satisfies A ⊆ Cla[e′1 = e′2], we have σm = 0 for all m with Je′1Km 6= Je′2Km. Thus for all
m ∈ S, Je′1Km = Je′2Km. Hence S1 = S2 = S1 ∩ S2. With (80), this implies ↓e′1∧e′2(σ) = ↓e′1(σ) =↓e′2(σ).
The fact ↓¬e′1∧¬e′2(σ) = ↓¬e′1(σ) = ↓¬e′2(σ) is shown analogously. 
Claim 3 tr[V1]V2 ρ
′
i = ↓¬e′1
(
(Jc′K ◦ ↓e′1)i(ρ1)) for all i ≥ 0.
Proof of claim. For i ≥ 1, we have
tr[V1]V2 ρˆi = tr
[V1]
V2
E
(↓e′1∧e′2(ρˆi−1))(79)= Jc′K(tr[V1]V2 ↓e′1∧e′2(ρˆi−1)) (∗)= Jc′K(tr[V1]V2 ↓e′1(ρˆi−1))
(∗∗)
= Jc′K(↓e′1(tr[V1]V2 ρˆi−1)) = (Jc′K ◦ ↓e′1)(tr[V1]V2 ρˆi−1).
Here (79) can be applied because ρˆi−1 satisfies A by Claim 1 and thus ↓e′1∧e′2(ρˆi−1) satisfies
Cla[e′1 ∧ e′2]∩A. (∗) follows from Claim 2 and the fact that ρˆi−1 satisfies A by Claim 1. And (∗∗)
uses the fact that fv(e′1) = fv(idx1 e1) ⊆ V cl1 .
Since tr[V1]V2 ρˆ0 = ρ1 by definition of ρˆ0 and ρ1, we get tr
[V1]
V2
ρˆi =
(Jc′K ◦ ↓e′1)i(ρ1) for all i ≥ 0.
And thus
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′
i = tr
[V1]
V2
↓¬e′1∧¬e′2(ρˆi)
(∗)
= tr[V1]V2 ↓¬e′1(ρˆi) = ↓¬e′1
(
tr[V1]V2 ρˆi
)
= ↓¬e′1
(
(Jc′K ◦ ↓e′1)i(ρ1)).
Here (∗) uses Claim 2 and the fact that ρˆi satisfies A by Claim 1. 
Claim 4 tr[V2]V1 ρ
′
i = ↓¬e′2
(
(Jd′K ◦ ↓e′2)i(ρ2)).
Proof of claim. Analogous to Claim 3. 
Claim 5 ρ′ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] exists.
Proof of claim. We have
∞∑
i=0
tr ρ′i =
∞∑
i=0
tr tr[V1]V2 ρ
′
i
(∗)
=
∞∑
i=0
tr ↓¬e′1
(
(Jc′K ◦ ↓e′1)i(ρ1)) = tr ∞∑
i=0
↓¬e′1
(
(Jc′K ◦ ↓e′1)i(ρ1))
(∗∗)
= tr
q
while e′1 do c
′y(ρ1) (∗∗∗)≤ tr ρ1 = tr ρ.
Here (∗) follows from Claim 3. And (∗∗) follows from the semantics of while statements. And
(∗∗∗) follows since Jwhile e′1 do c′K is a superoperator and thus trace-decreasing.
Since
∑∞
i=0 tr ρ
′
i ≤ tr ρ <∞, we have that ρ′ =
∑∞
i=0 ρ
′
i exists. 
Claim 6 ρ′ is separable and satisfies Cla[¬e′1 ∧ ¬e′2] ∩A.
Proof of claim. Since ρ′i is separable and satisfies Cla[¬e′1 ∧ ¬e′2]∩A by Claim 1, we immediately
have that ρ′ =
∑
i ρ
′
i is separable and satisfies Cla[¬e′1 ∧ ¬e′2] ∩A. 
Claim 7 tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ =
q
idx1(while e1 do c)
y
(ρ1) and tr
[V2]
V1
ρ′ =
q
idx2(while e2 do d)
y
(ρ2)
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Proof of claim. We have
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ =
∞∑
i=0
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′
i
(∗)
=
∞∑
i=0
↓¬e′1
(
(Jc′K ◦ ↓e′1)i(ρ1))(∗∗)= qwhile e′1 do c′y(ρ1) = qidx1(while e1 do c)y(ρ1).
Here (∗) follows from Claim 3. And (∗∗) follows from the semantics of while statements.
The fact tr[V2]V1 ρ
′ =
q
idx2(while e2 do d)
y
(ρ2) is shown analogously, using Claim 4. 
To summarize, for any separable ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2] that satisfies A, there is a ρ′ ∈ T+cq [V1] that is
separable and satisfies Cla[¬e′1 ∧ ¬e′2] ∩ A (Claim 6), and such that
q
idx1(while e1 do c)
y(
tr[V1]V2 ρ
)
=
tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ (Claim 7) and
q
idx2(while e2 do d)
y(
tr[V2]V1 ρ
)
= tr[V2]V1 ρ
′ (Claim 7). This implies{
A
}
while e1 do c ∼ while e2 do d
{
Cla[¬e′1 ∧ ¬e′2] ∩A
}
. 
A.3 Rules for quantum statements
Lemma 62: Measurements (one-sided)
Rule Measure1 holds.
Proof. Fix m1 ∈ TypesetV cl1 , m2 ∈ Type
set
V cl2
and normalized ψ1 ∈ `2[V qu1 ], ψ2 ∈ `2[V qu2 ] such that ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈JAKm1m2 .
Let M := Jidx1 eKm1m2 . Let Pz := M(z) = J(idx1 e)(z)Km1m2 . From the well-typedness of x ←
measure e with Q, it follows that M ∈Meas(Typex,TypelistQ ) = Meas(Typex1 ,Typelistidx1Q). Thus Pz
are mutually orthogonal projectors on `2(Typelistidx1Q) for z ∈ Typex1 . Let P ′z := Uvars,Q′PzU∗vars,Q′ ⊗
idV qu1 \Q′ . Then P
′
z are mutually orthogonal projectors on `2[V
qu
1 ] for z ∈ Typex1 , and P ′z ⊗ idV qu2 =Je′zKm1m2 .
Since ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JAKm1m2 ⊆ qCla[e is a total measurement]ym1m2 , we haveJe is a total measurementKm1m2 = true. Thus M is a total measurement, i.e., ∑z Pz = id .
Thus
∑
z P
′
z = idV qu1 . This implies
∑
z∈Typex1
tr proj(P ′zψ1) =
∑
z∈Typex1
∥∥P ′zψ1∥∥2 (∗)= ∥∥∥
=id
V
qu
1︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
z∈Typex1
P ′z ψ1
∥∥∥2 = ‖ψ1‖2 = 1. (81)
Here (∗) uses that all P ′zψ1 are orthogonal (since the P ′z are orthogonal).
For all z ∈ Typex1 , let φz :=
∣∣m1(x1 := z)m2〉
V cl1 V
cl
2
⊗ P ′zψ1 ⊗ ψ2. Let ρ′ :=
∑
z∈Typex1
proj(φz).
We haveq
idx1(x←measure Q with e)
y(
proj
(|m1〉V cl1 ⊗ ψ1))
=
q
x1 ←measure Q′ with idx1 e
y(
proj
(|m1〉V cl1 ⊗ ψ1))
(∗)
=
∑
z∈Typex1
proj
(∣∣m1(x1 := z)〉
V cl1
⊗ P ′zψ1
)
= tr[V1]V2 ρ
′, (82)
q
idx2 skip
y(
proj
(|m2〉V cl2 ⊗ ψ2)) = JskipK(proj(|m2〉V cl2 ⊗ ψ2)) (∗)= proj(|m2〉V cl2 ⊗ ψ2)
(81)
=
∑
z∈Typex1
proj
(|m2〉V cl2 ⊗ ψ2) · tr proj(P ′zψ1) = tr[V2]V1 ρ′. (83)
Here (∗) is by definition of the semantics of the measurement statement and the skip statement.
For all z ∈ Typex1 , we have
ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JAKm1m2 ⊆ rB{z/x1} ∩ im e′z + (im e′z)⊥z
m1m2
= JBKm1(x1:=z)m2 ∩ im(P ′z ⊗ idV qu2 ) + (im(P ′z ⊗ idV qu2 ))⊥.
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Since the
(
im(P ′z ⊗ idV qu2 )
)⊥-part of ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 vanishes under P ′z ⊗ idV qu2 , and since the(JBKm1(x1:=z)m2 ∩ im(P ′z ⊗ idV qu2 ))-part is invariant under P ′z ⊗ idV qu2 and lies in JBKm1(x1:=z)m2 , we
have
P ′zψ1 ⊗ ψ2 = (P ′z ⊗ idV qu2 )(ψ1 ⊗ ψ2) ∈ JBKm1(x1:=z)m2 .
Thus
proj(φz) = proj
(∣∣m1(x1 := z)m2〉V cl1 V cl2 ⊗ P ′zψ1 ⊗ ψ2) satisfies B.
Thus ρ′ :=
∑
z∈Typex1
proj(φz) satisfies B. Furthermore, ρ′ is separable.
Thus for all m1,m2, ψ1, ψ2 with ψ1⊗ψ2 ∈ JAKm1m2 , there is a separable ρ′ that satisfies B and such
that (82) and (83) hold. By Lemma 36, this implies
{
A
}
x←measure Q with e ∼ skip{B}. 
Lemma 63: Measurements (joint)
Rule JointMeasure holds.
Proof. Let A∗ := Cf ∩ Ce ∩A ∩ (u1Q′1 ≡quant u2Q′2).
Fix m1 ∈ TypesetV cl1 , m2 ∈ Type
set
V cl2
and normalized ψ1 ∈ `2[V qu1 ], ψ2 ∈ `2[V qu2 ] such that ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈JA∗Km1m2 .
Let Mi := Jidxi eiKm1m2 . Let Piz := Mi(z) = Jidxi ei(z)Km1m2 . From the well-typedness of x ←
measure Q1 with e1 and y ← measure Q2 with e2, it follows that M1 ∈ Meas(Typex,TypelistQ1) =
Meas(Typex1 ,Type
list
Q′1
) and M2 ∈ Meas(Typey,TypelistQ2) = Meas(Typey2 ,TypelistQ′2). Thus Piz for z ∈
Typex1 or z ∈ Typey2 , respectively, are mutually orthogonal projectors on `2[Qi]. Let
P ′iz := Uvars,Q′iPizU
∗
vars,Q′i
⊗ idV qui \Q′i . (84)
Then the P ′iz with z ∈ Typex1 or z ∈ Typey2 , respectively, are mutually orthogonal projectors on
`2[V qu2 ], and P
′
iz ⊗ idV qu3−i = Je′izKm1m2 .
Let Ui := JuiKm1m2 ∈ Iso(TypelistQi , Z). Let U ′i := UiU∗vars,Q′i ∈ Iso(TypesetQ′i , Z).
Let R := JfKm1m2 ⊆ Typex × Typey. Since ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JA∗Km1m2 ⊆ Cf , we have
∀x. qidx1 e1(x)ym1m2 6= 0 =⇒ ∣∣{y : (x, y) ∈ R}∣∣ = 1
and ∀y. qidx2 e2(y)ym1m2 6= 0 =⇒ ∣∣{x : (x, y) ∈ R}∣∣ = 1.
Since Piz = Jidxi ei(z)Km1m2 , this implies
∀x. P1x 6= 0 =⇒
∣∣{y : (x, y) ∈ R}∣∣ = 1 and ∀y. P2y 6= 0 =⇒ ∣∣{x : (x, y) ∈ R}∣∣ = 1. (85)
Claim 1 For all (x, y) ∈ R, ‖P ′1xψ1‖ = ‖P ′2yψ2‖.
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Proof of claim. Since ψ1⊗ψ2 ∈ JA∗Km1m2 ⊆ Ju1Q′1 ≡quant u2Q′2Km1m2 = (U1Q′1 ≡quant U2Q′2), by
Lemma 29, there are normalized ψX1 ∈ `2[Q′1], ψY1 ∈ `2[V qu1 \Q′1], ψX2 ∈ `2[Q′2], ψY2 ∈ `2[V qu2 \Q′2]
such that
U ′1ψ
X
1 = U1U
∗
vars,Q′1
ψX1 = U2U
∗
vars,Q′2
ψX2 = U
′
2ψ
X
2 and ψ1 = ψ
X
1 ⊗ ψY1 and ψ2 = ψX2 ⊗ ψY2 . (86)
Since
ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JA∗Km1m2 ⊆ JCeKm1m2 = Cla[∀(x, y) ∈ R. U1P1xU∗1 = U2P2yU∗2 ],
it holds that
U1P1xU
∗
1 = U2P2yU
∗
2 (87)
(note that (x, y) ∈ R by assumption of the claim).
We have∥∥P ′1xψ1∥∥(84),(86)= ∥∥(Uvars,Q′1P1xU∗vars,Q′1 ⊗ idV qu1 \Q′1)(ψX1 ⊗ ψY1 )∥∥ = ∥∥Uvars,Q′1P1xU∗vars,Q′1ψX1 ∥∥ ·
=1︷ ︸︸ ︷∥∥idV qu1 \Q′1ψY1 ∥∥
(∗)
=
∥∥U1P1xU∗vars,Q′1ψX1 ∥∥(∗∗)= ∥∥U1P1xU∗1U1U∗vars,Q′1ψX1 ∥∥(87)= ∥∥U2P2yU∗2U1U∗vars,Q′1ψX1 ∥∥
(∗∗∗)
=
∥∥U2P2yU∗2U ′1ψX1 ∥∥(86)= ∥∥U2P2yU∗2U ′2ψX2 ∥∥ (∗∗∗)= ∥∥U2P2yU∗2U2U∗vars,Q′2ψX2 ∥∥(∗∗)= ∥∥U2P2yU∗vars,Q′2ψX2 ∥∥
(∗)
=
∥∥Uvars,Q′2P2yU∗vars,Q′2ψX2 ∥∥ = ∥∥Uvars,Q′2P2yU∗vars,Q′2ψX2 ∥∥ · ∥∥idV qu2 \Q′2ψY2 ∥∥︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
=
∥∥(Uvars,Q′2P2yU∗vars,Q′2 ⊗ idV qu2 \Q′2)(ψX2 ⊗ ψY2 )∥∥(84),(86)= ∥∥P ′2yψ2∥∥.
Here (∗) follows since Uvars,Q′i and Ui and are isometries, so neither change the norm. (∗∗)
follows since U1 and U2 are isometries, and thus U∗1U1 = id and U∗2U2 = id . And (∗∗∗) holds
since U ′1 = U1U∗vars,Q′1 and U
′
2 = U2U
∗
vars,Q′2
. 
For all (x, y) ∈ R, let
φxy :=
1
‖P ′2yψ2‖
· ∣∣m1(x1 := x)m2(y2 := y)〉
V cl1 V
cl
2
⊗ P ′1xψ1 ⊗ P ′2yψ2.
(When P ′2yψ2 = 0, let φxy := 0.) Let ρ′ :=
∑
(x,y)∈R proj(φxy).
We have
tr[V1]V2 proj(φxy) =
1
‖P ′2yψ2‖2
· proj
(∣∣m1(x1 := x)〉
V cl1
⊗ P ′1xψ1
)
· tr proj(P ′2yψ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=‖P ′2yψ2‖2
= proj
(∣∣m1(x1 := x)〉
V cl1
⊗ P ′1xψ1
)
. (88)
And we have
tr[V2]V1 proj(φxy) =
‖P ′1xψ1‖2
‖P ′2yψ2‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 by Claim 1
·proj
(∣∣m2(y2 := y)〉
V cl2
⊗ P ′2yψ2
)
= proj
(∣∣m2(y2 := y)〉
V cl2
⊗ P ′2yψ2
)
. (89)
We haveq
idx1(x←measure Q1 with e1)
y(
proj
(|m1〉V cl1 ⊗ ψ1))
= Jx1 ←measure Q′1 with idx1 e1K(proj(|m1〉V cl1 ⊗ ψ1))
(∗)
=
∑
x∈Typex1
proj
(∣∣m1(x1 := x)〉
V cl1
⊗ P ′1xψ1
)
=
∑
x∈Typex1
proj
(∣∣m1(x1 := x)〉
V cl1
⊗ P ′1xψ1
)
· ∣∣{y : (x, y) ∈ R}∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 when P ′1x 6=0 by (85)
=
∑
(x,y)∈R
proj
(∣∣m1(x1 := x)〉
V cl1
⊗ P ′1xψ1
)
(88)
=
∑
(x,y)∈R
tr[V1]V2 proj(φxy) = tr
[V1]
V2
ρ′. (90)
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Here (∗) is by definition of the semantics of the measurement statement.
And analogously (using (89) instead of (88)), we getq
idx2(y←measure Q2 with e2)
y(
proj
(|m2〉V cl2 ⊗ ψ2)) = tr[V2]V1 ρ′. (91)
For any (x, y) ∈ R = JfKm1m2 , we have
ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JA∗Km1m2 ⊆ JAKm1m2 ⊆ rB{x/x1, y/y2} ∩ im e′1x ∩ im e′2y + (im e′1x)⊥(im e′2y)⊥z
m1m2
= JBKm1(x1:=x)m2(y2:=y) ∩ im(P ′1x ⊗ idV qu2 ) ∩ im(P ′2y ⊗ idV qu1 ) + (im(P ′1x ⊗ idV qu2 ))⊥ + (im(P ′2y ⊗ idV qu1 ))⊥.
Since the
(
im(P ′1x ⊗ idV qu2 )
)⊥-part and the (im(P ′2y ⊗ idV qu1 ))⊥-part of ψ1⊗ψ2 both vanish under P ′1x⊗
P ′2y, and since the
(JBKm1(x1:=x)m2(y2:=y) ∩ im(P ′1x ⊗ idV qu2 ) ∩ im(P ′2y ⊗ idV qu1 ))-part is invariant under
P ′1x ⊗ P ′2y and lies in JBKm1(x1:=x)m2(y2:=y), we have for all (x, y) ∈ R,
P ′1xψ1 ⊗ P2yψ2 = (P ′1x ⊗ P ′2y)(ψ1 ⊗ ψ2) ∈ JBKm1(x1:=x)m2(y2:=y).
Thus for all (x, y) ∈ R,
proj(φxy) = proj
(∣∣m1(x1 := x)m2(y2 := y)〉V cl1 V cl2 ⊗ P ′1xψ1 ⊗ P ′2yψ2) satisfies B.
Thus ρ′ =
∑
(x,y)∈R proj(φxy) satisfies B.
Furthermore, ρ′ is separable.
Thus for all m1,m2, ψ1, ψ2 with ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JA∗Km1m2 , there is a separable ρ′
that satisfies B and such that (90) and (91) hold. By Lemma 36, this implies
{A∗}x←measure Q1 with e1 ∼ y←measure Q2 with e2{B}. 
Lemma 64: Measurement (joint, same measurement)
Rule JointMeasureSimple holds.
Proof. Define the (constant) expression f as f :=
{
(x, x) : x ∈ Typex
}
. Since Typex = Typey, we
have that Typeexpf ⊆ 2Typex×Typey . Let u1, u2 := id be constant expressions where id is the identity
on `2(TypelistQ1). Let Z := Type
list
Q1 . Then Type
exp
ui ⊆ Iso(TypelistQi , Z). (Since TypelistQ1 = TypelistQ2 .) Let
Q′1, Q
′
2, e
′
1z, e
′
2z be defined as in rule JointMeasureSimple. (Note that Q′1, Q′2, e′1z, e′2z are define in
rule JointMeasureSimple in the same way as in rule JointMeasure, except that the index z is
called x or y there.)
Define Cf and Ce as in rule JointMeasure. Then all conditions for rule JointMeasure are
satisfied, and we have{
A∗
}
x←measure Q1 with e1 ∼ y←measure Q2 with e2
{
B
}
(92)
with
A∗ := Cf ∩ Ce ∩B∗ ∩ (u1Q′1 ≡quant u2Q′2),
B∗ :=
⋂
(x,y)∈f
B{x/x1, y/y2} ∩ im e′1x ∩ im e′2y + (im e′1x)⊥ + (im e′2y)⊥.
(Note, B∗ is called A in rule JointMeasure. We cannot call it A here because in rule
JointMeasureSimple there is already a different predicate called A.)
Since
∣∣{y : (x, y) ∈ f}∣∣ = 1 and ∣∣{x : (x, y) ∈ f}∣∣ = 1 for all x, y ∈ Typex = Typey, we have that
Cf = Cla[true]. And Ce simplifies to:
Ce = Cla
[
∀(x, y) ∈ f. u1
(
idx1 e1(x)
)
u∗1 = u2
(
idx2 e2(y)
)
u∗2
]
= Cla
[
∀x ∈ Typex. idx1 e1(x) = idx2 e2(y)
]
= Cla
[
idx1 e1 = idx2 e2
]
.
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And (
u1Q
′
1 ≡quant u2Q′2
)
=
(
id Q′1 ≡quant id Q′2
) (∗)
=
(
Q′1 ≡quant Q′2
)
.
Here (∗) follows from Definition 28. And⋂
z∈Typex
B{z/x1, z/y2} ∩ im e′1z ∩ im e′2z + (im e′1z)⊥ + (im e′2z)⊥.
Thus
A∗ = Cla[true] ∩ Cla[idx1 e1 = idx2 e2] ∩ (Q′1 ≡quant Q′2) ∩B∗ = A.
Thus (92) is the conclusion of rule JointMeasureSimple. 
Lemma 65: Unitary quantum operation
Rule QApply1 holds.
Proof. Fix m1 ∈ TypesetV cl1 , m2 ∈ Type
set
V cl2
and normalized ψ1 ∈ `2[V qu1 ], ψ2 ∈ `2[V qu2 ] such that ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈Je′∗ · (B ∩ im e′)Km1m2 .
Let c := (apply e to Q), d := skip,
Let U := Jidx1 eKm1m2 . From the well-typedness conditions for programs, it follows that Typeexpe ⊆
Iso(TypelistQ ), and thus Je′Km1m2 ∈ Iso[V qu1 V qu2 ]. Let U ′ := Je′Km1m2 = Uvars,Q′UU∗vars,Q′ ⊗ idV qu1 V qu1 \Q′ .
(This uses Definition 19.)
Let
φ1 :=
(
Uvars,Q′UU
∗
vars,Q′ ⊗ idV qu1 \Q′
)
ψ1, ρ
′ := proj
(|m1m2〉V cl1 V cl2 ⊗ φ1 ⊗ ψ2).
Then ρ′ is separable andq
idx1 c
y(
proj
(|m1〉V cl1 ⊗ ψ1)) = qapply idx1 e to Q′y(proj(|m1〉V cl1 ⊗ ψ1))
(∗)
= proj
(|m1〉V cl1 ⊗ φ1) = tr[V1]V2 ρ′, (93)q
idx1 d
y(
proj
(|m2〉V cl2 ⊗ ψ2)) = JskipK(proj(|m2〉V cl2 ⊗ ψ2)) (∗)= proj(|m2〉V cl2 ⊗ ψ2) = tr[V2]V1 ρ′. (94)
Here (∗) follows from the semantics of the respective statements.
Since ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ Je′∗ · (B ∩ im e′)Km1m2 = U ′∗ · (JBKm1m2 ∩ imU ′), there exists a ψ0 ∈ JBKm1m2 ∩
imU ′ with ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 = U ′∗ψ0. Thus
φ1 ⊗ ψ2 =
(
Uvars,Q′UU
∗
vars,Q′ ⊗ idV qu1 \Q′
)
ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 = U ′(ψ1 ⊗ ψ2)
= U ′U ′∗ψ0
(∗)
= ψ0 ∈ JBKm1m2 ∩ imU ′ ⊆ JBKm1m2 .
Here (∗) follows since U ′U ′∗ is the projector onto imU ′ (this holds for any isometry U ′) and ψ0 ∈JBKm1m2 ∩ imU ′ ⊆ imU ′.
Since φ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JBKm1m2 , it follows that ρ′ satisfies B by definition of ρ′.
Thus for all m1,m2, ψ1, ψ2 with ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ Je′∗ · (B ∩ im e′)Km1m2 , there is a separable ρ′ that
satisfies B and such that (93) and (94) hold. By Lemma 36, this implies {e′∗ · (B ∩ im e′)}c ∼ d{B}.
This proves the rule by definition of c,d. 
Lemma 66: Quantum initialization
Rule QInit1 holds.
Proof. Let A∗ := (A ÷ e′) ⊗ `2[Q′]. Fix m1 ∈ TypesetV cl1 , m2 ∈ Type
set
V cl2
and normalized ψ1 ∈ `2[V qu1 ],
ψ2 ∈ `2[V qu2 ] such that ψ := ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ∈ JA∗Km1m2 .
Let φ := Je′Km1m2 ∈ `2[Q′] and S := JAKm1m2 ⊆ `2[V qu1 V qu2 ]. Then ψ ∈ JA∗Km1m2 = (S÷φ)⊗`2[Q′].
And from the well-typedness of e q← Q, it follows that all Typeexpe contains only normalized vectors,
thus Typeexpe′ = Type
exp
e contains only normalized vectors, thus ‖φ‖ = 1.
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Let ψ1 =
∑
i λiψ
S
i ⊗ ψQi with λi > 0 and orthonormal ψSi ∈ `2[V qu1 \Q′] and ψQi ∈ `2[Q′] be
the Schmidt decomposition of ψ1 (Lemma 7). And
∑
i λ
2
i = 1 since ψ1 is normalized. Since ψ =∑
i λiψ
S
i ⊗ψQi ⊗ψ2 ∈ (S÷φ)⊗`2[Q′], and since the ψQi are orthogonal, it follows that all ψSi ⊗ψ2 ∈ S÷φ.
By definition of ÷ (Definition 20), this implies ψSi ⊗ φ ⊗ ψ2 = (ψSi ⊗ ψ2) ⊗ φ ∈ S = JAKm1m2 . Thus
proj
(|m1m2〉V cl1 V cl2 ⊗ ψSi ⊗ φ⊗ ψ2) satisfies A, and thus
ρ′ :=
∑
i
λ2i proj
(|m1m2〉V cl1 V cl2 ⊗ ψSi ⊗ φ⊗ ψ2)
satisfies A. And ρ′ is separable.
We have q
idx1(Q
q← e)y(proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1))
(∗)
= proj
(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ tr[V qu1 \Q′]Q′ proj(ψ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗∗)
=
∑
i λ
2
i proj(ψ
S
i )
⊗proj(Uvars,Q′Jidx1 eKm1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Je′Km1=φ
)
=
∑
i
λ2i proj
(|m1〉V cl1 ⊗ ψSi ⊗ φ) = tr[V1]V2 ρ′. (95)
Here (∗) follows from the semantics of quantum assignments. And (∗∗) follows since ψ1 =
∑
i λiψ
S
i ⊗ψQi
with orthonormal ψQi ∈ `2[Q′].
Furthermore,
q
idx2 skip
y(
proj
(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1)) (∗)= proj(|m1〉V cl1 )⊗ proj(ψ1)
(∗∗)
=
∑
i
λi proj
(|m1〉V cl1 ⊗ ψ1) · tr proj(φ) = tr[V2]V1 ρ′. (96)
Here (∗) follows from the semantics of skip, and (∗∗) from ∑i λi = 1 and ‖φ‖ = 1.
Thus for any separable ρ that satisfies A∗, there is a ρ′ that is separable and satisfies A such that
and (95) and (96) hold. By Lemma 36, this implies {A∗}Q q← e∼ skip{A}. 
A.4 Proof of rule Adversary
Lemma 67
Rule Adversary is sound.
Proof. We show rule Adversary by induction over the structure of C. That is, we distinguish five
cases: C = i, C = C ′;C ′′, C = if e then C ′ else C ′′, C = while e do C ′, and C = c. And we
assume that Adversary holds for C ′, C ′′.
Case C = i: In this case, we need to prove {A}ci ∼ c′i{A}. But that is already a premise of the rule,
so there is nothing to prove.
Case C = C ′;C ′′: Note that since the premises of the rule hold for C, they also
hold for the subterms C ′, C ′′. Thus we have {A}C ′[c1, . . . , cn]∼ C ′[c1, . . . , cn]{A} and
{A}C ′′[c1, . . . , cn]∼ C ′′[c1, . . . , cn]{A} by rule Adversary (which holds for C ′, C ′′ by induction hy-
pothesis). By rule Seq, we get {A}C ′[c1, . . . , cn];C ′′[c1, . . . , cn]∼ C ′[c1, . . . , cn];C ′′[c1, . . . , cn]{A}
which is the same as {A}(C ′;C ′′)[c1, . . . , cn]∼ (C ′;C ′′)[c1, . . . , cn]{A} and thus finishes the proof in
this case.
Case C = if e then C ′ else C ′′: Since C is XY -local, we have that fv(e) ⊆ X. Thus
A ⊆ Cla[X1 = X2] ⊆ Cla[idx1 e = idx2 e]. Since the premises of the rule hold for C, they
also hold for the subterms C ′, C ′′. Thus we have {A}C ′[c1, . . . , cn]∼ C ′[c1, . . . , cn]{A} and
{A}C ′′[c1, . . . , cn]∼ C ′′[c1, . . . , cn]{A} by rule Adversary (which holds for C ′, C ′′ by induction hy-
pothesis). By rule Conseq, we get {Cla[idx1 e ∧ idx2 e] ∩A}C ′[c1, . . . , cn]∼ C ′[c1, . . . , cn]{A} and
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{Cla[¬ idx1 e ∧ ¬ idx2 e] ∩A}C ′′[c1, . . . , cn]∼ C ′′[c1, . . . , cn]{A}. Then, by rule JointIf, we get{
A
}
if e then C ′[c1, . . . , cn] else C ′′[c1, . . . , cn]∼ if e then C ′[c′1, . . . , c′n] else C ′′[c′1, . . . , c′n]
{
A
}
.
This is the same as {A}C[c1, . . . , cn]∼ C[c′1, . . . , c′n]{A} and thus proves the rule in this case.
Case C = while e do C ′: Since C is XY -local, we have that fv(e) ⊆ X. Thus A ⊆ Cla[X1 = X2] ⊆
Cla[idx1 e = idx2 e]. Since the premises of the rule hold for C, they also hold for the subterm C ′.
Thus we have {A}C ′[c1, . . . , cn]∼ C ′[c1, . . . , cn]{A} by rule Adversary (which holds for C ′ by induc-
tion hypothesis). By rule Conseq, we get {Cla[idx1 e ∧ idx2 e] ∩A}C ′[c1, . . . , cn]∼ C ′[c1, . . . , cn]{A}.
Then, by rule JointWhile, we get{
A
}
while e do C ′[c1, . . . , cn]∼ while e do C ′[c′1, . . . , c′n]
{
Cla[¬ idx1 e ∧ ¬ idx2 e] ∩A
}
.
This is the same as {A}C[c1, . . . , cn]∼ C[c′1, . . . , c′n]{Cla[¬ idx1 e ∧ ¬ idx2 e] ∩A}. By rule Conseq, we
get {A}C[c1, . . . , cn]∼ C[c′1, . . . , c′n]{A} and thus proved the rule in this case.
Case C = c: Since C is XY -local, c is XY -local and thus XYW -local. By rule Equal (with X := X,
Y := YW , c := c), we get{
Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Y1W1 ≡quant Y2W2)
}
c∼ c{Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Y1W1 ≡quant Y2W2)}.
Then, by rule Frame (with X1, X2 := XY , Y1, Y2 := X˜Z with indices removed from Z, c,d := c,
A,B := Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Y1W1 ≡quant Y2W2), and R := R), we get:{
Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Y1W1 ≡quant Y2W2) ∩R
}
c∼ c{Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Y1W1 ≡quant Y2W2 ∩R)}.
(The premises for Frame all follow from the premises of Adversary with C = c.) This is the same
as {A}c∼ c{A} and thus proves the rule in this case. 
B Supporting theorems
In this appendix, we prove several theorems that are not required for the use of qRHL but support
various motivational claims made in the paper.
B.1 Uniqueness of the quantum equality
In Section 1.2 and Section 4.4, we mentioned that we conjecture that the quantum equality defined there
(Definition 28) is the only notion of quantum equality (represented as a subspace) that has the following
property: {
Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Q1 ≡quant Q2)
}
c ∼ c{Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ (Q1 ≡quant Q2)}
(If X,Q are all the variables of c.) In this section, we give formal evidence for it. (Namely, while we
cannot show it for our definition of qRHL, we can show it for the variant from Definition 40.)
We present this claim in two variants: Lemma 70 shows that our quantum equality is the only
predicate that satisfies this property with respect to Definition 40. (Except for the predicate 0, which is
always false and satisfies the property trivially.) This lemma is specific to the definition of qRHL from
Definition 40.
Lemma 69 shows the claim in a more abstract form that is independent of the definition of qRHL
judgments. It states that our quantum equality is the only predicate such that:
(a) for all vectors ψ, proj(ψ ⊗ ψ) satisfies this predicate, and
(b) if ρ := proj(φ) satisfies the predicate, then the two marginals ρ1, ρ2 of ρ are equal.
(We omitted some variable renamings in this description.) This lemma may be useful when analyzing
quantum equality for other variants of qRHL, or in the context of completely different logics. (And this
lemma also constitutes the central argument used in the proof of Lemma 69.)
Note that for simplicity, we have derived those facts only for the finite dimensional case.
Lemma 68: Symmetric and conjugate-normal matrices [40]
Let M denote the space of all complex (n× n)-matrices. (M is a complex vector space.) Let C ⊆M
be the set of all conjugate-normal matrices (i.e., matrices A with AA∗ = A∗A where · denotes the
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element-wise complex conjugate). Let S ⊆ C denote all symmetric matrices. (Then S is a subspace
of M .) Assume that X is a subspace of M such that S ⊆ X ⊆ C. Then X = S.
Lemma 69
Let Q1 and Q2 be disjoint lists of distinct quantum variables with finite TypelistQ1 = Type
list
Q2 =: T .
Let E be a subspace of `2[Q1Q2] such that:
• For any ψ ∈ `2(T ), we have that Uvars,Q1ψ ⊗ Uvars,Q2ψ ∈ E.
• For any φ ∈ E, let ρ1 := tr[Q1]Q2 proj(φ) and ρ2 := tr[Q2]Q1 proj(φ). Then U∗vars,Q1ρ1Uvars,Q1 =
U∗vars,Q2ρ2Uvars,Q2 .
Then E = (Q1 ≡quant Q2).
Proof. Let n := |T | and T =: {t1, . . . , tn}. We have that Uvars,Q1 |ti〉 form a basis for `2[Q1] and
Uvars,Q2 |ti〉 form a basis for `2[Q2]. Thus any φ ∈ `2[Q1Q2] can be written as
φ =
∑
ij
aijUvars,Q1 |ti〉⊗ Uvars,Q2 |tj〉 with aij ∈ C.
Then let Aφ denote the (n× n)-matrix with entries aij . That is,
Aφ :=
∑
ij
aij |i〉〈j| =
∑
ij
(
〈ti|U∗vars,Q1 ⊗ 〈tj |U∗vars,Q2
)
φ · |i〉〈j|
where 〈j| denotes |j〉∗.
Let X := {Aφ : φ ∈ E}. Let S := {Aφ : φ ∈ (Q1 ≡quant Q2)}.
Claim 1 X is a subspace of the set of complex (n× n)-matrices.
Proof of claim. Immediate from the facts that E is a subspace, and that φ 7→ Aφ is linear. 
Claim 2 S is the set of symmetric matrices.
Proof of claim. Since φ 7→ Aφ is bijective, it suffices to show for all φ ∈ `2[Q1Q2] that Aφ is
symmetric iff φ ∈ (Q1 ≡quant Q2). Fix some φ ∈ `2[Q1Q2], and let φ =:
∑
ij aijUvars,Q1 |ti〉 ⊗
Uvars,Q2 |tj〉. Then aij are the entries of Aφ. We have
φ ∈ (Q1 ≡quant Q2)
⇐⇒ φ = (Uvars,Q2U∗vars,Q1 ⊗ Uvars,Q1U∗vars,Q2)φ
⇐⇒
∑
ij
aijUvars,Q1 |ti〉⊗ Uvars,Q2 |tj〉=
∑
ij
aijUvars,Q2 |ti〉⊗ Uvars,Q1 |tj〉
⇐⇒
∑
ij
aijUvars,Q1 |ti〉⊗ Uvars,Q2 |tj〉=
∑
ij
ajiUvars,Q1 |tj〉⊗ Uvars,Q2 |ti〉
⇐⇒ ∀i, j. aij = aji
⇐⇒ Aφ symmetric. 
Claim 3 S ⊆ X.
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Proof of claim. By assumption, φ := Uvars,Q1ψ ⊗ Uvars,Q2ψ ∈ E for any ψ ∈ `2(T ). Thus∑
ij
〈ti|ψ · 〈tj |ψ · |i〉〈j| =
∑
ij
(
〈ti|U∗vars,Q1 ⊗ 〈tj |U∗vars,Q2
)
(Uvars,Q1ψ ⊗ Uvars,Q2ψ) · |i〉〈j| = Aφ ∈ X.
In particular, with ψ := |ti〉, and with ψ := |ti〉+ |tj〉, we get
|i〉〈i| ∈ X and |i〉〈i|+ |j〉〈j|+ |i〉〈j|+ |j〉〈i| ∈ X for all i, j.
And since X is a subspace (Claim 1), also |i〉〈j|+ |j〉〈i| ∈ X.
Since the matrices |i〉〈i| and |i〉〈j|+ |j〉〈i| form a basis for the space of symmetric matrices, it
follows that all symmetric matrices are contained in X. By Claim 2, S is the set of all symmetric
matrices. Thus S ⊆ X. 
Let UT |i〉 := |ti〉 for i = 1, . . . , n. Then UT is unitary.
Claim 4 For any φ ∈ `2[Q1Q2], we have U∗vars,Q1
(
tr[Q1]Q2 proj(φ)
)
Uvars,Q1 = UTAφA
∗
φU
∗
T
Proof of claim. Let aij be the entries of Aφ. Then
φ =
∑
ij
aijUvars,Q1 |ti〉⊗ Uvars,Q2 |tj〉
and thus
U∗vars,Q1
(
tr[Q1]Q2 proj(φ)
)
Uvars,Q1
= U∗vars,Q1
(
tr[Q1]Q2
∑
ijkl
aija
∗
kl Uvars,Q1 |ti〉〈tk|U∗vars,Q1 ⊗
tr(·)=1 iff j=l, tr(·)=0 else︷ ︸︸ ︷
Uvars,Q2 |tj〉〈tl|U∗vars,Q2
)
Uvars,Q1
=
∑
ijk
aija
∗
kj |ti〉〈tk| = UT
(∑
ijk
aija
∗
kj |i〉〈k|
)
U∗T = UTAφA
∗
φU
∗
T . 
Claim 5 For any φ ∈ `2[Q1Q2], we have U∗vars,Q2
(
tr[Q2]Q1 proj(φ)
)
Uvars,Q2 = UTA
∗
φAφU
∗
T . (Where ·
denotes the element-wise complex conjugate.)
Proof of claim. Let aij be the entries of Aφ. Then
φ =
∑
ij
aijUvars,Q1 |ti〉⊗ Uvars,Q2 |tj〉
and thus
U∗vars,Q2
(
tr[Q2]Q1 proj(φ)
)
Uvars,Q2
= U∗vars,Q2
(
tr[Q2]Q1
∑
ijkl
aija
∗
kl
tr(·)=1 iff i=k, tr(·)=0 else︷ ︸︸ ︷
Uvars,Q1 |ti〉〈tk|U∗vars,Q1 ⊗Uvars,Q2 |tj〉〈tl|U∗vars,Q2
)
Uvars,Q2
=
∑
jil
aija
∗
il |tj〉〈tl| = UT
(∑
jil
aija
∗
il |j〉〈l|
)
U∗T = UTA∗φ AφU
∗
T = UTA
∗
φAφU
∗
T . 
Claim 6 Any A ∈ X is conjugate-normal. (Cf. Lemma 68.)
Proof of claim. If A ∈ X, then A = Aφ for some φ ∈ E (by definition of E).
Then U∗vars,Q1(tr
[Q1]
Q2
proj(φ))Uvars,Q1 = U
∗
vars,Q2
(tr[Q2]Q1 proj(φ))Uvars,Q2 . (This is one of the as-
sumptions of the lemma.) By Claim 4 and Claim 5, this implies UTAφA∗φU
∗
T = UTA
∗
φAφU
∗
T .
Since UT is unitary, this implies AφA∗φ = A∗φAφ. Thus A = Aφ is conjugate-normal by definition.

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Claim 7 X = S.
Proof of claim. Let M denote the space of all complex (n × n)-matrices, and C the set of all
conjugate-normal matrices. By Claim 2, S is the set of all symmetric matrices. By Claim 3, we
have S ⊆ X, and by Claim 6, we have X ⊆ C. X is a subspace by Claim 1. Thus by Lemma 68,
X = S. 
Since X = S by Claim 7, we have {Aφ : φ ∈ E} = {Aφ : φ ∈ (Q1 ≡quant Q2)} by definition of X
and S. Since φ 7→ Aφ is injective, this implies E = (Q1 ≡quant Q2). 
Lemma 69 only gives an abstract characterization of ≡quant. It leaves open whether it is the only
notion of quantum equality that satisfies natural rules when used in qRHL judgments. While we were
unable to show this for our notion of qRHL (Definition 35), we were able to show it for the variant of
qRHL presented in Definition 40 which does not require the initial state and final state to be separable:
Lemma 70
Let Q ⊆ V qu be a list of distinct quantum variables with finite TypelistQ . Let Qi := idxiQ.
Let EQ1,Q2 be a Q1Q2-local predicate that satisfies rule Equal with respect to the qRHL definition
from Definition 40. That is, for EQ1,Q2 the following rule holds:
X is a list of classical variables
Q is a list of distinct quantum variables c is XQ-local Xi := idxiX Qi := idxiQ{
Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ EQ1,Q2
}
c∼ c{Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ EQ1,Q2}nonsep
Then EQ1,Q2 = (Q1 ≡quant Q2) or EQ1,Q2 = 0.
Proof. Assume that EQ1,Q2 6= 0. Since EQ1,Q2 is Q1Q2-local, we have that EQ1,Q2 = E′ ⊗
`2[V qu1 V
qu
2 \Q1Q2] for some E′ 6= 0.
Claim 1 Uvars,Q1ψ ⊗ Uvars,Q2ψ ∈ E′ for all ψ ∈ `2(TypelistQ ).
Proof of claim. Without loss of generality, we can assume that ψ is a unit vector. From the
rule in the lemma, we get {EQ1,Q2}Q q← ψ ∼ Q q← ψ{EQ1,Q2}. Fix some φ ∈ EQ1,Q2 . From the
semantics of Q q← ψ, we get:
ρ′1 := Jidx1(Q q← ψ)K(tr[V1]V2 proj(φ)) = proj(Uvars,Q1ψ)⊗ ρ′′1
ρ′2 := Jidx2(Q q← ψ)K(tr[V2]V1 proj(φ)) = proj(Uvars,Q2ψ)⊗ ρ′′2
for some positive ρ′′1 , ρ′′2 with tr ρ′′1 = tr ρ′′2 = 1.
By definition of qRHL judgments, there is a ρ′ such that tr[V1]V2 ρ
′ = ρ′1 and tr
[V2]
V1
ρ′ = ρ′2
and supp ρ′ ⊆ EQ1,Q2 = E′ ⊗ `2[V qu1 V qu2 \Q1Q2]. From tr[V1]V2 ρ′ = ρ′1 and tr[V2]V1 ρ′ = ρ′2, it
follows that ρ′ = proj(Uvars,Q1ψ ⊗ Uvars,Q2ψ) ⊗ ρ′′ for some positive ρ′′ with tr ρ′′ = 1. So
supp ρ′ = supp
(
proj(Uvars,Q1ψ ⊗ Uvars,Q2ψ)⊗ ρ′′
) ⊆ E′⊗`2[V qu1 V qu2 \Q1Q2]. Hence Uvars,Q1ψ⊗
Uvars,Q2ψ ∈ E′. 
Claim 2 For any φ ∈ E′, let ρ˜1 := tr[Q1]Q2 proj(φ) and ρ˜2 := tr[Q2]Q1 proj(φ). Then U∗vars,Q1 ρ˜1Uvars,Q1 =
U∗vars,Q2 ρ˜2Uvars,Q2 .
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Proof of claim. Assume for contradiction that for some φ ∈ E′ the claim does not hold. Then
U∗vars,Q1 ρ˜1Uvars,Q1 6= U∗vars,Q2 ρ˜2Uvars,Q2 . Hence there is a projector P such that
p1 := trPU
∗
vars,Q1 ρ˜1Uvars,Q1 6= trPU∗vars,Q2 ρ˜2Uvars,Q2 =: p2. (97)
From the rule in the lemma, we get
{Cla[x1 = x2] ∩ EQ1,Q2}c∼ c{Cla[x1 = x2] ∩ EQ1,Q2}nonsep (98)
where c := x←measure Q with M and Typex := B and M ∈ Meas(B,TypelistQ ) is the mea-
surement with M(true) = P and M(false) = 1− P .
Fix some normalized basis state ψ1 ∈ `2[V1 \Q1x1], ψ2 ∈ `2[V2 \Q2x2]. Let ρ :=
proj(φ⊗ ψ1 ⊗ ψ2 ⊗ |false〉x1 ⊗ |false〉x2). Note that ρ satisfies Cla[x1 = x2] ∩ EQ1,Q2 .
ρ′1 := Jidx1(x←measure Q with M)K(tr[V1]V2 ρ)
= Jx1 ←measure Q1 with MK(ρ˜1 ⊗ proj(|false〉x1 ⊗ ψ1))
(∗)
= proj(|true〉x1)⊗ Uvars,Q1PU∗vars,Q1 ρ˜1Uvars,Q1PU∗vars,Q1 ⊗ proj(ψ1)
+ proj(|false〉x1)⊗ Uvars,Q1(1− P )U∗vars,Q1 ρ˜1Uvars,Q1(1− P )U∗vars,Q1 ⊗ proj(ψ1). (99)
Here (∗) follows from the semantics of x1 ←measure Q1 with M .
And analogously
ρ′2 := Jidx2(x←measure Q with M)K(tr[V2]V1 ρ)
= proj(|true〉x2)⊗ Uvars,Q2PU∗vars,Q2 ρ˜2Uvars,Q2PU∗vars,Q2 ⊗ proj(ψ2)
+ proj(|false〉x2)⊗ Uvars,Q2(1− P )U∗vars,Q2 ρ˜2Uvars,Q2(1− P )U∗vars,Q2 ⊗ proj(ψ2)
Since ρ satisfies Cla[x1 = x2]∩EQ1,Q2 , from (98) it follows that there is a ρ′ such that tr[V1]V2 ρ′ = ρ′1
and tr[V2]V1 ρ
′ = ρ′2 and supp ρ′ ⊆ Cla[x1 = x2] ∩ EQ1,Q2 . Since supp ρ′ ⊆ Cla[x1 = x2], it follows
that ρ′ = proj(|true, true〉x1x2) ⊗ ρ′true + proj(|false, false〉x1x2) ⊗ ρ′false for some ρ′true, ρ′false.
Hence
ρ′1 = tr
[V1]
V2
ρ = proj(|true〉x1)⊗ tr[V1\x1]V2\x2 ρ′true + proj(|false〉x1)⊗ tr[V1\x1]V2\x2 ρ′false
With (99), it follows that
Uvars,Q1PU
∗
vars,Q1 ρ˜1Uvars,Q1PU
∗
vars,Q1 ⊗ proj(ψ1) = tr[V1\x1]V2\x2 ρ′true (100)
and hence
p1
(97)
= trPU∗vars,Q1 ρ˜1Uvars,Q1 = tr
(
Uvars,Q1PU
∗
vars,Q1 ρ˜1Uvars,Q1PU
∗
vars,Q1 ⊗ proj(ψ1)
)
(100)
= tr tr[V1\x1]V2\x2 ρ
′
true = tr ρ
′
true.
Analogously,
p2 = tr ρ
′
true.
Thus p1 = p2 in contradiction to (97). 
From Claim 1 and Claim 2, it follows that the preconditions of Lemma 69 (with Q1 := Q1, Q2 := Q2,
E := E′) are satisfied. Thus E′ = (Q1 ≡quant Q2).
Then E = E′ ⊗ `2[V qu1 V qu2 \Q1Q2] = (Q1 ≡quant Q2)⊗ `2[V qu1 V qu2 \Q1Q2] = (Q1 ≡quant Q2). (Here
the first Q1 ≡quant Q2 is the equality predicate over V qu1 V qu2 \Q1Q2, while the second Q1 ≡quant Q2 is
the equality predicate over V qu1 V
qu
2 .) 
Lemma 70 does not, in this form, hold for the definition of qRHL that we actually use (Definition 35).
For example Eq,q′ := span{|01〉qq′ + |01〉qq′} satisfies the rule from Lemma 70 for that definition. Why?
Eq,q′ contains no separable states, therefore the only separable ρ that satisfies Eq,q′ is ρ = 0. Thus, in
terms of which states satisfy it, Eq,q′ is equivalent to 0, and thus
{Cla[x1 = x2] ∩ EQ1,Q2}c ∼ c{Cla[x1 = x2] ∩ EQ1,Q2}
holds trivially (since the precondition is not satisfiable). However, that does not violate the spirit of
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Lemma 70 because Eq,q′ is essentially 0 as far as Definition 35 is concerned, not a different predicate.
More formally, we say A ≈ B iff for all separable ρ ∈ T+cq [V1V2], we have that ρ satisfies A iff ρ
satisfies B. Then Eq,q′ ≈ 0. With this notation, we can formulate the conjecture that with respect to
Definition 35, ≡quant is still essentially the only equality notion:
Conjecture 71 Let Q ⊆ V qu be a list of distinct quantum variables with finite TypelistQ . Let Qi := idxiQ.
Let EQ1,Q2 be a Q1Q2-local predicate that satisfies rule Equal. That is, for EQ1,Q2 the following
rule holds:
X is a list of classical variables
Q is a list of distinct quantum variables c is XQ-local Xi := idxiX Qi := idxiQ{
Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ EQ1,Q2
}
c ∼ c{Cla[X1 = X2] ∩ EQ1,Q2}
Then EQ1,Q2 ≈ (Q1 ≡quant Q2) or EQ1,Q2 ≈ 0.
We do not know whether this conjecture holds. If we try to use the same proof as for Lemma 70,
we run into the problem that Claim 2 holds only for separable φ. This in turns means that we need a
stronger version of Lemma 69 where the second condition holds only for separable φ ∈ E. And this in
turn means that Claim 6 does not hold, instead we only have that every A ∈ X of rank 1 is conjugate-
normal. (Because Aφ has rank 1 iff φ is separable.) And then we cannot apply Lemma 68 any more. (A
variant of Lemma 68 that requires X ∩R ⊆ C instead of X ⊆ C, and that shows X ∩R = S ∩R instead
of X = S would do the trick (where R is the set of rank 1 matrices).)
We leave a proof or counterexample for Conjecture 71 as an open problem.
B.2 On predicates as subspaces
In this section, we formally prove the claim made in Section 1.2 that predicates described by subspaces
are the only predicates that are closed under linear combinations and linear decompositions (at least in
the finite dimensional case):
Lemma 72
Let X be finite. Let A ⊆ T+(X). Assume that for all ρ1, ρ2 ∈ T+(X), and p1, p2 ≥ 0, we have
p1ρ1 + p2ρ2 ∈ A ⇐⇒ ρ1, ρ2 ∈ A. (101)
Then there exists a subspace S ⊆ `2(X) such that A = {ρ ∈ T+(X) : supp ρ ⊆ S}.
Proof. Let S :=
⋃
ρ∈A supp ρ ⊆ `2(X).
Claim 1 If ψ ∈ S, then αψ ∈ S for all α ∈ C.
Proof of claim. Immediate since supp ρ is a subspace for all ρ. 
Claim 2 If ψ1, ψ2 ∈ S, then ψ1 + ψ2 ∈ S.
Proof of claim. Since ψ1 ∈ S, we have ψ1 ∈ supp ρ1 for some ρ1 ∈ A. Hence ρ1 = α proj(ψ1) +
ρ′1 for some α ∈ C, ρ′1 ∈ T+(X). Thus proj(ψ1) ∈ A by (101). Analogously proj(ψ2) ∈ A.
Furthermore,
proj(ψ1 + ψ2) + proj(ψ1 − ψ2) = 2proj(ψ1) + 2proj(ψ2)
(101)∈ A.
Thus (again with (101)), we have proj(ψ1 + ψ2) ∈ A. Thus ψ1 +ψ2 ∈ supp proj(ψ1 + ψ2) ∈ S. 
Claim 3 S is a subspace.
Proof of claim. Since X is finite, this follows from Claim 1 and Claim 2. 
Claim 4 A ⊆ {ρ ∈ T+(X) : supp ρ ⊆ S} =: B.
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Proof of claim. For any ρ ∈ A, we have supp ρ ⊆ S by definition of S. Thus ρ ∈ B. 
Claim 5 B ⊆ A.
Proof of claim. Fix some ρ ∈ B. Then supp ρ ⊆ S. Thus we can write ρ = ∑i proj(ψi) for
finitely many ψi ∈ S. (Finitely many, since X is finite.) Since ψi ∈ S, we have that there are
ρi ∈ A with ψi ∈ supp ρi. Thus ρi = proj(ψi) + ρ′i for some ρ′i ∈ T+(X). Hence proj(ψi) ∈ A
by (101). Hence ρ =
∑
i proj(ψi) ∈ A by (101). 
The lemma follows from Claim 3, Claim 4, and Claim 5. 
B.3 Non-existence of quantum equality for uniform qRHL
Lemma 73
Let q ∈ V be a quantum variable with |Typeq| = 3. Assume that there is a classical variable x ∈ V
with |Typex| = 1. Let E ⊆ `2[V qu1 V qu2 ] be a q1q2-local predicate. Assume that the following rule
holds:
c is q-local
{E}c ∼ c{E}uniform
Then E = 0.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that E 6= 0.
Given a vector ψ ∈ `2[q], we use the shorthand idxi ψi := Urename,σiψ where σi maps q to qi. That
is, idx1 ψ, idx2 ψ are the same vector as ψ, except in `2[q1], `2[q2], respectively.
Since E is q1q2-local, there is an E′ ⊆ `2[q1q2] such that E = E′ ⊗ `2[V1V2 \ q1q2].
Claim 1 For all ψ ∈ `2[q], we have proj(idx1 ψ)⊗ proj(idx2 ψ) ∈ E′.
Proof of claim. Without loss of generality, ‖ψ‖ = 1.
Let cψ := (q
q← ψ). By assumption of the lemma, we have {E}cψ ∼ cψ{E}uniform. Let E be
a witness for this judgment. Since E 6= 0, there is a non-zero γ ∈ E. Let ρ := proj(γ). Then ρ
satisfies E. Let ρ′ := E(ρ). Then ρ′ satisfies E and we have ρ′i = Jidxi cψK(ρi) where ρ′1 := tr[V1]V2 ρ′,
ρ′2 := tr
[V2]
V1
ρ′, ρ1 := tr
[V1]
V2
ρ, ρ2 := tr
[V2]
V1
ρ.
By definition of cψ, we have that ρ′i = Jidxi cψK(ρi) = proj(idxi ψ) ⊗ ρ∗i for some non-zero
ρ∗i . Thus tr
[V1]
V2
ρ′ = proj(idx1 ψ) ⊗ ρ∗1 and tr[V2]V1 ρ′ = proj(idx2 ψ) ⊗ ρ∗2. Hence ρ′ = proj(idx1 ψ) ⊗
proj(idx2 ψ) ⊗ ρ∗12 for some nonzero positive ρ∗12. Fix a non-zero φ ∈ supp(ρ∗1 ⊗ ρ∗2). Then
idx1 ψ ⊗ idx2 ψ ⊗ φ ∈ supp ρ′ ⊆ E. Hence idx1 ψ ⊗ idx2 ψ ∈ E′ 
We define vectors ψ˜i ∈ `2[q]:
ψ˜1 :=
(
0
1
2
)
, ψ˜2 :=
(
2
1
0
)
, ψ˜3 :=
(
1
1
1
)
, ψ˜4 :=
(
1
2
3
)
, ψ˜5 :=
(
3
2
1
)
, ψ˜6 :=
(
3
4
5
)
.
(Here we identify `2[q] with C3.) Let ψi := ψ˜i/‖ψi‖. Let
α1 := 25, α2 := −15, α3 := −162, α4 := −147, α5 := 49, α6 := 250 and P :=
(
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
)
.
Claim 2
∑
i αi proj(idx1 ψi)⊗proj(idx2 ψi) = 0 and
∑
i αi proj(idx1 Pψi)⊗proj(idx2 Pψi)/‖Pψi‖2 6= 0.
Proof of claim. This is shown by explicit calculation. Sage [43] code for performing the
calculation can be found here: http://tinyurl.com/yb7g7xge. 
Let M ∈ Meas(Typex,Typeq) be the measurement with M(z) = P for z ∈ Typex. (Recall that
Typex has only one element.) Let cM := (x ← measure q with M). Note that cM is q-local,
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even though x occurs in cM . This is because x can take only one possible value, so x is not actu-
ally modified by cM . By assumption of the lemma, {E}cM ∼ cM{E}uniform. Let E be a witness for
{E}cM ∼ cM{E}uniform.
Let φ ∈ `2[V1V2 \ q1q2] be an arbitrary vector with ‖φ‖ = 1.
Claim 3 For any non-zero ψ ∈ `2[q], we have
tr[q1q2]V1V2\q1q2E
(
proj(idx1 ψ)⊗ proj(idx2 ψ)⊗ proj(φ)
)
= proj(idx1 Pψ)⊗ proj(idx2 Pψ)/‖Pψ‖.
Proof of claim. Let ρ∗ denote the lhs of the claim.
By Claim 1, proj(idx1 ψ)⊗proj(idx2 ψ) ∈ E′, thus ρ := proj(idx1 ψ)⊗proj(idx2 ψ)⊗proj(φ) ∈ E.
Since E is a witness for {E}cM ∼ cM{E}uniform, this implies that tr[V1]V2 E(ρ) = Jidx1 cM K(tr[V1]V2 ρ).
Thus
tr[q1]q2 ρ
∗ = tr[q1]V1\q1tr
[V1]
V2
E(ρ) = tr[q1]V1\q1Jidx1 cM K(tr[V1]V2 ρ)
= tr[q1]V1\q1Jidx1 cM K(proj(idx1 ψ)⊗ tr[V1\q1]V2\q2 proj(φ))
(∗)
= tr[q1]V1\q1
(
proj(idx1 Pψ)⊗ tr[V1\q1]V2\q2 proj(φ)
)
= proj(idx1 Pψ).
Here (∗) follows from the semantics of x←measure q with M .
Analogously, tr[q2]q1 ρ
∗ = proj(idx2 Pψ). Thus ρ∗ = proj(idx1 Pψ)⊗ proj(idx2 Pψ)/‖Pψ‖2. 
Finally, we have
0 = tr[q1q2]V1V2\q1q2E(0)
Claim 2
= tr[q1q2]V1V2\q1q2E
(∑
i
αi proj(idx1 ψi)⊗ proj(idx2 ψi)⊗ proj(φ)
)
=
∑
i
αi tr
[q1q2]
V1V2\q1q2E
(
proj(idx1 ψi)⊗ proj(idx2 ψi)⊗ proj(φ)
)
Claim 3
=
∑
i
αi proj(idx1 Pψi)⊗ proj(idx2 Pψi)/‖Pψi‖2
Claim 2
6= 0.
Thus we have 0 6= 0, a contradiction. Hence our initial assumption E 6= 0 was false. 
Symbol index
D(B) Distributions on B
D[V ] D(TypesetV ) – Distributions on Type
set
V 11
Iso(X,Y ), Iso(X) Isometries from `2(X) to `2(Y ) (on `2(X)) 12
Iso[V,W ], Iso(V ) Isometries from `2[V ] to `2[W ] (on `2[V ]) 12
x←measure q1 . . .qn with e Statement: Measure quantum variables q1 . . .qn with
measurement e
14, 15
B Booleans. B = {true, false} 11
`2(B) Hilbert space with basis indexed by B 11
`2[V ] `2(TypesetV ) – Hilbert space with basis Type
set
V 12
U(X,Y ),U(X) Unitaries from `2(X) to `2(Y ) (on `2(X)) 12
U[V,W ],U(V ) Unitaries from `2[V ] to `2[W ] (on `2[V ]) 12
fv(e) Free variables in an expression e (or program) 13, 14
Typeexpe Type of an expression e 14
{F}c∼ c′{G}uniform qRHL judgment, uniform definition 36
{F}c∼ c′{G}nonsep qRHL judgment, non-separable definition 6, 36
A∗ Adjoint of the operator A 12
id Identity 11
{F}c∼ c′{G} Quantum relational Hoare judgment 27
|b〉, |b〉V Basis vector in Hilbert space `2[V ] 11, 12
B≤1(X,Y ) Bounded linear operators with operator norm ≤ 1 12
B(X,Y ) Bounded linear operators from `2(X) to `2(Y ) 12
idV Identity on `2[V ] or on B[V ] 12, 12
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B[V,W ] Bounded linear operators from `2[V ] to `2(W ) 12
A÷ ψ Part of A containing ψ 19
m1m2 Union (concatenation) of memories m1, m2 11
suppM Support of an operator M 12
marginali(µ) i-th marginal distribution of µ (for µ ∈ D≤1(X × Y ), i =
1, 2)
11
x← e Program: assigns expression e to x 14, 15
suppµ Support of distribution µ 11
Meas(D,E) Projective measurements on `2(E) with outcomes in D 13
Uvars,Q Canonical isomorphism between `2(TypelistQ ) and `2[Type
set
Q ]
for a list Q
13
S⊥ Orthogonal complement of subspace S 12
idx1 c, idx1 e Add index 1 to every variables in c or e 27
V cl Classical variables in V 11
TypelistV Type of a list V of variables 11
T+[V ] Positive trace class operators on `2[V ] 12
T[V ] Trace class operators on `2[V ] 12
R Real numbers 11
C Complex numbers 11
D≤1[V ] Sub-probability distributions over variables V 11
D≤1(X) Sub-probability distributions over X 11
A⊗B Tensor product of vectors/operators A and B 12, 12, 12
T+(X) Positive trace class operators on `2(X) 12
T(X) Trace class operators on `2(X) 12
R≥0 Non-negative real numbers 11
{F}c∼ c′{G}class pRHL judgement (classical) 33
tr[V ]W (ρ) Partial trace, keeping variables V , dropping variables W 12
imA Image of A 11
dom f Domain of f 11
‖x‖ `2-norm of vector x, or operator-norm 11
trM Trace of matrix/operator M 12
Cla[e] Classical predicate meaning e = true 19
spanA Span, smallest subspace containing A 11
X1 ≡quant X2 Equality of quantum variables X1 and X2 21
proj(x) Projector onto x, i.e., xx∗ 12
V qu Quantum variables in V 11
TypesetX Type of a set V of variables 11
bxc x rounded down to the next integer
2M Powerset of M 11
AdvAPRG(η) Advantage of adversary A in PRG-OT-CPA game with
security parameter η
43
AdvA1A2ROR (η) Advantage of adversary A1, A2 in ROR-OT-CPA game
with security parameter η
42
a ◦e b Composition of expressions a, b as relations 30
Time(A) Worst-case runtime of A
N Natural numbers
R1 ◦R2 Composition of relations 11
d A program 14
c A program 14JcKclass Classical denotation of a program c 15JcK Denotation of a program c 15
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if e then c1 else c2 Statement: If (conditional) 15
skip Program that does nothing 14
x
$← e Statement: Sample x according to distribution e 14, 15
while e do c Statement: While loop 14, 15
apply q1 . . .qn to U Statement: Apply unitary/isometry U to quantum regis-
ters q1 . . .qn
14, 15
q1 . . .qn
q← e Statement: Initialize q1, . . . ,qn with quantum state e 14, 15
A»Q Lifts operator or subspace to variables Q 18
E A superoperator 12
T+cq [V ] Positive trace class cq-operators on `2[V ] 12
lift(µ) Transforms a distribution µ into a density operator 16
true Truth value “true” 11
false Truth value “false” 11
↓e(ρ) Restrict state/distribution ρ to the case e = true holds 15, 16
c;d Sequential composition of programs 15
Tcq [V ] Trace class cq-operators on `2[V ] 12
δx Point distribution: returns x with probability 1 11
|x| Absolute value of x / cardinality of set x
Typev Type of variable v 11JeKm Denotation of a classical expression e, evaluated on classi-
cal memory m
13
y A classical program variable 11
x A classical program variable 11
f |M Restriction of function f to domain M 11
e{f/x} Substitute f for variable x in e 14
eσ, cσ Apply variable renaming σ to expression e 14
Erename,σ cq-superoperator: Renames variables according to bijec-
tion σ
13
Urename,σ Unitary: Renames variables according to bijection σ 13
Pr[e : c(ρ)] Probability that e holds after running c on initial state ρ 16
f(x := y) Function update, i.e., (f(x := y))(x) = y 11
q A quantum program variable 11
Index
adjoint, 12
advantage
PRG, 43
ROR-OT-CPA, 43
Adversary (rule), 33
Assign1 (rule), 39
basis
computational, 11
Case (rule), 38
classical
program, 15
semantics, 15
classical variable, 11
computational basis, 11
conjugate-normal, 76
Conseq (rule), 38
context
multi-hole, 33
coupling
quantum, 6
cq-operator, 12
cq-superoperator, 12
distribution, 11
subprobability, 11
total, 11
Equal (rule), 38
expression, 13
expressions holds, 14
Frame (rule), 38
holds
expression, 14
If1 (rule), 39
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JointIf (rule), 39
JointMeasure (rule), 40
JointMeasureSimple (rule), 40
JointSample (rule), 39
JointWhile (rule), 39
local
predicate, 18
program, 16
Measure1 (rule), 40
measurement
total, 13
multi-hole context, 33
operator, 11
cq-, 12
partial trace, 12
predicate, 17
local, 18
satisfy, 17
PRG advantage, 43
program
(classical), 15
local, 16
well-typed, 14
program variable, 11
classical, 11
quantum, 11
projector, 12
QApply1 (rule), 40
QInit1 (rule), 40
QrhlElim (rule), 38
QrhlElimEq (rule), 38
quantum
semantics, 15
quantum coupling, 6
quantum variable, 11
readonly, 20
renaming
variable, 11
ROR-OT-CPA, 42
advantage, 43
Sample1 (rule), 39
satisfy
predicate, 17
semantics
classical, 15
quantum, 15
separable, 12
Seq (rule), 38
Skip (rule), 39
span, 11
subprobability distribution, 11
subspace, 11
superoperator, 12
cq-, 12
Sym (rule), 38
total
distribution, 11
measurement, 13
program, on A, 19
trace, 12
partial, 12
trace-class, 12
Trans (rule), 38
TransSimple (rule), 38
variable
classical, 11
program, 11
quantum, 11
variable renaming, 11
well-typed (program), 14
While1 (rule), 39
witness, 36
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